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T. F. TORRANCE, M.B.E., D.D., D.THEOL.
J. K. S. REID, B.D.

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Editors:

Rev. Prof. T. F. Torrance, M.B.E., D.D., D.Theol.,
21 South Oswald Road, Edinburgh, 9 (Telephone 46114)

Rev. Prof. J. K. S. Reid, D.D.,
44 Headingley Mount, Leeds, 6 (Telephone 56853)

Consulting Editors:

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THE CHRISTOLOGY OF D. M. BAILLIE

by The Rev. Professor J. H. HICK

The purpose of this article is to appraise the Christological suggestion offered by the late D. M. Baillie in *God Was In Christ* (1948), to the effect that the Incarnation was the supreme instance of 'the paradox of grace'. I propose, first, to define, from the standpoint of credal orthodoxy, the central task of Christology; second, to remind the reader of the features of Baillie's thought in this field; third, to offer a criticism of his theory in the light of the desideratum noted in the first section; and fourth, by distinguishing two different aspects of the problem of the Incarnation, to suggest wherein lies the positive value of D. M. Baillie's contribution.

I

The central task of Christology is to give meaning to the dogma that Jesus of Nazareth was both God and Man. The two parts of this programme are manifestly of unequal difficulty. The meaning of the statement that Jesus was a man is clear enough. The contemporary criteria for 'Jesus is a man' were the same as for 'Peter (or James or John) is a man'. But the meaning of the statement that Jesus was God—or, in its full trinitarian specification, that Jesus was God the Son Incarnate—is by no means so easily ascertained.

The problem appears less intractable if the Christological dogma is rephrased in adjectival form: Jesus was both human and divine. However, this reformulation has been the starting-point of many errors. For an adjective names a quality or universal, which may be present in different objects in varying degrees. Accordingly, to say that Jesus was divine, i.e. possessed the quality of divinity, is not to say unequivocally that Jesus was God, nor does it exclude the humanistic interpretation that all men are divine, but Jesus in a uniquely full degree. Yet both this assertion and this exclusion are inherent in the 'high' Christology of the ecumenical creeds. Thus from the point of view of historic orthodoxy, 'the divinity of Christ' is an uncertain

banner. The more exact phrase, which is for that reason to be preferred, is 'the deity of Christ'. For deity means God-ness. And 'God' is for theists, as D. M. Baillie points out, not a common noun but a proper name. It is not the title of a class, not even of a unit class, but is the proper name of an individual. Thus 'the deity of Christ' is analogous to 'the John Smith-ness of the man next door'. It does not attribute a universal or general characteristic, but on the contrary identifies a particular individual. D. M. Baillie notes, on grounds of New Testament usage, the impropriety of the term 'divine' when applied to Jesus, and concludes: 'it is more congenial to Christian theology to say that Jesus is God (with the further refinements of meaning provided by the doctrine of the Trinity) than to speak of Him as divine' (p. 82).

The word 'divine' can of course nevertheless be used, and frequently is used, to state the Christology of the creeds. That is to say, 'Christ was divine' is often employed to express what would be unambiguously expressed by 'Christ was God'. 'Divine' operates, in such a case, grammatically as an adjective, but logically as a substantive. For it is used with the rider that Jesus was divine not merely in a unique degree but in a unique sense. He was divine in the sense in which God is divine. He was not, therefore, more divine than other men, not even infinitely more divine than they; for in the sense in which he was divine other men are not divine at all. But this substantival use of 'divine' is more efficiently expressed by a substantive, namely 'deity'.[1]

There remains to be considered the sense of 'divine' in which divinity is not equivalent to deity. In this purely adjectival sense, all men can meaningfully be said to be divine. For God operates within as well as upon men; and some have expressed this fact by saying that all men are (or may be) divine. Human beings are divine, that is to say, in that, and in so far as, God works within them. Here 'being divine' is equated with the activity of the divine Spirit in a man's soul. When the word is so used it is no doubt correct, though liable to be misleading,

[1] The word 'divine' can of course be used unambiguously when the context indicates clearly that 'the divine *x*' means 'God's *x*', as when one speaks of the divine love or the divine purpose. To apply 'divine' as an adjective to the deity would be to use it meaninglessly—as in the celebrated but vacuous pronouncement, 'The divine is rightly so-called.'

to affirm that Jesus was divine in a uniquely full degree. For in His complete obedience to the Father, and His unreserved openness to God's guidance, He was perfectly and continuously what other men are only imperfectly and fragmentarily. He was a man—the only man—who has fulfilled the divine intention for human life.

But although as a man Jesus was divine in this adjectival sense, and divine in a unique degree, this is not what the creeds are concerned to assert of Him. When the Nicene symbol (followed by the Chalcedonian definition) speaks of Christ as ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρί, it is obviously not meant that Jesus was divine in the same manner as other men, but in much fuller measure. For the point of insisting that the Son is ὁμοούσιος with the Father was that Jesus, and He alone, could win men's salvation. Faith in Jesus was faith not in a man but in God. In other words, the creed-makers were concerned to assert the deity of Christ.

That the creeds do indeed claim deity for Christ is made clear by their use of the idea of substance. This concept, which at one time seemed so clear and adequate, has since acquired an odour of ambiguity and metaphysical pretension which has led to its disappearance from the working vocabulary of contemporary philosophy. Whether a new concept will have to be commissioned to carry the main burden of Christology (perhaps a concept which is dynamic in the sense in which 'substance' is static), or whether the notion of substance can be satisfactorily redefined, remains to be seen. But in any case the fundamental intention of the creed-makers is clear enough, and is not affected by our modern objection to the term 'substance'. The intention expressed in the phrase ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρί was to assert continuity of life, being, nature, existence between Jesus and the Godhead, whilst implying a discontinuity in the same category between man and the Godhead. Thus the creeds sought to accord to Christ a unique status adequate as the basis for Christian soteriology.

This ontological continuity and discontinuity are best defined in terms of the dogma of creation. God is Creator; man is created. The act of creation thus gives rise to an irremovable distinction; for it can never become true that a being which has been created has not been created. And the dogma of the

deity of Christ may accordingly be stated by saying that Jesus was not only (as are other men) continuous with the created world, but was also continuous with that which lies on the other side of the creative act, continuous with the divine activity towards the created universe. As human, Jesus was continuous with the natural world; as divine, He was continuous with the life of the Godhead.

Accordingly the task of any Christology which intends to serve the historic faith of the ecumenical creeds is to illumine for modern man the conception of the deity of Christ—or, more cumbrously, of the substantival as distinguished from the adjectival divinity of Christ. How does D. M. Baillie's Christology fare in relation to this task?

II

In expounding his Christology, D. M. Baillie first refers to the great paradoxes of the Christian faith—the paradox of creation,[1] the paradox of providence (all events are both naturally and divinely caused), and above all the paradox of grace (our good deeds express our own free choices and yet are also acts of God). He describes the paradox of grace more fully as follows:

> Its essence lies in the conviction which a Christian man possesses, that every good thing in him, every good thing he does, is somehow not wrought by himself but by God. This is a highly paradoxical conviction, for in ascribing all to God it does not abrogate human personality nor disclaim personal responsibility. Never is human action more truly and fully personal, never does an agent feel more perfectly free, than in those moments of which he can say as a Christian that whatever good was in them was not his but God's. (p. 114)

This paradox of grace, Baillie suggests, is our best clue to an understanding of the Incarnation:

> What I wish to suggest is that this paradox of grace points the way more

[1] This does not appear to be a true instance of paradox in the sense in which Baillie has defined the term, namely as 'a self-contradictory statement' (p. 110). (The formula is a condensation of the fuller definition which he quotes from Father Sergius Bulgakov, in which a paradox, or antinomy, is described as a statement which 'simultaneously admits the truth of two contradictory, logically incompatible, but ontologically equally necessary assertions' (pp. 108-9, quoting Bulgakov, *The Wisdom of God*, p. 116 note)). That God created all things *ex nihilo* is not a self-contradictory statement; it does not contain within itself logically incompatible components. It is 'paradoxical' only in the sense that it is empirically unverifiable and therefore *de fide*.

clearly and makes a better approach than anything else in our experience to the mystery of the Incarnation itself; that this paradox in its fragmentary form in our own Christian lives is a reflection of that perfect union of God and man in the Incarnation on which our whole Christian life depends, and may therefore be our best clue to the understanding of it. In the New Testament we see the man in whom God was incarnate surpassing all other men in refusing to claim anything for Himself independently and ascribing all the goodness to God. We see Him also desiring to take up other men into His own close union with God, that they might be as He was. And if these men, entering in some small measure through Him into that union, experience the paradox of grace for themselves in fragmentary ways, and are constrained to say, 'It was not I but God,' may not this be a clue to the understanding of that perfect life in which the paradox is complete and absolute, that life of Jesus which, being the perfection of humanity, is also, and in an even deeper and prior sense, the very life of God Himself? If the paradox is a reality in our poor imperfect lives at all, so far as there is any good in them, does not the same or a similar paradox, taken at the perfect and absolute pitch, appear as the mystery of the Incarnation?

(pp. 117-18)

This is a highly interesting suggestion, constituting perhaps the most original contribution to Christology in the past decade. Does it, I wish now to inquire, succeed in its central task of making intelligible the dogma of the deity of Christ?

III

Orthodox Christology treads the straight and narrow path between losing Christ's humanity in His divinity and losing His divinity in His humanity. These are the two opposing errors which Christian thought has always been determined to avoid. D. M. Baillie clearly has the intention of standing in the orthodox succession. He wishes to illumine the faith that 'while the life lived by Jesus was wholly human, that which was incarnate in Him was of the essence of God, the very Son of the Father, very God of very God' (p. 151). However, it is not difficult to discern on which side of the path Baillie's thought is most liable to stray. He writes eloquently about the full and true humanity of our Lord, not merely as Man but as *a* man. In this he is at one with (and has himself helped forward) the sound reaction of twentieth-century thinking against what might be called the higher docetism of much nineteenth-century theology. But a pendulum can swing back past the point of equilibrium. In re-emphasising one side of the truth there is always a possibility of unduly under-emphasising the other.

And Baillie's temptation is, not indeed to overstate Christ's humanity, but to understate His deity. For the essence of Baillie's suggestion is that 'God was in Christ' in the sense in which He is in all good men, namely as inspiring them, through the paradox of His grace within them, to good works. Good deeds are, Baillie points out, always both divine and human. And 'if these must be described on the one hand as human achievements, and yet on the other hand, and in a deeper and prior sense, as *not* human achievements but things actually wrought by God—is it not the same *type* of paradox, taken at the absolute degree, that covers the whole ground of the life of Christ, of which we say that it was the life of a man and yet also, in a deeper and prior sense, the very life of God incarnate?' (p. 129). This union of the human and the divine, which occurs in other men's lives only imperfectly and intermittently, was manifested in the life of Jesus completely and continuously. What in other men is inspiration amounted in Christ to Incarnation.

Thus far Baillie's theory is an elucidation of the adjectival concept of divinity. He offers a meaning for the statement that Jesus was divine in the same sense as, but in far higher degree than, other men. So far, then, his theory has not encompassed the distinctive Christological dogma of the creeds. For it is not the Nicene or the Chalcedonian claim that God was in Christ in the sense in which He is in all men, but in Christ to a unique extent. The Nicene and Chalcedonian position is that God was in Christ in a unique sense which is not approximated or paralleled in the case of any other human life.

The danger, it would therefore seem, towards which Baillie's suggestion tends is that of assimilating too unreservedly the divine presence in Jesus to the divine presence in all good men, or in all men in so far as they are good. However, Baillie was fully aware of this danger, and took steps to avoid it. There is an element in his theory which seeks to retain for Christ a unique status and soteriological significance, whilst holding to the paradox-of-grace theory of his divinity. 'If God in some measure lives and acts in us,' he says, 'it is because first, and without measure, He lived and acted in Christ' (p. 128). This thought is also expressed in the longer passage quoted above, in which Baillie speaks of the paradox of grace in the Christian

as 'a reflection of that perfect union of God and man in the Incarnation on which our whole Christian life depends' (p. 117). In other words, the situation is not correctly described by saying that God's mode of being 'in Christ' is a supreme instance of His manner of being in all men, but rather the reverse, God's mode of being in us is derivative from His being in Christ. Because He was fully and perfectly in Christ He is able to be in us too, in so far as we ourselves are 'in Christ'. Instead of the mystery of the Incarnation being a case of the paradox of grace in general Christian experience, this itself is a partial reproduction of the supreme mystery of grace in the Incarnation.

Baillie is undoubtedly making use here of an important New Testament truth concerning the presence of God in the believer; and he cites some of the relevant Johannine and Pauline passages. But does this biblical truth give support to his theory?

The paradox of grace upon which Baillie's position is based is a wider phenomenon than the Christian life. It is exemplified in all good deeds, whether wrought by Christ's disciples or by others. Baillie argues, no doubt rightly, that the reflective interpretation of the paradox of grace, in the concept of God as both demanding all and giving all, is peculiar to Christianity (pp. 122-3). But this is not to say that the actual occurrence of good deeds, to which the paradox-of-grace idea applies, is peculiar to Christianity. We may as Christians have the only adequate interpretation of moral goodness, but we do not have a monopoly of moral goodness itself. It would be quite impossible to sustain a view of the paradox of grace as an exclusively Christian phenomenon. There have been acts of self-sacrificing love, of unselfish service, of courageous witness to the right, prior to and outside of the sphere of the Christian revelation and faith. Have not such deeds exhibited the character which Baillie calls the paradox of grace, the character of being free human actions and yet at the same time gifts of the divine enabling grace? If this question is answered in the negative, it will follow that pagan saints have achieved without divine help what Christian saints have only been able to achieve with that help. But if on the other hand we recognise, as we must, the paradox of grace as transcending the boundaries of Christianity—as a human rather than an exclusively Christian phenomenon—then we are no longer able to relate it causally

to the Incarnation. We cannot say that the paradox of grace in other men is derived from or dependent upon its supreme instance in the life of Jesus. And hence the attempt to preserve a unique position for Christ as the source of the paradox of grace in others does not succeed. Baillie is left occupying the unsatisfactory position that Christ's uniqueness is one of degree —degree of divinely enabled moral achievement.

This rather central inadequacy in D. M. Baillie's theory implies, in spite of his strenuous denials, an adoptionist Christology. This can be brought out in the form of a dilemma, one horn of which is the undermining of the purpose of the Incarnation, whilst the other is a form of Adoptionism. These alternatives are generated by the application to the Incarnation of the paradox of grace in its two possible interpretations. On the one hand the paradox might be viewed as a vehicle of predestination, by which God determines man's choices even whilst such choices remain, from a human point of view, free and responsible decisions. As many passages indicate, this is not Baillie's own understanding of the paradox of grace. But in his determination to preserve the uniqueness of the Incarnation as wholly a divine act, not at any point dependent upon man, he comes very close to this predestinarian interpretation, and allows it to spread a film of protective ambiguity over his argument. It is therefore necessary to unpack the implications of this view, in order to rule it emphatically out and thereby drive the argument on to the other horn of the dilemma. The traces of this predestinarian view appear in Baillie's repeated emphasis upon the priority of the divine element in the paradox of grace. Speaking of Jesus' continual obedience to God's will, he says that 'in the last analysis such human choice is never prevenient or even co-operative, but wholly dependent on the divine prevenience' (p. 131). Taken without qualification, this represents so close an approach to the thought of an irresistible divine grace as to imperil the whole conception of God as respecting man's freedom and autonomy, upon which the doctrine of the divine *incognito* in the Incarnation rests. For Baillie's statement, with its denial even of human co-operation in moral achievement, suggests that God is able at will to produce right choices in men without infringing their freedom. But if this were so— if God were able, compatibly with human autonomy, to inspire

all men at all times freely to choose in accordance with His will—there would have been no such occurrence as sin, no occasion for redemption, and no need for the Incarnation.

Baillie would not (as I have already acknowledged) wish to subscribe to this predestinarian interpretation of the paradox of grace, or to the conclusion to which it points. To exclude this interpretation, however, enables us now to formulate unambiguously the view to which Baillie is committed, and to draw out its consequences. Baillie describes admirably the paradoxical interpenetration of grace and freedom:

> When I make the wrong choice, I am entirely responsible, and my conscience condemns me. And yet (here is the paradox) when I make the right choice, my conscience does not applaud or congratulate me. I do not feel meritorious or glow with self-esteem—if and in so far as I am a Christian. Instead of that I say: 'Not I, but the grace of God.' Thus while there is a human side to every good action, so that it is genuinely the free choice of a person with a will, yet somehow the Christian feels that the other side of it, the divine side, is logically prior. The grace of God is prevenient. (p. 116)

This is very different from a predestinarian picture of the divine grace as being in no way limited by human freedom. Baillie is not saying in this passage that God can, without infringing our human autonomy, *cause* men to choose rightly. He is simply saying that when, in the mystery of personal freedom, a man does choose rightly, what he has done is to allow the divine grace to operate within him. We can do wrong by ourselves, but we can only do right by surrendering to the grace of God; and this grace is always available, always the prior condition of a man's good works. The important point for our present purpose is that, in contrast to the predestinarian view, on this more moderate interpretation of the paradox of grace God is not able (without retracting His gift of freedom) to cause a man to choose rightly, although when he does so choose his choice is at once taken up into and is inextricably interpenetrated by the prevenient divine activity.

How does this doctrine of grace bear upon the problems of Christology? God is, we must suppose, seeking all the time to impart to men His enabling grace, whilst men make varying and imperfect responses. However, in the long course of God's dealings with men there came from the human side, nearly two

thousand years ago, a perfect response to God, a complete obedience to His will, so that every act of Christ's combined both the divine prevenient grace and a free human moral choice. This union of divine and human activities constituted the Incarnation. The first man to be wholly transparent to the divine grace was *ipso facto* the 'Son of God'.

This would be a doctrine of what might be called continuous adoption. From the beginning Jesus made right moral choices, so that His entire life constituted the conjunction of divine grace with a complete human receptivity to that grace. The difference between this and traditional Adoptionism is that, according to the latter, the man Jesus lived a perfect human life, until at the age of 30 He was for that reason adopted as the vehicle of the divine Logos; whereas Baillie's view involves that the adoption was coterminious with Christ's life, and represented not so much an arbitrary and dateable divine fiat as a truth of definition. For the paradox of grace in perfect operation *is* incarnation.

This, I suggest, is the position which Baillie's theory entails when the paradox of grace is construed in a non-predestinarian manner. And the theological objection to such a view, as to the older Adoptionism, is the very serious demurrer that it denies the deity of Christ, and so provides no adequate foundation on which to build the remainder of the fabric of Christian belief.

Baillie was conscious that criticisms of this kind would be offered, and he attempted to forestall them. He accordingly posed the question, 'Would *any* man who lived a perfect life be therefore and thereby God incarnate?' And he answered:

> But such a questioner would indeed be a Pelagian, showing by his very question that he regarded the human side of the achievement as the prevenient, the conditioning, the determinative. When we really accept the paradox of grace, when we really believe that every good thing in a man is wrought by God, when we have really understood the confession: 'I . . . yet not I, but God,' and have taken the divine priority in earnest, the question loses its meaning, and, like the proposed dilemma, fades away into the paradox of the Incarnation. (p. 131)

Now why does the question lose its meaning when we acknowledge the divine priority in the paradox of grace? What connexion does Baillie have in mind? His reasoning appears to be

that the divine grace, and only this, can cause a man continuously to choose rightly and so to live a perfect life; and that God has restricted this highest grace to Jesus: so that it would be Pelagian to speak of anyone else living a perfect life. This argument does indeed rule out the question which Baillie wishes to rule out, but only by falling back upon the predestinarian interpretation of the paradox of grace. For Baillie's position now entails that God could have influenced all men, without overriding their freedom and responsibility, in such manner that they would live perfect lives. This would be a return to the first horn of the dilemma, which shows how the Incarnation was possible, but at the cost of making it needless. The only alternative is to give a frankly affirmative answer to the original query: any man who lived a perfect life *would* therefore and thereby be God incarnate. This is the conclusion to which Baillie is committed, and from which he tries in vain to dissociate himself. But to think of the incarnation in such wise that any man who, divinely graced, lived a perfect human life, would thereby be God incarnate, is to define incarnation in terms, not of deity, but of divinity adjectivally construed, and is to fail in the task of restating the faith of the creeds for the modern world.

IV

I have argued so far that D. M. Baillie's theory does not perform the central Christological task of giving meaning to the dogma of the deity of Christ. Regarded as an attempt to do this, his treatment of the subject must be judged inadequate. But this is an unsatisfying conclusion; for there is undeniable power in Baillie's suggestion, if one can only isolate within the problem of the Incarnation the particular aspect to which the paradox of grace is relevant. This can, I am sure, be done, although I am far from sure that it is done satisfactorily in what follows.

There are two aspects to the total fact of the Incarnation. There is first the *incarnatum*, the historical phenomenon of the life of the incarnate Son. The theological task here is to describe and analyse this unique phenomenon. The kind of suggestions that have from time to time been offered are that Jesus' body was illusory (Docetism); that whilst His σῶμα and ψυχή were

human, His νούς or πνεῦμα was the divine λογός (Apollinarianism); and so on, through the long list of both heretical and orthodox speculations. It is to this problem of the *incarnatum* that D. M. Baillie's paradox-of-grace Christology is relevant. It throws light, perhaps more helpful light than has hitherto been provided, upon the 'divine-human psychology' of the incarnate Son, pointing out that in Him, and in Him alone, the paradox of grace is found at its height.

The other aspect of the Incarnation requires a verbal form, *incarnatio*. This refers not to the historical fact of the incarnate life, but to the trans-historical noumenon of God's act of incarnating. What does it mean for God to *become* man? Traditional answers include the doctrine of the Virgin Birth, the Kenotic theory, and, amongst the celebrated failures to explain, Adoptionism. If Baillie's suggestion is treated as a solution to this problem of the *incarnatio*, then, I have argued, it fails.

I do not want to suggest that the distinction between *incarnatio* and *incarnatum*, as I have drawn it, is entirely clear, or that it is of more than very limited use. At a certain level the dichotomy breaks down and the two problems merge into one. But it does point to two distinguishable aspects of the problem of the Incarnation, by reference to which many Christological theories can be classified. And it appears to me that when D. M. Baillie's suggestion is seen as dealing with the topic not of *incarnatio* but of *incarnatum*, it is to be welcomed as of very considerable value. It does not explain what it means for God to become man; but given this divine act, Baillie's theory makes a statement which is both true and important concerning the man who was God incarnate.

MYTHOLOGY AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE

by The Rev. Professor JOSEPH C. McLELLAND

Daniel Lamont, I think it was, once remarked that theologians should read more poetry. This insight into the nature of theological language has profound relevance for our contemporary concern with the problem of communicating the Gospel to modern man. Theology, as language about God, may be regarded in one sense as faced with an impossible task: 'The maker and father of this Universe it is difficult to discover; nor, if he were discovered, could he be declared to all men.'[1] This hiddenness of the divine being is reflected even in the historical beginnings of the biblical revelation, in the cryptic tautology, 'I am that I am' (Exod. 3.14). Yet the fact of revelation was taken to mean, within Israel at least, not that the divine aseity was now compromised, but that this very self-sufficiency was revealed in terms of a purpose of love towards this people. The revelation was instrumental to the fulfilment of that purpose: the divine condescension used creaturely forms to communicate its truth and life to men. Therefore the theological language which sets forth this communicative revelation will be proportionately indirect or analogical.

Historical theology, however, indicates a subtle yet profound shift in emphasis. Philo felt quite free to describe God as beyond all imperfections and perfections; and the theologian who had as much influence on medieval thought as did Augustine, namely St. Denis,[2] gives classic shape to the same idea, which we may quickly sketch as follows. God alone knows Himself and therefore alone can make Himself knowable. His self-revelation in Scripture shows that He speaks of Himself in terms borrowed from creatures that represent Him in various ways. To name God from the names of creatures involves theology in a threefold operation. The first moment is affirmative theology, which gives positive (creaturely) names to God,

[1] Plato, *Timaeus*, 28c.

[2] As Gilson now happily calls the pseudo-Dionysius (*History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Random House, p. 81).

but which cannot give positive content because they apply differently to Him. Negative theology therefore follows, since 'the sacred writers celebrate (God) by every Name while yet they call Him nameless'.[1] St. Denis' *Mystical Theology* thus consists of ascending orders of negatives, concluding with the statement, 'It transcends all affirmations by being the perfect and unique Cause of all things, and transcends all negation by the pre-eminence of Its simple and absolute nature—free from every limitation and beyond them all.'[2] Now through his works there emerges a third 'speculative theology', the definition of God as 'Hyper-Being' or 'Super-Essential Godhead'[3]; nevertheless since knowledge seeks an Object that transcends being, ignorance remains the highest form of knowing God,[4] while the goal of faith is mystical union with That which is truly revealed only in 'This Darkness which is beyond Light'.

Two assumptions were bequeathed to medieval theology by this kind of teaching: that God's transcendence means God's impassibility, and that revelation implies the relationship between model and image, but not necessarily a form of personal encounter. We might with some degree of truth suggest that the Reformers attacked the second assumption while contemporary theology is engaged in a re-evaluation of the first. The theology of the Reformers was an attempt to get behind both the Greek idea of model and image and the Latin idea of nature and grace, to the biblical category of revelation as the 'holy history' of God's activity in and upon man's flesh. The creaturely forms of that revelation, roughly equivalent to the 'names' with which Denis began, were therefore not patent of such motion and remotion as he had imagined, but were understood as existing in a positive relationship to the divine reality which had used them as instruments or 'means of grace'. Since it was the Incarnation which expressed this relationship in an archetypal way, it was the *unio hypostatica* of the Person of Christ that the Reformers too, as point of departure in their overthrow of the Romanist confusion of substances in the doctrines of

[1] *De div. nom.*, I.5 (Migne, P-G 3). [2] *De myst. theol.*, V.

[3] Moreover, Denis accepts the Platonic teaching that 'the Good' most nearly names God. His two works on the Celestial and Ecclesiastical Hierarchies describe this world ordered by the circulation of the Good.

[4] 'Est item divinissimae Dei notitiae, quae per nescientiam accipitur . . .' (*De div. nom.*, VII.3).

Church and Sacrament. Both Papacy and Mass were attacked on this ground, that they inverted the polarity of revelation—the human forms had become docetic.

The Reformers were concerned to show that the divine revelation was constituted as humiliation and exaltation for a twofold reason: in loving accommodation to our creaturely perceptiveness, and to our human sinfulness.[1] This twofold *ratio* means that Christian knowledge is bound to history in a decisive way, since this Man's history is the ground of human ability to know God; and it means that this same history of Israel and its Lord subsumes and qualifies all other history. But most significant of all is the fact that as accommodation or condescension, revelation implies a gap in the relationship between human forms and divine content, so to speak—a gap overcome not by any natural analogy of being but by the distinctive office of the Holy Spirit. Thus the language of theology is always characterised by an *impropriety*, and is applicable to the divine being only in an indirect or analogical manner. It was in their doctrine of the Sacraments that the Reformers worked this out, for what was at stake was the true humanity of the mediating forms of revelation and grace. But the distinctively Reformed emphasis, which has relevance to our modern situation, is best illustrated in terms of the Lutheran-Reformed controversy concerning the mode of Christ's presence in the Eucharist.

The doctrine of the Eucharist had proved the stone of stumbling to unity between Lutheran and Reformed as early as Marburg (1529), when agreement was reached on fourteen points of theological debate, while the question of the Supper prevented Luther from accepting Zwingli's hand of friendship. The divergence became most acute in the next generation, when Calvin against Westphal and Heshusius, and Peter Martyr and Zanchi against Marbach and Brentius, opposed the doctrines of consubstantiation and the ubiquity of Christ's body. The question concerned the *communicatio idiomatum*—are the

[1] One of the most striking passages in Calvin about this concept of revelation as *accommodatio* is quoted by T. F. Torrance (*Kingdom and Church*, Oliver and Boyd, p. 127): 'God comes down to *earth* that He may raise us up to *heaven*. . . . He condescends to our ignorance. Therefore when God prattles (*balbutit*) to us in Scripture in a rough and ready style, let us know that this is done on account of the love He bears to us' (*Comm. on John*, 3.12).

qualities or properties of Christ's divinity transferable *simpliciter* to His humanity? The Lutherans affirmed such a communication, and ridiculed the Reformed position: the circumscription of a glorified body, the concern for spatiality and locale, the idea of 'a golden chair beside the Father' as Luther himself had scornfully put it. Now the Reformed position had begun as a middle way between Lutheran and 'Zwinglian', for Calvin had defended Luther's extreme language by commenting, 'it is difficult to give an explanation of so high a matter without using some impropriety of speech.'[1] But the subsequent debate fostered increasing enmity and vilification, until even Martin Bucer was suspect among the Lutherans, while after his death all hope of unity seemed lost.

For our purpose here, we should note Calvin's comment on Ephesians 1.20, of which he reminds Heshusius, in order 'to dissipate the mists'[2]: 'This passage, if any, shows plainly what is meant by the right hand of God, namely not a place, but the power which the Father has bestowed upon Christ. . . .' Two things emerge from the debates: that the ascended body of Christ retains its bodily nature, having 'its own dimensions'; but also that this dimensional being of the new humanity of Christ is not simply or directly an extension of this-worldly dimensions. This latter point is decisive. For example, in Peter Martyr's debate with Brentius, the latter objects[3]: 'I marvel greatly that in beginning, you cannot shake off thoughts of the dimensions of geometry, when there is dispute about the body of Christ.' He goes on to accuse Martyr of hiding the body of Christ 'in a dark corner of heaven'. It is then that Martyr makes explicit the Reformed position as dimensional thinking beyond the limits of geometric or astronomic science: 'if we indeed comprehend that region called heaven, it may happen that the body is not discovered at all . . . if you define such a place with reference to the daily revolution of the earth, then your absurdity needs no answer.'[4]

Martin Bucer held a similar view: the Christian's communion

[1] *Short Treatise on the Holy Supper* of 1541.
[2] *The True Partaking of the Flesh and Blood* of 1561.
[3] In Martyr's *Dialogus de Utraque in Christo natura*, 1561, fol. 4c, 75d.
[4] Cf. Calvin, *True Partaking*: Heshusius 'sharply rejects what he terms the physical axiom, that one body cannot be in different places. . . . This is to dismember the body, and refuse to lift up the heart.'

with Christ, for instance, is a mystery that transcends reason, so that human terminology expresses it only metaphorically.[1] Therefore although Bucer agrees that the truth of Christ's risen humanity is to be insisted upon, he will not have the idea of a local heaven made a necessary doctrine, but prefers the negative form of speech: 'not of this world, not of sense, not of reason'.[2] It is here that we discover the relevance of this historical controversy to another controversy, supposedly the child of modern scientific man—namely, the problem described by Rudolf Bultmann as that of *Entmythologisierung*. For that older controversy was settled, for the Reformed party at least,[3] by the conclusion that the objective-historical form of revelation must be maintained as truly human at its crucial point, even though this true humanity is not to be misconstrued as a simple extension of worldly dimensions.

This conclusion suggests a failure on Bultmann's part, in applying his concept of 'myth'[4] to 'the event of Jesus Christ' in the radical way that he does—a failure to distinguish properly between the analogical nature of revelation, and the 'improper' nature of the theological interpretation of the analogated means of grace. That is, the question is not whether an irreducible minimum of objective-historical data about Jesus is necessary for Christian faith—Bultmann himself observes that 'His person is just what the New Testament proclaims as the decisive event of redemption'[5]—but whether the human forms and worldly patterns assumed in divine revelation are themselves part of the ultimate 'event of Jesus Christ'. Bultmann is aware of the 'unique combination of history and myth'[6] that is the Gospel, even as he is aware of the analogical nature of 'the language of

[1] *Exomologesis, sive confessio . . . de s. Euch.*, 1560, in the *Scripta Anglicana*, pp. 538-45.

[2] Letter to Calvin on the *Consensus Tig.*—*Corp. Ref.*, XLI, *Ioan. Calv. Op.*, vol. XIII, pp. 350ff.

[3] In this less passionate age we may agree that both sides were after the same goal, as Bucer himself had maintained until his dying day. Karl Barth regards the whole Lutheran-Reformed controversy as an unhappy emphasis of each side of the *unio hypostatica*, or rather of its positive and negative principles (*Kirchliche Dogmatik*, I.2, 1938, section 15.2, 'Wahrer Gott und Wahrer Mensch', pp. 145-87).

[4] *New Testament and Mythology* (in *Kerygma and Myth*, ed. Bartsch, tr. Fuller, S.P.C.K., 1953), p. 10, note 2: 'Mythology is the use of imagery to express the otherworldly in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms of this side.'

[5] ibid., p. 14.

[6] ibid., p. 34; cf. p. 110, On Thesis IVB.

the act of God',[1] and therefore many of his critics are fighting straw men in fearing that this is simply the old idealism in a new form.

A worthier critique, it seems to me, would lie along the following lines. First must come a consideration of Bultmann's basic *Fragestellung*, which appears to think of modern man as caught in a scientific trap of twentieth-century origin. Surely the problem is older, at least as old as the sixteenth-century Reformers.[2] That is to say, Bultmann's statement, 'it is no longer possible for anyone seriously to hold the New Testament view of the world. . . . No one who is old enough to think for himself supposes that God lives in a local heaven . . . we can no longer accept the story of Christ's descent into hell or His Ascension into heaven as literally true',[3] received serious consideration and judgment in that age too, as we have suggested. It is notorious that Calvin 'demythologised'[4] the article of the *descensus ad inferos* as popularly involving 'this fable' of 'a subterraneous cavern to which they have given the name of *Limbus*'. Again, the right hand of God is described as 'a similitude borrowed from princes', while of Christ's Session he writes, 'the present question relates, not to the position of His body, but to the majesty of His dominion.'[5] But for Calvin, the reason for such impropriety of theological language was to be found in the accommodative nature of revelation and the corresponding office of the Holy Spirit, who upholds both sides of the event of revelation, of the language of theology and of the action of liturgy.

Perhaps just here, in the concept of *Spirit*, do we find Bultmann's hermeneutic problem. He defines 'Spirit' as 'the possibility of a new life which is opened up by faith', and writes concerning Paul's teaching, 'the concept "Spirit" has been emancipated from mythology.'[6] John Macquarrie has already pointed out that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is 'one of the

[1] *Bultmann Replies to his Critics* (*Kerygma and Myth*), p. 196.

[2] Cf. John Baillie's thesis in *Natural Science and the Spiritual Life*, Oxford, 1951, concerning the relationship between the change in the doctrine of God and His relation to the world, and the revolution that gave birth to modern science.

[3] *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 4.

[4] *Inst.*, 2.16.9—Calvin's alternative would probably be classified by Bultmann as *re*mythologising: 'Therefore it is no wonder, if He be said to have descended into hell, since He suffered that death which the wrath of God inflicts on transgressors.'

[5] *Inst.*, 2.16.15.

[6] op. cit., p. 22.

obvious gaps in Bultmann's theological exposition'.[1] Is this the clue to his problem, which he acknowledges as lying in the application of the doctrine of justification by faith to the field of epistemology?[2] That is, does what the older theology understood as 'the office of the Holy Spirit' ease the tension between the objective-historical and the existential-historical in Bultmann's analysis? Only in part, we must say, for Bultmann's adherence to the methodology of *Formgeschichte* has crucial relevance at this point. That is, surely he has been virtually robbed of the Synoptic Gospels as theological[3] data, so that his preoccupation with the Pauline literature is inevitable? For the latter can thus be interpreted in isolation from the other New Testament 'theologies' as Christian anthropology.

These critical comments suggest that Bultmann's problem lies in his analysis of the structure of divine mediation. It may be in order to remind ourselves that it was no accident that Kierkegaard's antidote to Lessing's error about the significance of history for eternal truth was a Christian existentialism, and that this same Kierkegaard saw in Hegel the high priest of a cult of demythologisers who threatened the basic scandal of the Christian revelation, namely *the Deity in Time*.[4] Indeed, we may have in Hegel and the Hegelians a historical illustration of the way Bultmann's critics fear he will go. For Hegel's spiritualising or rationalising or demythologising of the divine truth led Feuerbach to the decision that religion is but the deification of man, that theology is anthropology.

Positively, must we not refresh ourselves at the deep wells of Reformation theology, with its insistence that the hypostatic union of the divine and the human in Jesus Christ is the *archetypus* of theological speech, and that the new humanity of the risen Lord provides us with a kind of third dimension beyond our abortive antinomies and dichotomies of thought? Thus we should say to St. Denis that God is both anonymous and poly-

[1] *An Existentialist Theology*, S.C.M., 1955, p. 244; cf. p. 220. But cf. Bultmann, op. cit., p. 204, note 2: 'The love of God is not a phenomenon whose apprehension leaves a man the same as he was before. Hence even the apprehension itself must be attributed to the operation of the Holy Ghost.'

[2] op. cit., p. 211.

[3] Not merely 'historical' data, for their character as *Kleinliteratur* begs the question of the objective-historical 'event of Jesus Christ' in terms of the life-situations of the primitive Christian communities. But just how do we get back to the *Sitz im Leben* of Jesus Himself?

[4] In the *Fragments* and *Postscript*.

onymous, but that above all He is uniquely named in this composite, divine-human, Hebrew-Greek name of 'Jesus Christ'. Theology is not symbolical or metaphorical, but analogical or ectypal. It is of more than historical interest, moreover, that Augustine understood the Trinitarian doctrine to be the catharsis of anthropomorphism and mythology precisely because it articulated personality in the Godhead. For this unique divine-human event not only circumscribes theological language, but positively directs its line of analogical inference. The theologian today is called to a 'depth exegesis' of the distinctively Christian dimension, the new humanity of Jesus Christ. The real scandal and problem for theological science is raised neither by the Virgin Birth nor by the events of Good Friday and Easter Sunday, but by the *Ascension*. For this infinite recession into the being of God happens to a crucified and risen humanity, so that the problem is not so much that of mythopoeic limitation or direction but of the specifically biblical doctrine of 'sign' or 'mystery'. Jesus is not transformed into a kind of 'megaphone or loud-speaker' whose words sound down the ages,[1] but is revealed as the divine-human Person continuing as personally operative in spite of and because of his new dimension of existence.

To speak of 'ectypal theology' and of 'dimensions' is to acknowledge our debt to Bultmann, for every sermon is such an attempt to translate the content of the faith into the living analogies of our contemporaries, for their 'upbuilding'. The work of Karl Heim comes to mind here, for like Bultmann, he is convinced that the language of today 'is after all bound to be scientific language'.[2] Therefore Heim has chosen the category of the *dimension* as that which is clarified by science and able to point towards the reality of Christian faith. Beginning with the fact that geometry, for instance, knows different 'kinds' of spaces with different kinds of laws, he distinguishes I-space and It-space in the manner of existential philosophy, but then proceeds to use this dimensional thinking to enlighten the nature

[1] As E. Bevan describes Bultmann's picture of Jesus: *Symbolism and Belief*, p. 273. Yet in fairness to Bultmann we must point out that his concern is to distinguish the reporter from the herald, and that he does not equate demythologisation with dehistoricisation: he wants the history of God 'to take place in itself (*an sich*) instead of conceiving it (*sich vorstellen*) in accordance with the subject-object pattern' (F. Gogarten, *Demythologising and History*, p. 67).

[2] Pascual Jordan, quoted by Heim, *Christian Faith and Natural Science*, p. 162.

of faith's object. The omnipresence of God is described as 'a space, indeed (as) the archetypal space, which forms the eternal counterpoise to the totality of all polar spaces'.[1] Just as we live in and from these polar spaces with their intra-mundane relationships, so Christian faith is the mode by which we live in and from the new dimension: 'Just as we stand with our entire existence in the physical world, so now we stand in the supra-polar sphere and we become invested with all the powers which here are present all around us.'[2]

In such a way might we describe the new humanity in and from which we live, the reality of these 'heavenly places' of which theology speaks, as a kind of 'fifth dimension' of reality. This would not be understood as a simple extension of our four-dimensional space-time continuum,[3] but as a new dimension of reality existing in a tangential relationship to it, so that only its 'edge', so to speak, has direct contact with it. This edge would be apprehended as the means of grace, corresponding to the analogical direction of revelation itself. But within this new dimension of reality there is 'real' space and 'real' time because there is *new* space and *new* time. Thus the true and new humanity of our Risen Lord is preserved apart from false ideas borrowed *simpliciter* from this world. To sit in these 'heavenly places' and to experience this 'communion of saints' might also have more meaning in these terms.

No doubt there is a risk in every such attempt at selecting the most appropriate language for one's generation; yet here perhaps is one indication of the way in which we may help the doctrine of the Ascension and Session to be 'understanded of the people' without losing, through de- or re-mythology, the reality of that new Humanity which is our life.

[1] ibid., p. 177—cf. the more basic inquiry in *God Transcendent*, Nisbet, 1936.
[2] *The Transformation of the Scientific World View*, p. 148.
[3] The doctrine of analogy itself assists us here, for it demands (according to St. Thomas) a 'likeness of proportion' along with a 'difference of proportion', so that this new dimension is not simply identical with a fifth dimension, but is *like* (and *un*like) a fifth.

LUTHER'S CONCEPTION OF THE CHURCH

by The Rev. C. CYRIL EASTWOOD

The Preaching of the Word

Article vii of the Augsburg Confession of 1530 contains a definition of the Church the substance of which was adopted by most of the Protestant Confessions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including the Articles of the Church of England and the Confessions of the Free Churches: 'The Church is the congregation of the saints, in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the Sacraments rightly administered. And for the true unity of the Church it is sufficient to agree about the teaching of the Gospel and the administration of the Sacraments, nor is it necessary to have everywhere like human traditions, whether rites or ceremonies instituted by man.'[1]

Luther proclaimed it 'for certain, and firmly established that the soul can do without everything except the Word of God'. This implies that the Church is inextricably related to the Gospel and the Sacraments and cannot exist without them. It means that the Word is constitutive of the Church. In what sense does the Word create the Church? Bishop Newbigin considers that this view has been accepted too easily in Protestantism and that some of its implications have been overlooked. He points out, for instance, that in the Amsterdam volume on the doctrine of the Church, Karl Barth commences every key paragraph with the phrase: 'The congregation (*ecclesia*) is an event (*Ereignis*)', and the Bishop makes the following comment upon it[2]: 'The immediate relation of the Church in every moment of its being to its living Lord could not be more powerfully expressed. But there seems to be no place in the picture for a continuing historical institution, nor for any organic relation between congregations in different places and times. In so far as the Church possesses the character of a continuing institution it seems, on this view, to have fallen away from its

[1] *Documents of the Church*, 295, ed. by Bettenson.
[2] Newbigin, *The Household of God*, 50.

proper centre. The eschatological has completely pushed out the historical.' What does the phrase 'the Church is an event' mean? Professor Schlink elucidates Dr Barth's point: 'Thus the Church is constituted by the event (*Ereignis*), of the preaching of the Gospel and the administering of the Sacraments, and so by Christ Himself acting through and present in Gospel and Sacraments.'[1] Bishop Newbigin maintains that this view has led to two distortions in Protestant teaching, namely, to an over-intellectualising of the content of the word 'faith', which in turn has resulted in the setting of Word and Sacraments in isolation over against the continuing life of the fellowship; and secondly, it has led to the virtual disappearance of the idea of the Church as a visible fellowship. The proclamation of correct doctrine does not of itself constitute the Church. Such proclamation presupposes a believing congregation, and if a response in faith is lacking, the Church does not exist. But the response of a believing people is impossible apart from the working of the Holy Spirit. It follows that at least two other factors are required in order to constitute a congregation, in addition to the proclaimed Word; these are—the working of the Holy Spirit and the awakening of faith in the believer. All three factors have been operative in many places and in many generations. These truths are not absent in Luther's teaching. We shall inquire then what Luther says on the content of the word 'faith' and on the idea of the Church as a visible unity. We shall observe, in the first place, that the clauses in Article VII leave no doubt that the Reformers believed that the Gospel and Sacraments were operative *in* the congregation of believers and not apart from it.

(*a*) Gospel and Sacraments are *in* the congregation of believers the means by which the Holy Spirit arouses faith, effects the assembling of believers.[2]

(*b*) Gospel and Sacraments are *in* the congregation of believers the service imposed upon it and discharged by it. The Church is 'the mother who conceives and bears individual Christians through the Word of God' (*Greater Catechism*, II, 42).

It is the mission of the Christian ministry, in its administration of the Word and Sacraments, to convey this Gospel to every soul, and to arouse a corresponding faith. If this faith is

[1] *The Nature of the Church*, 61, ed. by Flew. [2] ibid., 59.

not aroused, we cannot be incorporated in Christ and we can have no part in the congregation of believers. The Church is being created by the preaching of the Gospel, but even this presupposes the response of faith. In fact, the Church equals justification by faith in action. Faith does not exist in itself. It means listening to a Gospel which is preached and receiving Sacraments which are given. In Luther's view faith never exists alone. The exterior Word must always be there and the Holy Spirit is active through the proclamation of the Gospel. Not only is the fellowship of believers dependent upon the proclaimed Word; it is the result of it. Since the fellowship of believers cannot exist without the exterior Word, it follows that it does not exist apart from the Ministry. The Ministry is not placed, however, above the Church but *in* the Church. According to the Episcopal view the Ministry is placed above the Church. In Luther's view the Ministry is placed in the congregation. This involves a different conception of grace from that which is held by those who accept the Episcopal view. For Luther, grace is God's favour expressed in the Gospel. Where there is faith in the Gospel, there is a listening congregation. Faith and Gospel are like two hands being shaken. The Church suffers whenever they are separated.

According to the Roman view, however, grace is not the favour of God expressed in the Gospel, but supernatural power in the Sacraments and this has no relation to faith. Such supernatural power does not require faith to make it effective, it operates by the intrinsic authority which it is supposed to possess. Now when grace is thought of as a supernatural transforming power, it is necessary to believe in a hierarchy which possesses this authority and power. The reason for this is not difficult to find. Authority cannot be mediated through the congregation because the congregation has not got it. The Roman view is that it was given to St. Peter only. We are faced, then, with two widely divergent views:

1. The Roman view which places the Hierarchy *above* the congregation and regards it as a special state or caste.

2. The Lutheran view which sets the Ministry *in* the congregation and maintains that it may adequately fulfil its function there.

The Gospel is the gracious will of God in relation to man.

It is the task of the Ministry to make that gracious will known by proclaiming it. It does this not outside the congregation but within it, and in this way the Gospel is mediated through the congregation. So the Ministry becomes a function of the priesthood of all believers and not a hierarchical caste.

If this is true, the statement that the Reformers' doctrine of the Church 'resulted in the virtual disappearance of the Church as a visible unity' needs some modification.

'*Invisible Church*'

The problem centres on the interpretation of the term 'invisible'.[1] 'Yet by substituting at this crucial point for the true and biblical dialectic of outward and inward, visible and invisible, Luther himself helped profoundly to confuse the issue at the Reformation.' Again, in the American Theological Committee's Report on the Nature of the Church (1945), it is explained that the Anglicans regard the Church as 'a visible society with institutionalised officers, regulations and powers'. The report goes on to say: 'It is for this reason that among Anglicans, the term invisible Church seems quite meaningless.' The New Testament injunction to 'tell it to the Church' seemed void of meaning if the Church were invisible.

This problem dates back to the time of Augustine whose double interpretation of the Church resulted in complete confusion. Augustine held that the Church as the sphere of salvation and authority was the sole agent of grace. Alongside this view he also held that the Church is the elect who have not obtained their election through the Church but directly by grace, and these may not be identified with the visible society. Augustine was faced with a titanic problem in dealing with the Donatists who had been baptised by heretics, but to effect a congenial arrangement by expelling the Donatists from the visible Church and then to create an invisible Church to include them again was a high price to pay, and Augustine's solution created a much bigger problem than the one he sought to solve. The Church was left to make the best of this complicated issue and the result was that Rome has since held the view that there are many members who are not of the 'body' of the Church because of various impediments, but they may

[1] Newbigin, *The Household of God*, 54, 56.

still be of the 'soul' of the Church on the ground of election.

Professor Henderson thinks that the Calvinistic solution is the right and final one: 'All that is meant by the Church "invisible" is "God's Elect", and that is sufficiently scriptural, and neither abstract nor imaginary.'[1] This solution, however, will not suffice because it is no more than a reassertion of Augustine's second interpretation, which, if taken alone, leaves no room for the idea of a visible community.

Luther was not happy about the term 'invisible'. 'When I have called the Church a spiritual assembly, you have insultingly taken me to mean that I would build a Church as Plato builds a state that never was.'[2] An *ecclesia abscondita* cannot be demonstrated. The fact that the saints are invisible does not mean that they are not in the world but that their holiness is not to be seen in themselves. The moment their holiness is attributed to themselves they are the false Church. This does not mean that they cannot visibly be called to serve or to suffer. The Church is visible in its functions—in its ministry and sacraments; it is invisible in the sense that the essence of the Church (holiness) is never contemplated in believers but in Christ. It is not something to be seen, but to be heard in the Word proclaimed to faith. While the Fellowship of believers is real, it is none the less hidden in the world. The Church that is hidden (*abscondita*) is not the same as the Church 'invisible'. It means a real presence with a veil surrounding it. The true Church is present and active in the world, but a veil surrounds it, and this veil is pierced only through faith. Faith recognises the Church as the fellowship of true believers. It will be seen that Luther's emphasis upon the hidden Church in no way precludes the belief in a visible fellowship of believers. Luther's words on this point are emphatic: 'I believe that here below and throughout the world, there is only one Christian Church, the Church universal, and that this Church is identical with the universal fellowship of the saints, i.e. the devout believers everywhere on earth. This Church is gathered, sustained and ruled by the Holy Spirit . . . and strengthened day by day through the sacraments and the Word of God.'[3] Professor Skydsgaard is speaking

[1] G. D. Henderson, *The Church and Ministry*, 76.
[2] Quoted in G. Rupp, *The Righteousness of God*, 317.
[3] Lee Woolf, *Reformation Writings*, Vol. I, 87.

or the Lutheran Church when he says: 'The predominating oncept is that of the Congregation or People (*congregatio sanctrum seu fidelium*). Here the chief stress falls. It is therefore conistent with this that our Churches attach great significance to he priesthood of all believers; and the practical consequence f this is that the laity play a very real part in our Church life.'[1]

It is essential to understand the way in which Luther relates he ministry of the Word to the priesthood of all believers, ince this will show us how firmly Luther believed in the visible ommunity of Christians—the Congregation of the Faithful. Therefore everyone who knows that he is a Christian should e fully assured that all of us alike are priests, and that we all ave the same authority in regard to the Word and the Sacraments, although no one has the right to administer them without the consent of the members of his Church, and the call of he majority.'[2] Immediately after this Luther says: 'The priesthood is simply the ministry of the Word.' This being the case, all possess the same authority though all are not called to exercise it. The fact that this was a common authority rather than a specially endowed authority helped to bring about the unity of believers.

To speak of unity in connexion with a man whose name is associated with the most conspicuous disruption in the history of the Church may seem ironical, but it must be made clear that Luther's main concern was the strengthening not the weakening of the fellowship of believers. He was opposed to those who weakened its message and challenged the authority of Christ. Rome was not ready to face the possibility of drastic reform. Even so, the fact that Rome could not afford to delay the day of reckoning much longer is proved by the reforms which took place at Trent in 1546. Luther proclaimed the *una sancta* and he believed that to this one Church belonged the saints of all ages. Not only through the Church, but *principally* through it, God was governing the world. The proclamation of the Gospel was always an assertion of this fact. It is in this sense that the *Regnum Christi* is set forth and extended upon earth till the end of time. This was not something to be established by man; it was a fact, a divine fact. To this extent the conception of the preaching of the Gospel as an 'event' is appropriate, since

[1] *The Nature of the Church*, 83. [2] *R.W.*, 318.

it is not a hope or an aspiration but something which is taking place every moment. The Gospel rightly preached and the sacraments rightly administered effect a twofold unity. They unite the believer with his Lord, and they unite priesthood and laity.

(a) The Unity of the Believer with his Lord

Such a possibility of unity at the personal level had been seriously assailed in the process of ecclesiastical development. Professor Brunner points to the impasse which has been reached by the Church's misunderstanding of its task: 'Now it is the person of the priest-bishop, who, as authoritative vicar of Jesus Christ Himself, can distribute the salvation of Christ and claim for himself the obedience which believers owe to their Lord. The episcopal administration of a sacramental grace places the Christian community in the position of a receiving laity; episcopal apostolic authority makes of them subjects who owe obedience. Only through this twofold dependence upon the Church ruled by bishops and priests can the individual attain salvation. Out of the 'mystical' brotherhood rooted in the Word and the Spirit, out of the Body of Christ whose Head is Christ Himself above, and whose members, therefore, are of equal status, out of the royal priesthood and holy nation has grown the Church—a totality composed of individual communities, each of which comes under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of a bishop, who as administering priest stands opposed to the receiving laity because he controls the Sacrament, the food of salvation, the sacral thing which holds together the individual components and makes them into a solidary collective.'[1]

This impressive statement by Brunner spotlights the problem: in the light of the conception of the Church as an institution, what is the believer's relationship with Christ?

This relationship is firmly based on faith. This is the believer's standing ground before God. How is God presented to our faith? The answer is: in Jesus Christ. But how is it possible to be sure of His living presence today? The Christian affirms that He is present with us in the Word and Sacraments of the Gospel. In the Word of the Gospel, Christ Himself is present

[1] *The Misunderstanding of the Church*, 83.

n His saving power, to evoke faith, to reconcile sinful man with he holy God, and to build up the Church which is His Body by drawing all men to Himself. 'Wherever', says Luther, 'you see his Word preached, believed, confessed and acted on, there do not doubt that there must be a true *ecclesia sancta catholica* . . . , or God's Word does not go empty away.'[1]

By these words Luther brought into question the whole tructure of institutionalism. It does not matter who preaches nd who gives the Sacraments, nor do they require the authority f the Pope, for the Word and the Sacraments are God's, not man's. By these God does His work. But it must not be thought hat it is merely the formal proclamation of the Word or the enactment of the sacramental ritual which effects the salvation f the soul, for these are empty and void unless they are vehicles f the Holy Spirit. It is for this reason that Luther held the iew that the authority of the Word, and the testimony of witnesses, are *in vacuo* until and unless they are accepted in faith nd confirmed in experience by the Holy Spirit. The common notion[2] that Luther failed to hold the proper balance between he Word and the Spirit becomes strange in the light of his eaching. Indeed, it is only when Word and Sacraments are ccepted in faith and become operative and effective in the life f the individual through the Spirit, that salvation is possible. t is also equally true that the Word of God is not operative unto alvation until accepted in faith and experience.

Perhaps we shall understand this more clearly if it is seen gainst the background of the Roman position at the Council f Trent. Justification is there regarded as a translation from he *standing* of sinful Adam into the standing of grace and adop- ion, and is effected by Baptism or the will to receive it. But ater, the thought of translation becomes uncertain. It is claimed hat the beginning of justification is wrought by prevenient race (by which adults are called in the absence of any merit f their own). But its contemplated end is: 'that those who have een alienated from God by their sins, *may be disposed* by His *nciting* and *aiding* grace, to convert themselves in order to gain heir own justification, by their freely assenting to and co- perating with, the same grace.' The extent to which the

[1] Holman, *On the Council and the Churches*, Ed. V, 271.
[2] See G. D. Henderson, *The Church and Ministry*, 40.

Tridentine theologians completely misunderstood the Lutheran position is shown not only by the above Pelagian phrases, but by the fact that they were able to explain justification without any reference either to faith or the Holy Spirit.

Romanism and Lutheranism are agreed that the believer may be united with his Lord, but they are not agreed upon the manner in which this is brought about. Luther's position is that the unity of the believer with Christ is not the outcome of knowledge or learning or good works or religious ceremonial, but only through the faith which throws itself entirely upon the mercy of God. It seemed to Luther that a massive barrier made up of Church, Priesthood and Sacraments, had been raised up between the believer and Christ. This was bewildering to Luther who thought that the Priest should ensure the freedom of the believer and not his bondage. He describes this unity in moving words: 'Faith not only gives the soul enough for her to become, like the divine Word, gracious, free, and blessed. It also unites the soul with Christ, like a bride with the bridegroom, and, from this marriage, Christ and the soul become one Body, as St. Paul says (Eph. 5.30). Then the possessions of both are in common, whether fortune, misfortune, or anything else; so that what Christ has, also belongs to the believing soul, and what the soul has, will belong to Christ.' Faith receives all. Christ gives everything for everything 'All things are yours' takes on a new meaning. Luther returns to the idea that Christ shares all He possesses with all Christians: 'Since Christ has the primogeniture with all appropriate honour and worth, He shares it with all Christians who are His, that, through faith, all may be kings and priests with Christ, as St. Peter says in 1 Peter 2: "You are a priestly kingdom and a royal priesthood." The result is that a Christian is lifted up by faith so high above all things that he becomes the spiritual lord of all, for nothing can hinder his salvation.'[1] Luther longed for a relationship with Christ which could not be assailed by many hindrances. He thus proclaims with great vigour that every circumstance is made to serve God's end in the life of the Christian. Even death and suffering may be of service to salvation. 'Nothing is so good or so evil but that it must serve me for good, if I have faith. Indeed I need none of these (material) things. My faith

[1] *R.W.*, 363, 365.

s sufficient for me. How precious then is the freedom and potency which Christians possess!'[1]

This was no mere academic conclusion; it was a judgment of faith; moreover, it was Luther's personal history. Luther did not commence his work by searching the Scriptures to find a suitable weapon which he might wield against the Roman hierarchy. The Word came to his heart, and he believed. Restlessly, he searched for an answer to his problem. The answer was revealed to him, 'The just shall live by faith.' Instantly he saw the implication of this—God is a *gracious* God. With this overwhelming, comprehensive truth, Luther shook the whole religious system of his day.

Pope, priest, penance, indulgences, and good works had failed to help Luther in his attempts to find access into the immediate presence of the forgiving God. External aids having failed, Luther had to rely solely upon personal faith in a loving God. Thus the Reformation took its rise not primarily from criticism of the Roman system but from the enlightenment in the soul of a seeker. Luther had used *every* means provided by the penitential system of his Church. In all things he had submitted to the orders of his superiors. In obedience to the demands of his Church he was well-nigh without fault. He underwent every part of the complex system of expiations, and made full use of the Sacraments. At the Erfurt Convent which he entered in 1505, he was advised not to read the Bible: 'Brother Martin, leave the Bible alone and study the old teachers.' In addition, he was told that every man must work out his own salvation by strict asceticism, fastings and scourgings. Despite all this well-meant advice, Luther knew that, as far as he was concerned, the appointed systems were of no avail. 'Though I listened to this glowing language about myself and allowed myself to be described as a wonder-worker who could make himself holy in such an easy way, yet I found neither Baptism nor monkery could assist me.' The attempt to live a consistently good life by human resources alone made such heavy demands upon him that the attempt could not possibly be sustained. 'When an awakened soul seeks to find rest in works-righteousness, it stands on a foundation of loose sand which it feels running and travelling beneath it, and it must go

[1] *R.W.*, 366.

on from one good work to another, and so on without end.'[1]

The Monastery did not solve Luther's problem, neither did his pilgrimage to Rome. What tortured the great African, Augustine, tortured Luther also—the unbearable thought of permanent alienation from the God of love. In the case of Luther, however, Staupitz saw the real difficulty. He pointed out to Luther that he had been right enough in contrasting man's sin and God's holiness, but he had been wrong when he had kept these two thoughts permanently in opposition. Staupitz explained that God's righteousness might become man's in and through Christ. This brought Luther to the verge of his great discovery. He had sought help from others. He had been obedient to his superiors. He had tried by every means to help himself. But since *no* help was to be found in man, his soul was forced to find all in God.

Out of this experience arises his definition of the Christian religion. 'The Christian Religion is the living assurance of the living God who has revealed Himself and opened His heart in Christ—nothing more.'[2] This, in fact, was all Luther needed to know. Before, he was not permitted to come too near; now he could not get near enough. His new conception of the character of God has altered his whole conception of religion.

Unfortunately for his Mother Church, and fortunately for the whole of Protestantism, he began to ask some important questions. Whose responsibility was it to show him the way of salvation? Whose duty was it to unfold the true meaning of Scripture to a seeker? Whose duty was it to point another to the only Source of all grace and love? The logical answer was that these were the duties of the priests. If in this they had failed him, where had they succeeded? Yet they were the chosen custodians of divine authority. They were the appointed channels of divine grace. The disturbing thought now occurred to Luther that it was because authority and Scripture and grace were securely enshrined in the very office of the priesthood and jealously guarded by the priests that Luther for so long had been deprived of personal and eternal salvation. Could it be that the ecclesiastical system especially appointed to offer grace to men had become the very means whereby they were deprived

[1] T. M. Lindsay, *History of the Reformation*, Vol. I, 201.
[2] A. Harnack, *The History of Dogma*, Vol. VII, 183.

of it? To this crucial question there was but one answer, and it was inescapable. His answer to it is no less than a statement upon the meaning of priesthood in relation to all believers.

(*b*) *The unity of priesthood and laity*

1. All believers share a common dignity. It cannot be said that some Christians belong to a religious class and others do not. The honour and dignity conferred by Christ upon one is also conferred upon all. 'For all Christians whatsoever really and truly belong to the religious class, and there is no difference among them except in so far as they do different work. That is St. Paul's meaning in 1 Cor. 12, when he says, "We are all one body, yet each member hath his own work for serving others." This applies to us all, because we have one Baptism, one Gospel, one faith and are all equally Christian. For Baptism, Gospel, and faith alone make men religious, and create a Christian people. . . . The fact is that our Baptism consecrates us all without exception, and makes us all priests.'[1] All believers share this high dignity whatever their daily calling might be: 'A shoemaker, a smith, a farmer, each has his manual occupation and work; and yet, at the same time, all are eligible to act as priests and bishops. Every one of them in his occupation or handicraft ought to be useful to his fellows, and serve them in such a way that the various trades are all directed to the best advantage of the community, and promote the well-being of body and soul, just as the organs of the body serve each other.'[2] The fellowship of believers implies that all men are essentially equal in the sense that they have received the treasures which God has given. God's grace is offered to all, and no vocation is too mean or poor to be the vehicle through which He may do His work.

2. All believers share a common calling. The Christian's dignity is a dignity of service, for all Christians are called *to serve*. 'Should you ask: "What is the difference between the priests and the laity in Christian standing, if all are priests?" the answer is that spiritual mischief and other wrongs have been done to the little words "priest" or "pastor". These words have been taken away from the community in general and handed over to those little communities which we now call "the clergy".

[1] *R.W.*, 113. [2] ibid., 116.

The Holy Scriptures make no distinction beyond calling the instructed or the consecrated, ministros, servos, oeconomos, i.e. helpers, servants, stewards, whose duty is to preach Christ, and faith, and Christian freedom to others. For although we are all equally priests, still not all of us can serve and minister and preach. Thus St. Paul says in 1 Corinthians 4: "We do not desire to be held by the people to be other than servants of Christ and stewards of the Gospel." But there has now grown out of the stewardship such a worldly, outer, gorgeous and awe-inspiring lordship and authority that the worldly powers proper cannot compare with them. Indeed, it is as if the laity were something other than Christian people. The whole meaning of Christian grace and liberty and faith is taken away, together with everything we have in Christ, and, indeed, we are robbed of Christ Himself.'[1] The Christian's calling and not his status, is the all-important fact. This calling is characterised in two distinct ways: it is characterised by the possession of the grace of Christ, and by the Christian's acceptance of the role of 'servant'. The principal and only concern is not lest Christians should be robbed of privileges, status, powers and rights, for these are of the earth earthy, but lest they should be robbed of Christ. The Christian does not ask, 'What is due to me?' but 'What is due to Christ?' He cannot claim anything on the ground that he is good, but he may claim everything on the ground of his calling. It is interesting to notice that when he speaks of the marks of the Church Luther never points to visible holiness in believers. The holiness of believers is never a holiness which is demonstrated but a holiness which is hidden. It is the holiness of Christ in which the believer participates. They contemplate their righteousness not in themselves but in Him. Their holiness is found in Him alone. The marks of the Church are not in them but in Christ. The fact that they are believers is seen in the recognition of their calling and in their response to the Gospel which is proclaimed to them. They have no holiness apart from Christ, and if they are robbed of Christ they are robbed of everything. They are being most true to their calling when they sing:

> Look, Father, look on His anointed face,
> And only look on us as found in Him.

[1] *R.W.*, 367.

3. All believers share a common privilege. If all believers are called upon to become true servants of Christ, it follows that laymen as well as priests are called to be servants. The two passionate concerns of the Christian are to contemplate and receive the righteousness of Christ in the service of Holy Communion, and to intercede for all who seek that righteousness. To deny either of these is to strike at the very roots of his religion. Both were denied to the Christian in the Church as it then existed. Concerning the first, Luther says: 'To deny both kinds to the laity is impious and oppressive; and it is not in the power of any angel, nor of any Pope or council whatever to deny them.' Luther claims that to deny the Cup to the laity really means that the Sacrament is not for *all*. 'It is sin', he says, 'to refuse to give both kinds to those who wish to exercise freedom of choice; and it is the priests and not the laity, who must bear the guilt. The Sacrament does not pertain to priests alone, but to all; the priests are not lords but servants, and it is their duty to administer both kinds to those who so desire, and as often as they desire.'[1] In this instance, therefore, Luther is not pleading on the grounds of equality between priests and laymen, but on the grounds of the universal significance of the sacrament. There is strong support in the words of Jesus, 'Drink ye *all* of this', and if, as Hort suggests, 'the Twelve sat that night as representatives of the ecclesia at large', we may assume that the Supper was instituted for the benefit of all believers. The other reason which Luther gives for asserting that sharing in the Communion Service is a common privilege is the individual liberty of the Christian. He puts this briefly in the following words: 'Each man should be allowed his free choice in seeking and using the sacrament, just as in the case of Baptism and penance.'[2]

The other privilege which belongs to the Christian is that of exercising the ministry of intercession, and Luther states this in noble terms: 'In addition, we are priests, and thus greater than mere kings, the reason being that priesthood makes us worthy to stand before God, and pray for others. For to stand before God's face is the prerogative of none except priests. Christ redeemed us that we might be able spiritually to act and pray on behalf of one another just as, in fact, a priest acts and prays

[1] *R.W.*, 223. [2] *R.W.*, 224.

on behalf of the people. . . . By virtue of his kingship he (the Christian) exercises authority over all things, and by virtue of his priesthood he exercises power with God, for God does what he asks and desires.'[1]

To sum up: the preaching of the Word effects this twofold purpose, first, it brings the believer into a true relationship with Christ through faith; and it unites all believers in a common dignity, a common calling, and a common privilege. The beginning, and the sign, and the seal of this relationship is the Sacrament of Baptism.

R.W., 366.

RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR: AN EARLY SCOTTISH THEOLOGIAN?

by The Rev. G. S. M. WALKER

The twelfth century witnessed a memorable conflict between rationalism and authority, in the persons of Peter Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux. It is, of course, erroneous to exaggerate these two extremes; by the one, reason was ultimately accepted as the servant of personal faith, and by the other, authority was founded on a basis of mystical devotion. None the less it remains true that both, in different directions, were guilty of the same dangerous tendency, that of abstracting one element from the wholeness of human personality, and of confining religion to the sphere of that one element; Abelard was too exclusively concerned with matters of the intellect, while Bernard directed an almost equally exclusive attention to the will; and the factor neglected and suppressed by both, which breaks through in Bernard's Sermons on the Song of Songs, and overwhelms Abelard in his affair with Heloise—the factor of emotion, of personal experience, of the deep springs of affection in the human heart—it was this forgotten factor which another school of theologians had the distinction of restoring to its proper place. The great Victorines took a saner and more balanced view of human nature. They studied man in his totality, and were willing to derive or at least expound their doctrine on the level of practical experience. They occupied a mediating position from which, with exaggerating either, they could give due weight to the claims of both reason and faith.

St. Victor, an abbey of Augustinian Canons Regular, was founded at Paris in the year 1113. Its original impulse came from William of Champeaux (died 1121), pupil of Anselm and opponent of Abelard. It possessed a magnificent library, illustrious teachers and international contacts. Here Hugh, a Saxon by birth, taught from about 1125 until his death in 1141, embracing in the wide sweep of his lucid mind not only a scheme of universal history but also a survey of all known science. The range of his intellectual interests may be estimated from his

fourfold division of human knowledge—theoretical knowledge, the pursuit of truth, comprising theology, physics and mathematics; practical knowledge, the discipline of conduct, comprising moral philosophy, social studies and politics; mechanical knowledge, the guide of action, comprising navigation, agriculture, weaving, the manufacture of weapons, hunting, medicine and drama; and logical knowledge, the science of thought and language, comprising grammar, rhetoric and dialectic. No useful study was omitted from the curriculum of St. Victor, for Hugh wished his pupils to be thoroughly grounded in all sound learning. Yet at the same time nothing of secular concern was to be studied as an end in itself, but purely as a means to strengthen the life of contemplation. The object of his education was intuitive wisdom rather than discursive knowledge, and its result the formation of Christian character by the practice of divine charity. The crown of Hugh's philosophical activity is a mysticism which seeks, not so much a supersensuous revelation of transcendent reality, as an insight into the providential ordering of natural phenomena.

Hugh's disciple and successor in the teaching office was Richard, born in the first quarter of the twelfth century, who entered St. Victor under the abbacy of Gilduin, became subprior by 1159, prior in 1162, and died on 10th March 1173. John of Toulouse, who in the seventeenth century gathered biographical materials from older sources, is uncertain whether to locate his birth-place in England or Scotland. But two recorded epitaphs, of the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, describe him as being a Scot, and since the Irish ceased to be known by this designation in the course of the eleventh century, it seems that Scotland can fairly claim Richard as one of the earliest, and not the least distinguished, of her theologians.[1] His life was cloistered but not without its tumults; the abbey letter-books indicate the frequency with which his advice was sought from outside; and within the community the neglect of Abbot Ervise forced him, during the last decade of his life, to stress the practical and moral aspects of instruction more fully than his master Hugh had done. Richard is above all a mystic, a theologian of the spiritual life. But he is a practical mystic,

[1] Cf. C. Ottaviano in *R. Accad. dei Lincei*, VI, 1931, *Memorie della Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche*, vol. iv, p. 412.

devoting the greater part of his literary work to Scriptural exposition, consulting Jews on the details of biblical chronology, arguing against Gregory the Great for the practicability of Ezekiel's Temple as an actual building, and eschewing the more fanciful flights of speculative Greek spirituality. With a flash of poetry in his soul, he is highly sensitive to beauty and specially attracted to the jewels, songs and flowers of Scripture. Apparently unable to refer directly to the Hebrew text, he is none the less deeply interested in the allegorical meaning of Hebrew names, which he can make into an excusé for long digressions on morality. But if his exegesis is pre-scientific, like that of all biblical scholars in the Middle Ages, it is fundamentally sound and sensible, and his doctrine of revelation has a surprising affinity with more modern views. His great originality is shown in proving the ontological necessity of the Trinity from the statement that God is love, and not in the intellectualist manner of Augustine and Anselm. Traces of Anselm's thought are to be found in his argument from perfection to being; but Gilson[1] is incorrect in saying that 'it is always the spirit of Anselm by which he is controlled'. Richard grounds his proofs of the existence of God on an empirical basis; and thus at one blow he preserves both mystical immediacy and natural science. His Trinitarian doctrine moulded that of Alexander of Hales, who cites Richard frequently and expresses the desire to follow him; his mysticism inspired Bonaventura, Pierre d'Ailly and some German contemplatives; and the influence of his thought, in more remote channels, has extended into the modern age.

A list of his writings, in very rough chronological order, will indicate the direction of his interests, expository, mystical, moral and doctrinal. Except where otherwise stated, these works are contained in volume 196 of Migne's *Patrologia Latina*[2]:

I. Early Period (before 1150)—*In Cantica Canticorum*; *In Apocalypsim*; *Explicationes difficultatum Apostoli*; *Adnotationes in Psalmos*; *In Ezechielem*; *De Tabernaculo*; *In Habacuc*; *Declarationes difficultatum Scripturae*; *Quomodo Christus ponitur in signum populorum*; *De fine mundi*; *De comparatione Christi ad florem*; *De sacrificio David*; *De*

[1] *Philosophie au Moyen Age*, 1952, p. 306.

[2] A good bibliography will be found in J. Chatillon and W. J. Tulloch, *Richard de Saint-Victor, Sermons et opuscules spirituels inédits*, vol. I, 1951; to this must be added G. Dumeige, *Richard de Saint-Victor et l'idée chrétienne de l'amour*, 1952, and C. Kirchberger (transl.), *Richard of Saint-Victor, Selected Writings*, 1957.

differentia sacrificii Abrahae a sacrificio B.M.V.; *De superexcellenti baptismo Christi*; *De potestate ligandi et solvendi*; *De judiciaria potestate in finali judicio*; *De spiritu blasphemiae*; *De differentia peccati mortalis et venialis*; *De Emmanuele*; *De missione Spiritus Sancti*; *De gemino Paschate*; *In Nahum* (*P.L.* 96, wrongly ascribed to Julian of Toledo); *Tractatus in Misit Herodes Rex Manus* (*P.L.* 141, wrongly ascribed to Fulbert of Chartres); *In Joel* (*P.L.* 175, wrongly ascribed to Hugh of St. Victor); *In Abdiam* (do.); *Allegoriae in Vetus et Novum Testamentum* (*P.L.* 175, wrongly ascribed to Hugh, but see P. S. Moore in *The New Scholasticon* IX, 1935, pp. 209-25); *Sermones centum* (*P.L.* 177, wrongly ascribed to Hugh, but shown to be the work of Richard by J. Chatillon in *Revue du Moyen Age Latin* IV, 1948, pp. 343-66).

II. Period 1150-1153—*De tribus appropriatis Personis in Trinitate*; *De Verbo incarnato.*

III. Period 1153-1160—*Liber Excerptionum* (*P.L.* 175 and 177, wrongly ascribed to Hugh; the date is fixed by J. Chatillon in *Revue du Moyen Age Latin* IV, 1948, p. 50).

IV. Final Period (1162-1173)—*De eruditione interioris hominis*; *De statu interioris hominis*; *Super exiit edictum seu De tribus processionibus* (ed. J. Chatillon and W. J. Tulloch, *Sermons et opuscules spirituels inédits*, vol. I, 1951); *De gradibus charitatis*; *De quattuor gradibus violentae charitatis*; *De praeparatione animi ad contemplationem seu Benjamin Minor*[1]; *De gratia contemplationis seu Benjamin Major*; *Allegoriae Tabernaculi foederis*; *De exterminatione mali et promotione boni*; *De Trinitate*; *Quomodo Spiritus Sanctus est Amor Patris et Filii.*

There is cause for uncertainty about the authorship of several of these writings, particularly the Commentaries on Nahum, Joel and Abdias (Obadiah), but I propose to treat the first of these at least as being Richard's work. The list of titles indicates a gradual transition from predominantly Scriptural interests to moral and philosophical ones—the *Liber Excerptionum*, for example, offers a vast compendium of universal history and science, divided according to the system of Hugh—and from these again the interest shifts to mysticism and culminates in the doctrine of the Trinity.

[1] The latter name, referring to mystical rapture, is derived from the false Vulgate and Septuagint rendering of Ps. 67.28 (68.27 in English versions)—'*Benjamin adolescentulus in mentis excessu*'.

As an expositor, Richard loves system and method; thus in expounding the Song of Songs, he prefers to follow the logical order of thought rather than that of the chapters and verses. His scholastic approach is particularly evident in *De Emmanuele* I, where he uses the form of a regular *disputatio* with Master Hugh. His method of Scriptural interpretation adheres to the standard medieval pattern: 'Holy Scripture treats of its material in a threefold manner, following history, allegory and tropology. History is the narrative of past events, embraced in the primary or literal meaning. Allegory is the signification, through a factual record, of some other fact, past, present or to come. Tropology shows us how to recognise our duty through reading what was done, and Holy Scripture greatly excels secular knowledge in this, that in it *not only words but also acts have meaning*' (*Lib. Excerpt.*, II 3, *P.L.* 177, 205 A-B, italics mine). Here Richard adumbrates the modern view that revelation is given through the acts of God; but, wiser than some of the moderns, he realises that revelation cannot be transmitted without an authoritative record of the facts. Sometimes he follows a fourfold division of the senses of Scripture: 'The prophet Nahum prophesies against the kingdom of Assyria—historically, he speaks of the destruction of Nineveh, which was its capital; allegorically, of the devastation of the world; mystically, of the renewal of the human race through Christ; morally, of the restoration of the sinner, fallen in iniquities, to his former dignity or to a greater glory' (*In Nahum*, Praefatio, *P.L.* 96, 205 D). This passage is first developed, on the lines of historical interpretation, by a discourse which fixes the date of Nahum by comparative Greek and Roman chronology. Next, arising from a translation of the name Nahum as 'benevolus', the moral interest leads to a long disquisition on benevolence, in the course of which Cicero is quoted. Richard follows previous exegetes in making great play with the allegorical interpretation of proper names. Thus he writes: 'Of the vineyard of Noah and his drunkenness. . . . Noah, who was the tenth from Adam, signifies Christ. . . . Now Noah is translated "peace". And Christ is our peace, in the present by grace, in the future by glory. His vineyard was the Israelite nation, as it is written: The vineyard of the Lord of Hosts is the house of Israel. And this, when it should have brought forth grapes, brought forth

wild grapes and was turned to bitterness. The vineyard released Barabbas and made Christ, its planter and cultivator, drunk with the wine of His passion. He slept the sleep of death and His wretchedness, that is, the mortality which He had assumed from us and for us, was openly seen. Unhappy Ham, who is the unbelieving people of the Jews, derided Him saying: He saved others, Himself He cannot save; if He be the King of Israel, let Him descend now from the cross and we shall believe in Him. But Shem, who is the Apostles and other disciples and whoever believed in Him from amongst the Jews, and Japheth, who is the Gentile people converted to the faith, covered the nakedness of their father with a cloak, by declaring Christ's passion to have been, not a defect, but the effect of His whole virtue and the true sacrament of human redemption . . .' (*Alleg. in Vet. Test.*, I 17, *P.L.* 175, 643 B et seq.). The same interpretation is found less fully in Cyprian (*Epist.*, 63, 3, *P.L.* 4, 375) and whatever may be thought of its extravagance in detail, the importance of it lies in its Christological reference. The same reference appears very frequently, as in the following shorter passage, whose source is Isidore (*Allegoriae Quaedam ex Vet. Test.*, 98, *P.L.* 83, 113): 'Concerning the curse pronounced by the man of God on the children at Bethel. . . . Elisha is translated "God's salvation". He, who signifies Christ, was mocked by the Jews when raised upon the cross at Calvary. While they mocked Him, they acted in stupid, childish fashion; but after Christ ascended to Bethel, that is, to the house of God, in the fortieth year He sent two bears from the sons of the Gentiles, Vespasian and Titus, who overthrew them with a savage slaughter, and their blood was poured out at the place where they crucified the Lord' (*Alleg. in Vet. Test.*, VII 21, *P.L.* 175, 715 B). Here the historical interpretation combines with allegory in a harmonious manner. But there are occasions when Richard extracts an allegorical meaning which sharply contradicts the plain historical sense. 'For sometimes Scripture itself, as we are taught on the authority of the Fathers, signifies according to the mystical understanding a praiseworthy virtue by what, in accordance with history, it relates as an execrable deed. This is particularly clear in the account given by sacred history of the action of David and Uriah, where the innocent devotion of Uriah pointed to the unfaithfulness of the Jews, and the sin

of David prefigured the great mystery of Christ and the Church' (*Tract. in Misit Herodes* Praefatio, *P.L.* 141, 277 c). Here the patristic authority followed is again Isidore (*Alleg. ex Vet. Test.*, 90, *P.L.* 83, 112). However surprising and even offensive this allegorical interpretation may appear, it does not extend to tropology in providing a model for imitation; 'for David's sin did not cease to be sin in virtue of prefiguring that greatest good' (*P.L.* 141, 278 c).

Richard obtained food for contemplation not only in the Bible, but also in the liturgical ceremonies of the Church. This may be illustrated from the recently discovered *De tribus processionibus*. As its editors (J. Chatillon and W. J. Tulloch, *Sermons et opuscules spirituels inédits*, I, 1951) rightly perceive, an occasion for writing this little work was probably offered by the intervention of Pope Alexander III in the affairs of the abbey, which had been scandalously mismanaged by Ervise for some years after 1162. But they are wrong in identifying the Alexander of the treatise directly with that Pope, for several incidental passages indicate that Richard intends rather to signify Christ speaking through the papacy. Thus he writes: 'This is that Alexander who is set for the fall and resurrection of many, and for a sign to be spoken against' (op. cit., p. 6). Again: 'For this Alexander of ours knew, He knew who says, Be ye holy for I am holy' (ibid., p. 8). And when he writes, 'Thus in the procession of the Purification great Alexander bids all be present with their lamps' (ibid., p. 40), he can hardly be referring to Alexander III, since the Candlemas procession was introduced in the Latin Church as early as the sixth century. The other two processions mentioned in the treatise are those of Palm Sunday and Ascension Day. The three are connected with the names Judaea, Hebrew and Galilee, which are respectively interpreted, following Jerome's *De nominibus Hebraeis*, as 'confession', 'transition' and 'transformation or revelation'. Thus the three festivals, with their ceremonies illumined by a wealth of Scriptural illustrations, are taken to signify: (1) purgation of vices, (2) transition to an active life of good works, and (3) transformation to the practice of contemplative virtues. The result is to provide a mystical scheme of the soul's progress: 'first it is purified, secondly sanctified and thirdly glorified' (ibid., p. 58).

Before turning to the strictly mystical writings, it will be desirable to clarify two points: Richard's doctrine of free-will, and his theory of perception. Human freedom remains as a vestigial likeness of the divine image: 'Among all the blessings of creation nothing in man is more exalted or more noble than free-will. . . . Certainly freedom of the will bears the impress not only of eternity but also of the divine majesty' (*De statu interioris hominis*, I 3, *P.L.* 196, 1118 C). But 'this is rightly called weak because of itself it is never directed to any good thing. . . . It is indeed often directed towards good, but never except by the Holy Spirit. . . . To be free is an utterly different matter from being strong' (ibid., I 12, 1125 C-D). The will is thus morally impaired as a result of sin, and its true freedom can only be recovered by conversion to a higher obedience: 'Man had all things subject to him before the Fall, and found absolutely no opposition in his subjects so long as he freely subjected himself to a Superior' (ibid., I 14, 1126 C-D). From this discipline of voluntary subordination[1] Richard derives one of his most characteristic doctrines—that of the *affectus ordinatus*, desire rightly directed, by which he means that it must be directed towards a fitting object—and this doctrine becomes a focal point in his demonstration of the Trinity. Less severe than Augustine, he confines predestination to the sphere of election: 'for predestination, accurately and properly taken, appears to apply so much to this sphere that we almost always speak of fore-ordaining to life alone, and it is only referred to the other realm with distortion and impropriety. Indeed although God's government extends to either part, because He never leaves anything uncontrolled, yet all His purposes serve only for the salvation of the elect' (*Benjamin Major*, II 21, *P.L.* 196, 103 A-B). His foreknowledge is, however, particularly wonderful in the case of evil, which 'we know occurs only by His permission and never by His performance. Consider, if you can, how worthy of wonder it is that He even could fore-know what He resigned to the will of another, to a will which did not yet exist and which He was never to motivate. For He never motivates an evil will, though He permits its existence' (ibid., 102 B).

For his theory of perception, Richard follows the Aristotelian

[1] His biblical authority is the Vulgate rendering of Cant. 2.4: '*ordinavit in me charitatem*'.

teaching of abstraction by the mind from sense-data. Material objects provide the primary source of knowledge, and therefore contemplation, even of things divine, must begin from the physical universe. 'Without doubt sensory perception precedes spiritual perception in acquiring knowledge, because unless the mind first received sense-data through the bodily senses, it could by no means discover the conclusions it should draw from these. . . . Sense-perception does not grasp immaterial objects; yet these are not attained by reason without its guidance, as has been shown in the proof already alleged above. Certainly it is true that if man had avoided sin, his outward senses would have helped the inner in recognising objects; for who would deny that Adam received his Eve for a helper? But it is one thing to have a companion on your journey, and quite another thing to require a leader for the path' (*Benjamin Major*, II 17, *P.L.* 196, 96 C). Richard therefore begins his scheme of contemplation with percepts or images, and proceeds from these to revelation by way of reason; and his proofs for the existence of God are drawn from the material world. As in his doctrine of Scripture, so here he maintains that physical objects can possess spiritual significance, that the underlying reality is to be abstracted by the mind from things: 'for what we see outwardly in an object or action is quite different from the spiritual power which resides within. Thus you can believe, but by no means perceive, the reality which resides within the Sacrament' (ibid., II 6, 84 A-B).

The *Benjamin Minor*, the first of his great mystical works, is largely concerned with mental and spiritual discipline, basing its psychology on tropological interpretations of the names of Jacob's sons. 'As we have said, the sons of Jacob by Leah are nothing else than ordered inclinations (*ordinati affectus*). . . . Thus the sevenfold progeny of Leah are the seven virtues. In truth virtue is nothing other than an inclination of the mind which is ordered and temperate—ordered, when it is directed to the right object; temperate, when it is of the appropriate degree' (*Benjamin Minor*, VII, *P.L.* 196, 6 B). There is no need to dwell here on the lower reaches of the mystical life, and it will be sufficient to refer to the two highest levels, which concern revealed doctrine: 'it is surely agreed that two types of contemplation are above reason, and both pertain to Ben-

jamin.[1] The first is above reason, but not contrary to reason, while the second is both above and contrary to reason. Now the things above but not contrary to reason are those which, though reason permits their existence, yet cannot be demonstrated or proved by reason. But the things which we affirm to be both above and contrary to reason are those which human reason seems wholly to contradict—such as our belief in the one-ness of the Trinity, and many matters concerning Christ's Incarnation which we hold on the undoubted authority of faith' (ibid., LXXXVI, 61 D). To some extent, Richard later modified his view that the doctrine of the Trinity is irrational.

Contemplation receives a fuller treatment in the *Benjamin Major*, where in contrast with meditation ('earnest mental concentration carefully confined to the object studied'), it is defined as 'the mind's clear and untrammelled survey dispersed in all directions over the matters under review' (*Benjamin Major*, I 4, *P.L.* 196, 67 D). The servants of contemplation are the image-making faculty and reason, the first dealing with the forms of material objects, the second with their order and causes; visible things are used as symbols and pointers to the invisible by a reason which, based on perceptual experience, is guided by that 'light which lighteth every man coming into this world'; and the climax of contemplation is the apprehension of revealed truth. 'There are six types of contemplation quite distinct in themselves and from each other. The first lies in the imagination and is concerned with imagination alone. The second lies in imagination rationally conceived. The third lies in a reason which operates by images. The fourth lies in reason and is purely rational. The fifth is above but not contrary to reason. The sixth is above reason, and seems to contradict reason' (ibid., I 6, 70 B). Of these six stages or types, the first two, where imagination is supreme, are concerned with visible creatures; the second two, which form the particular domain of reason, deal with invisible but created objects; the last two, in which reason gives place to revelation, handle divine truth (cf. Richard's *recapitulatio*, 193 C). But it is to be noted that reason, although on the one hand it derives its material from the senses, and on the other it resigns its authority to a higher guide, none

[1] The name is interpreted with reference to mystical rapture, as explained above, p. 40, note 1.

he less enters into the operations of all but the first and sixth tages. The mind may be enlarged and elevated by the influence of grace without ceasing to function normally; and apture, when the subject loses normal consciousness, is only he reward of transfiguration granted to peculiar spiritual fervour (ibid., V 2, 169 D; cf. V 5, 174 A). The purpose of contemplation, however, is not simply the acquirement of supranational knowledge, but also the progress of the soul in holy charity: 'it is vain for us to advance in the abundance of divine nowledge, unless this increases in us the flame of divine love. Thus our growth should always be in love arising out of knowledge, and no less in knowledge arising out of love, and as these fructify together they should minister their mutual fruit . . .' ibid., IV 10, 145 C). By this union of love with knowledge, Richard seeks to solve the conflict of reason and faith.

His greatest and most original work, the *De Trinitate*, is intended to prove the rationality of this central doctrine in the creed; and the method he employs is to investigate the implications of the statement that God is love. The Trinity provided a stock subject for scholasticism. Medieval theology divides here into two leading schools—the Augustinianism of Anselm, Peter Lombard and Aquinas, and the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic tendencies apparent in Richard and Bonaventura. The immediate background to Richard's work is provided by the errors of Gilbert de la Porrée on the one hand, in distinguishing the divine essence from the Deity and their personal properties from the divine Persons, and on the other hand by the errors of Peter Lombard, who denied the formula that substance begets substance' and held that Christ as man could not be an individual entity. One of Richard's main objects is to prove the Son's identity in substance with the Father, which is indeed the whole point of the metaphor of begetting in this context. At the same time, he maintains a sharp distinction between creature and Creator, and finds no place for the Greek scheme of mediating primordial causes and a hierarchy of ideas. He does admit the Greek conception of some bond between the human intellect and divine wisdom, but couples this with an almost Augustinian view of the moral misery of man. He accepts without question the Latin doctrine of the double procession of the Spirit, and this provides the second of

his main arguments for the Trinitarian nature of a loving God. But he fails to make an adequate distinction between substance and person, and there is one passage[1] which would seem to imply the existence of three substances in God. The texture of his argument is close and polished throughout, but there are some logical fallacies, perhaps derived from the ontology of Anselm, as in *De Trinitate*, II 5 (*P.L.* 196, 904 B), where he proves that God must be of infinite magnitude because He is eternal: 'for if His eternity is infinite, but His magnitude finite, one and the same substance will be according to its eternity greater than its magnitude, that is, than itself, and according to its magnitude it will be less than its eternity, again, that is, than itself'.

The Prologue emphasises the priority of faith before all other virtues: 'the just lives by faith. . . . For without faith it is impossible to please God. Where faith does not exist there cannot be hope, since it behoves him who approaches God to believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of those that seek Him—otherwise, what hope can there be? But where hope is not, love cannot exist. For who loves one from whom he hopes for no return? Therefore by faith we are induced to hope, and by hope we advance to love. . . . Thus revelation arises through love, and through revelation contemplation arises, and through contemplation, knowledge. . . . You observe whence and how attainment is achieved, and by what stages we ascend, with the help of hope and love and faith, to divine knowledge, and by divine knowledge to eternal life' (*De Trinitate*, Prologus, *P.L.* 196, 887 C et seq.). Faith, in other words, is the first and essential step in laying hold on that life which is hid with God; it is the channel by which we enter into the divine life itself What is that hidden life of God, which can embrace the believer and the mystic, and which is defined as consisting in an eternal society of Persons? Richard confidently answers that love is the significant characteristic of that life, and the sufficient explanation of its social nature. His argument proceeds by two stages. First, love must have from all eternity a worthy object of its love, the desire must be fittingly directed as an *affectus ordinatus*, and in the case of God the worthy object must be itself divine: 'We

[1] *P.L.* 196, 986-7; see A. M. Ethier, 'Le "De Trinitate" de Richard de Saint-Victor' in *Etudes médiévales d'Ottawa*, IX, 1939, pp. 113 and 119.

have learnt from the previous discussion that in what is supremely good and entirely perfect there must be the plenitude and perfection of all goodness. But where there is a plenitude of all goodness, true and supreme charity cannot be lacking, since nothing is better or more perfect than charity. No one, however, is fittingly said to possess charity on account of a private and personal self-love. It is therefore necessary that love should reach out to another in order that it may be charity. Thus where a plurality of persons is lacking, charity certainly cannot exist. But you will perhaps suggest that, even if there were only one Person in the true Godhead, yet He might still possess charity towards His creation; and indeed He would possess it, but surely He could not possess the supreme charity towards a created person. For that charity would be disordered (*inordinata*), and it is impossible for charity to be disordered in the goodness of supreme wisdom. Thus a divine Person could not have supreme charity towards a person who was not worthy of supreme love. In order that charity may be supreme and supremely perfect, it must be so great that there could not be a greater, and so good that there could not be a better. . . . A divine Person would have only Himself to love worthily, if He did not have any person of equal worth (*condignam personam*). But a person who was not God could not be of equal worth with the divine Person. Then in order to find room for the plenitude of charity in the true Godhead, some divine Person, endowed with a share in the very Deity, was required for the person of equal worth. In this manner you may see how easily reason proves that in the true Godhead a plurality of Persons cannot be lacking' (ibid., III 2, 916 c et seq.). This argument is not original—one brief source for it can be found in Gregory the Great[1]—and by appealing to the required *condignus* as the worthily beloved, it only proves the necessity for two Persons in God. Richard's second argument is all his own, and in it he seeks to prove that two Persons, in order to manifest supreme charity, must have a third as *condilectus* or partner of their love: 'Supreme charity must be entirely perfect. . . . Now it is clearly a characteristic mark of true charity

[1] Greg. Magn., *Homil. in Evang.*, XVII (*P.L.* 76, 1139 A); see F. Guimet, 'Notes en marge d'un texte de Richard de Saint-Victor' in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, XIV, 1943, p. 376.

that it wishes another to be loved like itself; indeed in a love that is mutual and very strong, there is nothing rarer or more excellent than that you should wish another to be equally loved by him whom you love supremely and by whom you are supremely loved. . . . Therefore the supreme lover and the supremely beloved must both desire a partner of their love (*condilectum*) with equal longing, and with a concord equal to their longing they must hold him. Thus you may see how the consummation of charity requires a Trinity of Persons, apart from which it could by no means continue with its plenitude unimpaired' (ibid., III 11, 922 C et seq.). Here Richard's human analogy is probably the family, with the Holy Ghost proceeding like a child from the love of Father and Son—though the analogy must not be pressed, since there is no identity between the generation of the Son and the double procession of the Spirit[1]—and on the high level of affection to which he appeals his argument is psychologically sound. It must be remembered that, setting aside revelation, we can only argue from the best and highest elements in human experience, and that these alone are the lines on which a rational demonstration of the Trinity can be constructed. His conclusion therefore runs: 'a communion of love can in no circumstances exist between less than three persons' (ibid., III 14, 925 A).

The next question that must be answered is, Why no more than three? Richard meets this problem with typically scholastic reasoning: 'It is doubtless agreed that all the divine Persons participate alike in the whole plenitude; the distinction of their personal properties centres on two points, for it consists in giving and receiving. For the property of one Person, as is clear from the premisses, resides only in giving, that of another in receiving alone. Between these lies the mean of both giving and receiving. But perhaps someone may reply to this. . . . Why should there not be a fourth Person isolated alike from giving and receiving? . . . Reason obviously proves that no Person in the Godhead can be unoriginate, except for one alone. . . . Thus it is seen that the fourth property can have no place in the Godhead' (ibid., V 15, 960 D et seq.). Expressed in other terms, this means

[1] Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I 27 artt. III, IV *et al.*, distinguishes generation as being *secundum actionem intelligibilem* from procession as being *secundum operationem voluntatis*.

that the Persons can only be distinguished by their mutual relationships; the Father is the unoriginated source, the Son receives being from the Father and joins in transmitting it to the Spirit, the Spirit originates from both; no other relationship is possible, and a fourth Person, unoriginate and unoriginating, could not be distinguished from the first.

To complete his argument, Richard must now demonstrate the unity of these three Persons, and this is his hardest task, for he readily admits that while the unity and Trinity are separately intelligible, the Trinity in unity appears to contradict reason. Here he can only give an illustration, drawn again from human experience: 'Imagine three people, of whom one discovered and taught some piece of knowledge, the second learnt it from its discoverer and wrote it down, the third read and understood it; the first has it from himself, the second from the first alone, the third from both the first and second. . . . If thus there can be one and the same knowledge in three persons, why should we not much more believe that in the three Persons of the divine Trinity there is one and the same wisdom?' (ibid., VI 25, 990 C). The defect of this illustration lies in the fact that a community of knowledge cannot prove a community of being, although by substituting the word 'wisdom' Richard attempts to suggest something of the divine essence. He is happier when he speaks of Trinity and unity in separation: 'From the consideration of omnipotence it is readily proved that God is not and cannot be other than one; from the plenitude of His goodness, that He is personally three; and from the plenitude of His wisdom we clearly understand how the unity of substance agrees with the plurality of Persons' (ibid., VI 25, 992 A).

Such is Richard's demonstration of the Trinity. He promises at the outset to prove the rationality of the doctrine (ibid., I 5, 893 B-C), and recurs to the question of rational proof several times (e.g. III 1, 915 C); he admits the difficulty of understanding the Trinity in unity (IV 1, 931 A), yet makes a definite attempt to commend that fact to reason. But in the *Benjamin Minor* (quoted above, pp. 45f) and again in the *Benjamin Major* (IV 17, *P.L.* 196, 156 A-B) he had maintained that while the unity belongs to the fifth grade of contemplation, being above but not contrary to reason, the Trinity in unity, which is both above and contrary to reason, belongs to the sixth. In the

De Trinitate he is feeling his way to a different outlook, and there is some discrepancy between this later work and the earlier; but it is no more of a discrepancy than may be expected in the active development of an author's thought, and the more important question is how far his proof succeeds. It does not, of course, succeed completely, and no proof has yet been constructed which is logically compelling; but it does show an original bent in using religious experience to illustrate the essential rather than the economic Trinity, and if the argument from human nature is at all to be accepted, it is clear that Richard follows the right line in arguing, not from intellect, but from love.

JONAH: A STUDY IN OLD TESTAMENT HERMENEUTICS

by Professor BREVARD S. CHILDS

I

In the history of exegesis there have been few books within the Old Testament which have roused more vigorous controversy than the interpretation of the Book of Jonah. There was a time when one's orthodoxy could be quickly determined simply on the basis of opinions held regarding its historicity. Yet in spite of the stormy past it is a surprising fact that in modern times there has been a great unanimity of interpretation reached among Old Testament scholars. On the one hand, the attempt of the older expositors, such as Pusey and Orelli, to defend the book as literal history has been almost universally rejected as untenable. On the other hand, the allegorical interpretation of G. A. Smith has found few followers. Rather, the great majority of modern scholars[1] have reached the conclusion that the book of Jonah is simply a narrative which the author used as a means of conveying a general truth in an interesting and effective manner. R. H. Pheiffer[2] is typical when he calls it 'a short story with a moral'. The spiritual message of the book is the lesson that God's love is not exclusively confined to Israel, but that Israel carries a responsibility of sharing it with others.

This generally accepted understanding among scholars, however, still comes as a surprise to many within the Church. Often even the pastor himself finds difficulty reconciling this alleged verdict of scholarship with his conviction regarding the nature of the Bible. It would be helpful to sketch briefly the reasons which have led so many scholars to find in the book of Jonah something other than a historical account. In the first place, the style of the book differs markedly from that of the other

[1] Cf. J. Bewer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Jonah* (1912), pp. 7ff; T. H. Robinson, *Die Zwölf Kleinen Propheten* (1938), p. 118; A Weiser, *Das Buch der zwölf Kleinen Propheten*, I (1949), p. 188; A. Bentzen, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, II (1949), p. 147.

[2] *Introduction to the Old Testament* (1941), p. 587.

so-called minor prophets. The book does not contain the speeches of Jonah, but stories about him. The psalm in chapter 2 is no exception to this since it is a stylised form of Old Testament liturgy. The book clearly focuses on the didactic element, omitting all extraneous material and ending abruptly once the lesson has been taught. Secondly, the historical references within the book not only are without verification, but according to the analogy of historical science their occurrence is extremely improbable. There is no historical evidence that Nineveh ever repented; in fact, the subsequent attitude of the Old Testament prophets to Assyria increases the difficulty of its acceptance. Moreover, the references to the size of the city (3.3) and the title of its king (3.6) are felt to reflect popular folk-lore rather than historical material. Finally, the story of a man being swallowed by a fish, of his living three days in its belly, and being spewed out safely on dry land has been characterised by many as an adaptation of a popular myth found in the literature of the Greeks.

To many readers, however, these arguments of critical scholarship have little force. They seem to them rationalistic. Why could not God have caused a fish to have swallowed Jonah if He so desired? Could not God have kept him alive in its belly for three days? Can one come to the Bible in a critical manner or must one come only in faith? We see clearly that there are two approaches to this question which differ widely due to their varying presuppositions. Let us first investigate the method of critical scholarship, and then evaluate its usage regarding the Bible.

Biblical criticism is a science whose roots reach back to the period of the Enlightenment. There are various divisions under the broad title of biblical criticism. Literary criticism concerns itself chiefly with questions of structure, date, and authorship. Historical criticism attempts to understand, evaluate, and interpret historical evidence for the purpose of forming as true a picture as possible of a given period of time. This critical method rests upon certain presuppositions, the most important of these being that the Bible shares in common the laws governing the formation of any secular literature. This means that the date and authorship of the various books of the Bible can be determined *empirically* since they also reflect their particular age

hrough language, structure, and content. Moreover, modern biblical scholarship believes that its research has confirmed this presupposition. The Bible does share the characteristics of a human book. Its language follows the same grammatical principles as in secular literature. The style of its books varies in vocabulary and form depending on its particular author. Its text has suffered the same corruption as every other book which has been passed down through the hands of copyists. In these areas no special hermeneutics is needed since the same laws regarding secular literature are to be used. The form into which the Bible is cast not only allows, but demands critical study.

Critical science of the Bible has gone another step. It has asked itself the question whether it is logical to distinguish between form and content. If the Bible shares in the laws of secular literature completely regarding its form, why does it not share in its content also? Do not the events recorded in the Bible assume also the ambiguity and temporality of every event which enters the world of phenomena? The destruction of Jericho, the fall of Jerusalem, the return from the exile, are events which have entered the stream of history, and can be studied empirically. Like every such science the results of research can never be absolute, but reflect only degrees of probability regarding what is considered true. Therefore the biblical events can also be subjected to the general laws of historical criticism to determine their historicity. Is the writer an eyewitness? How soon after the event is the record? Is the writer personally concerned or 'neutral' regarding the event reported? Are there contradictions or inconsistencies between two accounts of the same event? etc.

Once again modern biblical scholarship believed that its research has confirmed its presuppositions regarding the content of the Bible. Often the Bible does contain two accounts of one event differing markedly in content (cf. Mark 11.12ff and Matt. 21.18ff). There are contradictions, inconsistencies, and distortions (cf. 1 Sam. 16.17ff and 1 Sam. 17.1ff; 2 Sam. 24.24 and 1 Chron. 21.25). There are events whose historicity is confirmed to a high degree. There are other events which not only escape verification, but also whose historicity is highly improbable.

II

If we are now acquainted with the methods of biblical criticism, a *theological* evaluation is certainly in order. It is the offence of the Written Word that it has fully entered into the frailty of this world. It has partaken completely of its nature which means of its relativity. It shares in a reality which we can only approach in connexion with the empirical method. This means we can at best only partially understand. The linguistic vehicle by which the message is transmitted is a good example of this. The Old Testament is written in Hebrew. No matter how strong one's faith, he can only read its lines when he has submitted himself to the empirical study accompanying the learning of any language.

Now the Church has made a similar confession regarding the nature of the revelation in Jesus Christ, the Living Word. He is truly man. He has entered completely into the weakness of this world, partaking of its relativity. According to the New Testament Jesus was truly man, 'yet without sin' (Heb. 4.15). However, this verse does not limit the extent of Christ's humanity. Sin in the Bible is disobedience, not lack of intellectual knowledge. The witness is that Jesus was absolutely obedient to the Father even as a man. Men beheld Jesus Christ with the same eyes by which they perceived the rest of the world. They heard His voice with the same ears. The natural means of understanding were maintained along with the possibility of misunderstanding. Because of this fact, the understanding of the Bible cannot be removed from the sphere of uncertainty. There can be no short cut to its secrets which does not make use of criticism. We have to read it like any other book, study its words, and analyse its form. Moreover, we must form a judgment about its content using the only method available for evaluating the reality of this world.

Thus far we have acknowledged the human side of the Bible. We have argued that because the Bible has entered into the sphere of reality understood only in conjunction with the empirical method that historical criticism is legitimate and obligatory. However, the Bible claims and the Christian Church has always confessed another reality which transcends the reality understood by the human mind. God in Jesus Christ

has entered the world and has brought 'newness of life'. The confession that Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God is an impossibility for the human mind bound by the limits of its experience. Only as the new and divine reality is revealed can this confession be made. This reality is not discovered, but is revealed. Its truth is not relative, but absolute. This reality is not judged by human reason, but human reason is judged by it.

The mere acknowledgment of a reality transcending that which can be handled through reason does not solve the problem. Liberal theology also affirms a reality over and above that fully grasped by reason, which is conceived of in the pattern of idealistic philosophy as 'eternal truths'. The Bible is the human vehicle pointing beyond itself to these unchangeable verities. Then again, the existential philosophy employed so effectively by Rudolf Bultmann, while rejecting the liberal solution, nevertheless insists also on a reality which is not subject to the laws of the 'fallen world'. Bultmann makes much of the dialectic between being bound in the 'world of our disposal' (*verfügbare Welt*) and the life of 'freedom from the claims of the world' (*Entweltlichung*). This latter possibility is a reality which one enters into through the existential decision of the moment called faith. It is characterised by a transcendence of the laws of the empirical world, among which is included freedom from the claims of the historical past.

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss at length the liberal and existential solution, but rather to suggest new insights toward a solution. The problem with which we are faced is how to relate the reality witnessed to in the Bible, which is understood through the means of reason on the basis of the empirical sciences, with the reality made known in Jesus Christ which transforms our human reason. First of all, we must affirm with all emphasis that, according to the biblical witness, reality is not two but one. We can never allow two unrelated areas of reality to exist. The Jesus of history is the Christ of faith. The manner in which the two aspects of reality are related is cloaked in divine mystery, but the fact of a union must be maintained.

According to the testimony of the Gospels the nature of reality is ambivalent. There is a mystery which surrounds the coming

of the Kingdom. This understanding finds its classical expression in Mark's account of the purpose of Jesus' parabolic teaching. 'Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God: but unto them that are without, all these things are done in parables: that seeing they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand' (4.11f). Jesus taught in parables in order both to reveal and to conceal His identity. The parable was a vehicle through which man could be confronted with the Word of Truth in a veiled manner. Rather than being overwhelmed with the full force of divine revelation, the parable created a situation which allowed man room for decision.[1] He was challenged to surrender his will in order that he might understand. Only as he committed himself to the claims of the Truth in Christ did the parable become to him a revelation rather than a concealment. Only to the 'eyes of faith' was the mystery of the Kingdom revealed.

It becomes increasingly evident that the basic problem regarding the understanding of the biblical reality is Christological. Jesus Christ entered history in the incarnation truly man and truly God. To be truly man means to partake fully of the temporality of this world. Hence Jesus was a Jew; He was born in the first century; He lived in Palestine. His offence was that to the natural eye there was nothing whatever unique about Him (1 Cor. 1.18ff). The witness of the Gospels is that His miracles even as His parables were ambiguous to the natural eye. Yet Jesus Christ was truly God. This confession is not made on the basis of human insight or logic. To 'flesh and blood' it remains an impossibility. Only through the work of the Spirit of God does one make this confession (Matt. 16.17). The manner in which the Spirit accomplishes this remains hidden. All we know is that there is a 'new understanding'. The Scriptures speak of a 'new heart', a 'new man', a 'new being'. In this transformation the earth-bound temporal form is not abrogated, but changed. The Christ of faith can never be known apart from the Jesus of history. The divine reality remains one with its human manifestation because of the incarnation. To understand the divine, one can never by-pass the world of *empeiria*, the world which is subject to the laws of

[1] Cf. the discussion of T. F. Torrance, *Scottish Journal of Theology*, Vol. 3 (1950), pp. 301ff.

probability. The reality witnessed to in the Bible continues to partake of two noetic spheres.

This understanding can be illustrated in the following manner. In the Old Testament we are dealing with the footprints of God stamped into the history of the Hebrew people. These prints can be studied by all. Their length, their width, their depth can be measured. At times these prints are deep and unmistakable in size. At other times the marks are faint and distorted. The historical method sees them along with many other marks of history and can only compare them on the basis of past experience. To the rational mind there is nothing in the steps to point to the work of God. Even when the records are comparatively clear as in the case of the fall of Jerusalem in 587 B.C., there is nothing unique which would in any way indicate a divine action. It is judged as one of the many inevitable steps in the expansion of the Neo-Babylonian empire. If the account in Scripture is faint, then it is characterised as legendary or mythical by historical criticism.

To the 'eyes of faith', however, these prints are signs pointing to the redemptive work of God in history. The marks become the means of understanding the God who made the prints. In faith the empty footprints are filled with the form of Him who acted on their behalf. It belongs to the nature of God's revelation that He communicates the fulness of His reality only by means of these prints. In spite of their inadequacy and frailty, these prints remain the sole vehicle through which faith is led to the true and full reality.

It is the task of Old Testament exegesis to deal seriously with both areas into which the full reality has penetrated. It must come to grips with the fact that the human witness is the only channel to the full reality. Biblical criticism is the attempt to understand the temporal form of the witness with the only tools available for this area of life. The great challenge of the exegete comes, as in prayerful expectation, God's Spirit opens his eyes to the full reality known only in faith. The temporal form becomes then a transparency through which the divine light shines giving the picture its true perspective.

III

Let us return to the problem of the Book of Jonah and attempt

to apply the hermeneutical principles which we have outlined to its exegesis. In the first place, the research of historical criticism must be taken seriously as the means by which we reach in faith the full reality of this witness. We learn from our critical analysis that the events recorded are not historical. By this we mean that, judged by the methods of scientific historical research, these events have not entered into the realm of measurable time and space. These footprints are judged faint or non-existent. At this point it is crucial for us in our exegetical method to realise that this judgment in no way eliminates the reality of the biblical witness. Moreover, this reality is not just a general truth or idea about the universality of God's love. The Bible is not concerned with transmitting general truths about God, but is the Word from God calling forth a response. The fact that the Church heard a prophetic witness in the Book of Jonah gives us the key to its understanding. The prophets were men called of God to deliver to a particular people in a particular situation a particular message. Theirs was the Word of God confronting His people with the divine claim, and demanding obedience. Of such a nature also is the Book of Jonah.

We can reconstruct from critical study the historical situation into which the message was given. There can be little doubt on the basis of the late Hebrew language of the book that its composition falls into the post-exilic era. This period is characterised by the growing political frustration of the community, by the deep economic poverty of the majority of the people, and by the increasing religious exclusiveness of the Jewish religion. The preaching of 2nd Isaiah regarding God's purpose of universal salvation seems almost to have passed without effect. Into this situation the message of Jonah was spoken.

The unknown prophetic writer of the book cloaked his message in story form. He chose as his main figure an obscure prophet who had lived during the reign of Jeroboam II, Jonah the son of Amittai (cf. 2 Kings 14.25). He fashioned a story using as his material many of the older traditions known in Israel, some mythical, some legendary.[1] This was his story: Jonah, the prophet, had been chosen for a divine mission to Nineveh. Because of his disobedience in fleeing from God, he had been

[1] Cf. Hans Schmidt, *Jona* (1907), for a detailed study of the traditions.

hrown into the sea to drown. Yet God had miraculously saved
im by means of a great fish, and given him the task once more.
onah preached in Nineveh, and again God's grace was mani-
est as the heathen people responded and repented. Then
onah was personally offended that his message of judgment on
he city had not been carried out. He went out beyond the city
o sulk. As he sat out in the heat of the day, God caused a tree
o sprout up and shade him, at which Jonah was exceedingly
appy. Then God let a worm destroy the tree, at which Jonah
itterly complained. God spoke to him: 'You pity the plant, for
which you did not labour . . . should not I pity Nineveh, that
great city in which there are more than a hundred and twenty
housand persons who do not know their right hand from their
eft.'

The story comes to an abrupt end, but its purpose is thereby
evealed. This is not just an interesting story concerned with a
emote figure in the distant past. Nor is its point to be found
n a moralism. The historical setting is a mere device to hide
he existential nature of the message. As in the parable of the
vineyard (Isa. 5.1ff), suddenly through the story the hearers
are addressed by the Word of God. It is no longer a tale about
Jonah, but about them. They are the people chosen by God,
miraculously saved from death, and given another lease on life
to proclaim the message of salvation to the heathen. They are
offended that God has a concern for others, for whom they wish
only destruction. The message of Jonah is God's Word in action
udging this disobedience and challenging them to a new
apprehension of their divine commission.

The story of Jonah, judged by criticism as mythical, has
become the vehicle for the Word of God acting in the lives of
His people. The story is not history in the sense of measurable
events in time and space. However, it is *the history* in the
biblical understanding of the term: God's purpose for mankind
being realised through the activity of His Word. The Bible is
a witness to the reality of this redemptive purpose which
reality, although concealed in the temporal forms of this world,
nevertheless, is revealed in its fulness to those who respond to
His call.

'ABBA, FATHER' AND BAPTISM

by The Rev. Professor T. M. TAYLOR

Among the many insights for which we should be indebted to Professor Rudolf Bultmann is the recognition that πίστις is for Paul at once active and passive. Simultaneously it is 'faith' *and* 'obedience'. To be sure it receives the unmerited grace of God in a completely passive way,[1] but at the same time it actively responds to that grace in obedience.[2] By faith the believer accepted passively at God's hand a new freedom from sin heretofore unknown (Rom. 6.1-14), but in that very 'act' of *receiving*, he also by faith made himself *obedient* to God (Rom. 6.15-23).[3] The one cannot be had without the other for they are absolutely inseparable.

This seemingly paradoxical bivalent understanding of *faith*, characteristic of Paul, is well depicted by Professor Bultmann thus:

> If, simply copying, one reproduces the statements of Paul, it becomes evident, therefore, that, in reality, *two acts of faith or belief and consequently also two concepts of faith-belief* must be distinguished. The first is belief (in the narrower popular use of the English word): willingness to consider true (=believe) the facts reported of the pre-existent Son of God—incarnation, crucifixion, resurrection from the dead—and to see in them a demonstration

[1] 'The attitude of man in which he receives the gift of "God's righteousness" and in which the divine deed of salvation accomplishes itself within him is *faith*. . . .
'At the outset, it may be simply said that "faith" is the condition for the receipt of "righteousness", taking the place of "works", which in the Jewish view constitute that condition. It may also be simply said at the outset that such "faith" is the acceptance of the Christian message—following a usage that developed in the missionary enterprise of Hellenistic Christianity.' R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (2 vols., London, 1951, 1955), I, 314.

[2] '*Paul understands faith primarily as obedience*; he understands the act of faith as an act of obedience.' ibid., p. 314. See discussion, pp. 314-17.

[3] 'For Paul the acceptance of the message in faith takes the form of an act of obedience because of the fact that the message which demands acknowledgment of the crucified Jesus as Lord demands of man the surrender of his previous understanding of himself, the reversal of the direction his will has previously had.' ibid., p. 315.
'"Faith" is the acceptance of the kerygma not as mere cognisance of it and agreement with it but as that genuine obedience to it which includes a new understanding of one's self. Therefore, it cannot be an act that takes place once and then becomes a thing of the past. . . . *It determines one's living in its manifold historical reality*, and there is no moment in which the man of faith is released from the obedience of constantly living out of the "grace" of God.' ibid., p. 324.

of the grace of God. The second is a faith which is a self-surrender to the grace of God and which signifies the utter reversal of a man's previous understanding of himself—specifically, the radical surrender of his human 'boasting'.

A homogeneous concept of faith-belief and a single decisive act of faith-belief would be detectable only if the decision-question whether a man is willing to give up his old understanding of himself and henceforth understand himself only from the grace of God and the question whether he will acknowledge Jesus Christ as the Son of God and Lord should turn out to be one and the same question. That is just what they evidently are in the real intention of Paul.[1]

Whether Paul's willingness to re-evaluate himself was a concomitant of his recognition of Jesus of Nazareth as Messiah and Lord in the conversion experience itself, or was a logical conclusion shortly to be drawn from it,[2] is of little consequence at this point. Their necessary interrelationship was unmistakable in his personal experience of the living Christ. For practical purposes he could treat them as one.

It is my growing conviction that the unqualified *faith-obedience* which baptism is meant to initiate in the life of the believer may very well be indicated by the enigmatic expression, *ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ*, which twice occurs in Paul's letters.[3]

This bilingual formula, occurring here in the mid-fifties of the first century and, a decade later, carried back into the usage of Jesus by the earliest Evangelist,[4] must have enjoyed common currency in the first generations of the Church's life. Its bilingual character, as well as its appearance in these early Christian documents, attests its early origin. J. B. Gould declared:

[1] ibid., p. 300.

[2] H. G. Wood ('The Conversion of St. Paul: Its Nature, Antecedents, and Consequences', in *New Testament Studies*, I (1954), pp. 280-2) is right, I believe, in his insistence *contra* Bultmann that Paul's willingness to reassess his life under the judgment of God in the light of the Cross was, strictly speaking, a *consequence* of his conversion rather than a constituent element in it. With regard to the actual content of the conversion experience *per se* I am inclined to agree with A. D. Nock (*St. Paul* (New York, 1938), pp. 74ff) that it was 'a sudden intuition' of the truth of the Resurrection—'that the condemned criminal was in fact the Anointed One of God', and that immediately '*thereafter* Paul had to readjust his whole thinking'. The very way in which Paul supplements the *traditio resurrectionis* (1 Cor. 15.3-7) with his own vision of the risen Lord (v. 8), and the cardinal position which he assigns to the Resurrection in Christain doctrine (1 Cor. 15.12-19), it seems to me, tend to confirm the position of Nock and Wood.

[3] Gal. 4.6; Rom. 8.15.

[4] Mark 14.36. Neither Matthew (26.42) nor Luke (22.42) keep this strange bilingual combination in their accounts. Matthew simplifies the address to *πάτηρ μου*, while Luke has only the vocative *πάτηρ*.

This combination of Greek and Hebrew words could not of course appear in the speech of our Lord, who used only Hebrew. Neither is ὁ πατήρ explanatory of the ἀββά, as the Evangelists employ for this the formula, δ' ἐστιν μεθερμηνευόμενον, or simply, ὅ ἐστι. But this is a combination of the two, belonging to the later usage, and put here by the Evangelist into the mouth of Jesus.[1]

With others, Gould had put his finger upon something—'the later usage'—which he felt was significant, but which he could not, or at least did not, define. Dr Sanday insisted that to look upon ὁ πατήρ as nothing more than a translation of ἀββά was not enough. 'The three passages are . . . all too emotional for this explanation', and furthermore, 'interpretation is out of place in a prayer'.[2] Bishop Lightfoot admitted that 'St. Paul in both passages seems to dwell on it with peculiar emphasis'[3]; and Loisy went so far as to say that Paul 'succeeded in drawing out of the invocation, "O Father", his entire theory of salvation'.[4] More recently Professor Schlier has written, 'Here, as in Rom. 8.14, the prayer is a cry of the Spirit Himself. The content of the prayer is ἀββα, ὁ πατήρ.'[5] Many commentators have, thus, seemed to sense a profundity here, more than meets the eye, yet none seems to have been able to put his finger upon its substance.

Something may be said, perhaps, for the fact that the earliest Gospel, addressed to citizens of the empire, should have followed ἀββά = אבא with a Greek equivalent; but why should Paul, even though he were writing to churches of dual, Jewish-Gentile origin, use the expression ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ, twice, since his letters were written in Greek, the lingua franca of the period, which would have been understood even in purely Jewish communities of the dispersion? There can be no valid reason unless somehow the phrase did enjoy some 'later usage'—later, that is, than the period of Jesus' ministry as portrayed in the Gospels.[6]

[1] J. B. Gould, *The Gospel According to Mark* (I.C.C., New York, 1896), p. 270. For the opposite view, that the bilingual expression was original with Jesus, see M. P. Lagrange, *L'évangile selon Saint Mark* (4th ed., Paris, reprint 1947), p. 388.

[2] Wm. Sanday and A. C. Headlam, *The Epistle to the Romans* (I.C.C., New York, 1896), p. 203.

[3] J. B. Lightfoot, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* (London, 1902), p. 169.

[4] A. Loisy, *Épître aux Galates* (Paris, 1916), p. 166.

[5] Heinrich Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater* (Göttingen, 1949), p. 140.

[6] The conclusions of Professor Vernon McCasland in a recent article ['Abba, Father' in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXXII (June 1953), pp. 79-91] are, considered against the historical context, incredible. He holds that by the time Paul writes, using the expression in addressing Churches of the Gentile mission, ἀββά has become a metonym for God, its Aramaic meaning already forgotten, and ὁ πατήρ

For a number of years during which I have been working in, and living with, the Pauline letters for purposes of research along a broader line, I have been driven again and again to the conclusion that the expression, 'Abba, Father', is somehow connected with Christian Baptism. A recent essay by Dr J. A. T. Robinson moves in the same direction:

> The association at the Baptism of Jesus of the gift of the Spirit with the declaration of Sonship is the ground of the connexion between Christian Baptism, the Spirit, and our adoption as sons (Gal. 3.26-4.7; cf. Rom. 8.14-16). In Gal. 4.6 the correct translation should in all probability run: 'And to declare that ye are sons of God, God sent forth the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father.' Christian Baptism simply reproduces in the life of the Christian the one Baptism of Jesus begun in Jordan and completed in the Resurrection.[1]

One has but to read again such passages as Gal. 3.23-4.7 and Rom. 8.1-17 to realise how appropriate they would have been as early Christian homilies in connexion with a baptismal service.[2] We find explicit references to Baptism in the first, and a similar reference is not far removed from the second.[3] In Gal. 3.27 we find, 'For as many of you as have been baptised into Christ have been clothed in Christ',[4] and in Rom. 6.3-11 the same idea is developed more extensively, though in different figures.

But let us look at Rom. 8.1-17 from the point of view that it could have been developed originally as part of a baptismal sermon. At least, it seems to me, the kind of reasoning here set forth must have been worked out in Paul's mind in response to just this kind of practical situation. With this in mind let us paraphrase the passage:

> There is therefore now not a single accusation against you who (having

an appellative, so that the whole expression means, 'O God, my Father'. Thus it is virtually meaningless by mid-first century, at the very time when it first appears in our sources, and when Paul is obviously appealing to it because of its common currency and because it is saturated with profound significance. Furthermore, if McCasland's conclusions are correct, and Paul is writing for Gentile Christians, why should he not have written *θεέ, ὁ πατήρ μου*, if that is what he meant? The fact is that both Romans and Galatians are, on the basis of internal evidence, addressed to communities where there are sizable Jewish groups; and the meaning of so common an Aramaic term as אבא can scarcely have been unknown.

[1] J. A. T. Robinson, 'One Baptism', in *Scottish Journal of Theology* (Vol. 6, Sept. 1953), pp. 257-74, esp. p. 262f.

[2] Cf. also in the Captivity correspondence, Col. 2.6-15; Eph. 5.1-21, 25-27.

[3] Rom. 6.3ff.

[4] M. Dibelius, *Paul* (Philadelphia, 1953), pp. 93f, 105f, for the mystery garment figure.

been baptised) are in Christ Jesus. 2 For the law of the Spirit of life has set you free from the law of sin and death. 3 For in the face of the impotence of the Law, whereby it was weak through the flesh, God having sent his own Son, in a likeness of a flesh of sin and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh, 4 in order that the requirement of the Law might be fulfilled in us who (since our baptism) are walking not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit. 5 For those who are (living) in the flesh are concerned for the demands of the flesh, but those who are in the Spirit for the desires of the Spirit. 6 For the concern for the flesh is death, but concern for the Spirit is life and peace. 7 Therefore the concern for the flesh is animosity toward God 8 for it is not subject to God's law, nor can it be. 9 But (since you have been baptised) you are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if indeed God's Spirit dwells in you. Now if anyone does not have Christ's Spirit he is not Christ's man; 10 but if Christ is in you your body is dead on account of sin while your spirit is life on account of righteousness. 11 Now if the Spirit who raised Jesus up from the dead dwells in you (since your baptism), he who raised Christ Jesus up from the dead shall also revive your mortal bodies by his Spirit which is now inhabiting you.

12 So then, brothers, we are debtors, not to the flesh to live according to the flesh. 13 For if you are living according to the flesh you are going to die; but if by the Spirit (received at baptism) you kill the practices of the body you will live. 14 For as many as are being led by God's Spirit—these are God's sons. 15 For (at your baptism) you did not receive again a spirit of slavery for fear; but you did receive a spirit of sonship, by which we cry, 'Abba, Father!' 16 The Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are God's children; 17 and if (we are) children we are also heirs—heirs on the one hand of God and on the other fellow-heirs of Christ, if we are really suffering with him so that we may also be glorified with him.[1]

The thrust of both passages (Galatians and Romans), far from having anything to do with any indication of a mode of Baptism, as many have taken it, is that Christian Baptism implies virtually from the earliest days of the Church[2] that the person who submits to it does indeed 'drink of the cup' and is 'baptised with the Baptism' of his Lord. The dominical saying found in Mark 10.38, 'Can you drink of the cup which I am

[1] William Sanday saw this passage as a baptismal reference, and paraphrased it thus as early as 1896: 'When you were first baptised, and the communication of the Holy Spirit sealed your admission into the Christian fold, the energies which He imparted were surely not those of a slave. You had not once more to tremble under the lash of the Law. No! He gave you rather the proud inspiring consciousness of men admitted into His family, adopted as his sons. And the consciousness of that relation unlocks our lips in tender, filial appeal to God as our Father. Two voices are distinctly heard: one we know to be that of the Holy Spirit; the other is the voice of our own consciousness. And both bear witness to the same fact, that we are children of God.' Op. cit., p. 201f.

[2] This is apparent from the way in which Paul refers indirectly to Baptism in 1 Cor. 1.13ff. Cf. R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, I, 133ff, 311ff.

drinking, or can you be baptised in the Baptism with which I am being baptised?', must almost certainly have been in circulation as a part of the oral tradition.[1] The point of both Pauline passages is that Christian Baptism implies the participation of the disciple in the passion of Christ. He suffers, is crucified, dies, and is buried with Christ, and then rises to newness of life in him.[2] That is why the Rom. 8 passage comes to the conclusion that we find there:

> The Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are God's children; 17 and if (we are) children, we are also heirs, heirs on the one hand of God, and on the other fellow heirs of Christ, *if we* are really suffering with him (*εἴπερ συνπάσχομεν*), so that we may also be glorified with him.[3]

Here we can begin to see the relationship between the *ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ* of Galatians and Romans, on the one hand, and that of the Gethsemane story on the other hand. In the latter, *ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ* introduced *the prayer of submission to the will of God*: "*Ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ*, all things are possible for thee; take *this cup* away from me; yet it is not what I will, but what thou wilt."[4] In Galatians and Romans it is the coming of the Spirit of Christ *at Baptism*, to dwell in the believer, which enables him to say as Christ does in Gethsemane, *ἀλλ' οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω, ἀλλὰ τί σύ*. This marks the believer's submission to God's will; and what better means could there be to signalise it than by his crying out, as early Christian tradition asserted his Lord had done in Gethsemane, *ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ*?

Paul himself virtually equates *Baptism* with *crucifixion*, the climax of the passion, in the parellelism of 1 Cor. 1.3. Both Professor Cullmann and Dr Robinson have seen this:

[1] See Robinson's comments on this verse, op. cit., p. 259. Cf. R. Bultmann, *Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition* (Göttingen, 1931), p. 73.

[2] 'We have to realise that in Baptism there happens to us that which in the Cross and Resurrection of Jesus Christ took place for us. Baptism is not merely a reflection of that occurrence, as Barth teaches. It does not merely point to it. Its character is not merely cognitive or significatory. On the contrary, in it—that is, in the occurrence of Baptism itself—we have to do with what Christ did as what God does to us on whose behalf that which is proclaimed in the Cross and Resurrection of Christ took place. Baptism is therefore the appropriation of the work of Christ as it took place "for us" and indeed "for me".' Heinrich Vogel, 'The First Sacrament: Baptism', in *SJT* (Vol. 7, March 1954), p. 45. See full discussion, pp. 44-51. Cf. also John Heron, 'The Theology of Baptism' in *SJT* (Vol. 8, March 1955), p. 42f.

[3] Rom. 8.16f.

[4] Mark 14.36. Note the reference to *the cup* here, and in Mark 10.38 quoted above.

Is Christ divided? Was Paul crucified for you? or were ye baptised into the name of Paul? (1 Cor. 1.13)

'Here,' as Cullmann comments, 'the two expressions "you were baptised" and "another was crucified for you" are treated as synonymous . . . ,[1] Paul's argument is to stress the impossibility of Christian disunity: "There is one baptism," he is saying, "namely, Christ's death, in which you have all been baptised." '

I would not, brethren, have you ignorant, how that our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; and were all baptised into Moses in the cloud and in the sea. (1 Cor. 10.1f)

The point here is that the Israelites, simply by their participation in the saving events of the Exodus, were all automatically 'baptised', even though most subsequently fell away. So, the implication runs, the whole People of God have now been baptised in the new *Heilsgeschichte*, the death and resurrection of Christ, of which the Exodus was the type. There is a *fait accompli*, which has included every one of us, a general Baptism, whose very objectivity makes apostasy so serious. Paul bases his warning, not, as we might, on the vows taken at Christian initiation, but on the One Baptism of Christ in which all have been involved, whether they have received Church Baptism or not.[2]

This concept of the corporate Baptism of all believers in the Passion-Baptism of Christ,[3] viz. His suffering, death, and resurrection, is brought out in both of our Pauline passages which, as we have shown, are suggestive of baptismal homilies. In Gal. 3.27-28, he writes, 'For *as many of you* as have been baptised into Christ have been clothed in Christ . . . *for you are all one in Christ Jesus.*' In Rom. 6.4-5 he says, 'Therefore, *we have been buried together with him through our Baptism into his death*, so that . . . we also might walk in newness of life. *For if we have become joined to him in the likeness of his death, we shall be more so (in the likeness) of his resurrection.*' Thus we find Paul consistently taking the position that Baptism marks the individual's effective participation in the passion of Christ.

This incorporation of the believer into the sufferings of his Lord is identical with, or at least paralleled by, his incorporation into the family of God. In Baptism he becomes one of the *υἱοὶ θεοῦ*,[4] or *τέκνα θεοῦ*.[5] He is, thereby, also incorporated into

[1] Oscar Cullmann, *Baptism in the New Testament* (Chicago, 1950), p. 15.
[2] J. A. T. Robinson, op. cit., p. 268f.
[3] A distinctively Pauline contribution to the theology of Baptism, drawn from Gnostic thought. R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, I, pp. 141, 178, 298-300, 311ff.
[4] Gal. 3.26, 4.5-7, Rom. 8.14, 19; cf. 2 Cor. 6.18, Rom. 9.26.
[5] Gal. 4.28, 31, Rom. 8.16, 17, 21, 9.7, 8, Phil. 2.15.

σῶμα Χριστοῦ.[1] The classical reference here is, of course, 1 Cor. 12.12-13:

> For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body, so also is Christ; 13 *for we have all been baptised by one Spirit into one body*—whether (we were) Jews or Greeks, whether slaves or free men—*and all of us were given one Spirit to drink.*[2]

Here also, the receiving of Baptism and the giving of the Spirit are conjoined, as the normal expectation for Christian life and experience.

What better, more meaningful, more effective expression could there be by which the believer, immediately upon his Baptism, could express his acceptance of all this, than by his uttering, in the power of the newly granted Spirit, those memorable words which the earliest Gospel and, probably, the oral Gospel which preceded it, had attributed to Christ himself, when he submitted to the cup and Baptism of his passion?

Mark records Jesus' prayer in Gethsemane, 'Abba, Father, all things are possible for thee. Take this cup away from me. Yet, not what I want, but what thou (willest).'[3] Paul writes to the Christians of Galatia,

> Now because you are sons, God sent out the Spirit of his Son into our hearts (at *our* Baptism), crying, 'Abba, Father' (just as his Son did). So you are no longer a slave, but a son, and if you are a son you are also an heir. by God's act.[4]

And to the Roman Christians he wrote,

> For as many as are being led by God's Spirit, these are God's sons. For (at your Baptism) you did not receive a spirit of slavery again for fear; but you did receive a Spirit of sonship (*υἱοθεσία*) in which we cry, 'Abba, Father'. The Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are God's children, and if (we are) children we are also heirs, . . . if we are really suffering with him. . . .[5]

Just as the confession of sonship, 'Abba, Father', marked Jesus' unconditional submission to the Father's will and the formal inauguration of His passion, so the confession of the newly baptised believer, in the same terms as those preserved in the Christian oral tradition, would have marked his submission to the Divine will and his injection into the passion experience of

[1] 1 Cor. 10.16-17, 12.12f, 14-27, Rom. 12.4-5.
[2] Cf. *ποτίζειν* here with *ποτήριον*, Mark 10.38, 14.36.
[3] Mark 14.36. [4] Gal. 4.6-7. [5] Rom. 8.14-17.

his Lord. With what a depth of emotion the *ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ* would have been pronounced by the newly baptised saint! And, if this were so, with what a wealth of associations this unusual Aramaic-Greek formula would ever afterward be accompanied in the Christian's mind.

At the heart of the whole business of Baptism was the new covenantal relationship thus divinely validated. What more natural response could the human party to that covenant make than his acknowledgment of submission in the very words which the Christian tradition held to be dominically sanctioned? In the Spirit of Jesus he was saying exactly what his Lord had said before him.

My conjecture, therefore, is that these words comprise a formula which the convert was taught to say immediately following his Baptism, possibly in response to an otherwise cryptic formula preserved in Eph. 5.14, or something like it,

> Awake, O sleeping one,
> And arise from the dead,
> And Christ shall shine upon thee.[1]

For the first time in his life the person just baptised would be empowered and entitled to say, *ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ* (Gal. 4.6; Rom. 8.15). Just as Paul had declared that 'no one, speaking in the Spirit of God says, "Jesus is anathema," neither can any one say, "Jesus is Lord," excepting in the Holy Spirit',[2] so here, no one can rightfully say, *ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ*, unless it be in the power of the Spirit.[3] But, having put his faith in the vicarious Passion-Baptism of Christ, and having been baptised into Him, by His Spirit, the believer could, and does, cry out triumphantly, *ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ*.

If, as we believe, the expression, *ἀββά, ὁ πατήρ*, was a baptismal formula, familiar to every Christian in both Jewish and Gentile churches alike, Paul would only have had to allude to it, as he does in Galatians and Romans, and its full and profound significance would have registered immediately in the hearts of his readers, or hearers. They had all uttered it at their Baptisms, and had witnessed it frequently at the Baptism of others. With all the richness of its Gethsemane associations in the Christian tradition, as a testimony to Jesus' self-effacing

[1] Cf. Isa. 60.1-2; also Isa. 9.2; 2 Cor. 4.6.
[2] 1 Cor. 12.3. [3] Gal. 4.6; Rom. 8.14-16.

submission to the will of God, the next step was for the Church to employ it as the formula by which the Christian neophyte would signalise his own submission to the Father's will. Its bilingual nature, moreover, together with Paul's use of it in the mid-fifties of the first century, confirms its origin within the first generation of the Church's life, beyond any question; and the kind of usage which we have conjectured would go far to explain the subtle profundity which virtually all commentators have felt to be lurking in the phrase.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought. By JOHN BAILLIE. Oxford University Press. Pp. viii + 155. 15s. net.

DR BAILLIE's new book, based on his Evans Lectures at Aberystwyth, and his Bampton Lectures at Columbia, is a survey of the treatment by modern theologians of one of the cardinal doctrines of Christianity. Modern theology at its best is characterised by a renewed understanding that all our theological thinking must serve the revelation that has been given to us, and it is this which has led to the revival of theology in the midst of which we are living. Thinkers of many different traditions have contributed to this revival of revelational theology, but it is probably fair to see, as Dr Baillie does, some unity in their concerns, though there remain important differences which, as we shall suggest, are not clearly enough exhibited in his account. Dr Baillie has himself played a part in this theological endeavour, and his book is more than 'an extended review', for it also tells us, both explicitly and by the arrangement and selection of the material, something about where its author stands.

In an opening chapter, Dr Baillie reminds us of the sombre background against which the modern recovery of revelation took place. Perhaps indeed his detachment and calm lucidity fail to bring out strikingly enough the decay of Christian theology from its foundations upwards which had afflicted the Protestant and Anglican Churches during the period leading up to our own time. He then passes to the main body of his book, in which he sketches, with abundant and varied quotation, what he conceives to be the salient features of the modern view. In revelation, God offers to us, not a body of propositions, but Himself. The divine self-disclosure is from subject to subject, and of subject to subject. Neither Bible, whether considered as a body of propositions, or, with Farrer, as a quarry of inspired images, nor yet doctrine, must be identified with revealed truth. There are indeed truths of revelation (Temple) which arise when we reflect upon God's self-disclosure, but their status is human, and though they are not formulated without the enablement and guidance of God, not inerrant.

Revelation is of that which is man's ultimate concern (Tillich). Revelation is accordingly not, as Kraemer thinks, characteristic only of the Judaeo-Christian and Islamic religious tradition, for some revelation has been given to all men, and the idea of revelation is

common to all religions. But what is distinctive in Christianity is its content: Christ as our life, our deliverance from our ultimate human exigency. In Christ we know God in Person: he is revealed in the mystery of His Presence, or Parousia. This revelation is given in history, that is, in the interaction of event and interpretation. This interaction of the divine and the human, which begins in the Old Testament, and indeed in lesser degrees is found even outside the biblical tradition, comes to its climax in the Incarnation, the supreme interaction of the divine and the human, and therefore the fulness of revelation.

Man's response to revelation is faith, considered as *fiducia*, not *notitia* or *assensus*. Doctrine has its subordinate place, but differences in creed do not imply a different faith, for at the intellectual level we are only relating our faith to our culture, and not expressing its essence, which is personal trust. Thus revelation is only completed by the *testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti*. Though we receive revelation in the *koinonia* of the Church, it is given essentially to individuals, as the Spirit brings them to personal encounter with God.

The Bible is not, as Thornton thinks, the 'whole with which revelation as a whole is to be identified'. Scripture is 'the written witness' to revelation, and not revelation itself. Thus it is at no point inerrant. No distinction in this respect can be made between doctrines and historical events, nor between propositions and images. On the other hand the biblical writers, though not inerrant, are inspired even in the words in which they express the revelation they have received in the intensity of their personal encounter with God.

Finally, Dr Baillie, in a passage which perhaps expresses his own thought more than most in the book, makes room for 'natural theology' as an implication of a general revelation given to all men, and thought of in Scripture as the Noachic covenant. Special revelation is thus set in a context of 'general revelation', in which God deals with all men through the medium of history, though it is the special gift of the Hebrews to recognise this divine action in the events of their life.

Dr Baillie's book may be considered in two aspects. We may ask what sort of an account Dr Baillie has given of the theologians whose work he surveys, and in doing that we shall necessarily also be evaluating Dr Baillie's own position. More broadly, we may also fruitfully consider the abiding value of the school of thought represented in this book. It need not be said that Dr Baillie has read everything that matters, and reproduces it with his customary lucidity, sometimes with the aid of his own excellent translation of quotations. If we part company with him, as the present reviewer in the last resort does, it will be on account of his selection and

arrangement of the material provided by these many and varied theologians. That arrangement legitimately and necessarily reflects Baillie's own theological judgment. On the other hand, we may question if it suits equally well every theologian whose work he notices. The endeavour to consider so many theologians, as distinct in their approach as Barth and Tillich, Thornton and Bonhoeffer, in the space of a short book, has the inevitable result that their thought is exhibited in a systematic framework which is the author's and not theirs. In the case of those writers with whom he is most in sympathy, such as Temple and Brunner, this does very well; but it is hard to recognise the characteristic voices of Barth or of Tillich, however accurately reproduced where they come under notice, in a framework of thought which differs so strikingly from that which is respectively their own.

The effect of this simplification, almost unavoidable, granted the premises on which the book is written, is to create of these theologians an artificial unity, greater than their actual likeness to one another warrants, and so to approximate them all, as may indeed be legitimate in the case of many, to a single school of thought, of which Dr Baillie is himself a notable representative. I hope Dr Baillie will not object if we describe this school as semi-liberal (in America, where points of reference are a little different, they would be called neo-orthodox). Its standpoint, well exhibited in Dr Baillie's own systematic framework, is such as to justify the title, for while this school differs from the old liberals in giving revelation a place of real importance in its theology, it approaches revelation by way of a personalistic existentialism that is as philosophical, or as 'metaphysical' (though this is seldom realised) as the older scholastic tradition ever was. Thus revelation does not in the end decisively determine their thought: it remains somehow in the sphere of 'philosophy of religion', and not of dogmatics. These thinkers lead up to Christology by way of personalism and philosophy of history: they do not, as indeed they might, derive their personalism and historicism from their Christological analysis.

Thus the issue between this school and those who hold to a more consistently Christological approach to revelation is a subtle one, since their paths cross at so many points. But in the end, as it seems to the reviewer, they are going in different directions. For if we start from the personalistic philosophy of religion, it will determine our Christology, and Christ will be allowed to reveal God only in ways that are satisfactory to the personalist. It may be suspected that personalism has thus become the new natural theology when we find so sharp a divorce as is here postulated between faith and theology, between personal encounter and the propositions of the

Word, or when we find it asserted, as by Dr Baillie on p. 47, that we know God by acquaintance. For if we start with Christ, and not with personalism, we discover that He indeed reveals God personally, and so gives to us what may be called analogically, or perhaps better, metaphorically, personal knowledge of God, but that is because He reveals God by all that He is, because indeed He *is* what God is, being of one substance with the Father. While that indeed means that God's self-disclosure transcends the propositions of faith, it also means that it cannot be divorced from the words of Christ, or from those propositions in which the Apostles, and the Church after them, proclaim the ascended Lord, who is no longer simply given to our terrestrial knowledge. It means that the Church, the Word and the Sacraments (on which last Dr Baillie is silent), as the media of Christ's present self-revelation, cannot be left out of account. If we have personal knowledge of God, subject to subject, it is a much more mysterious and indirect matter than the semi-liberals make it sound, and sometimes much more like *assensus* than they will admit.

Thus it is significant that Dr Baillie, very fairly it must be said, in view of his own preoccupations, does draw our attention to Barth's refusal to have anything to do with the removal of *notitia* and *assensus* from their indissoluble connexion with faith. Barth is himself able, when he wishes, to use the language of personalism, and even of 'I-thou', without falling into the antithesis beloved of the semi-liberal school, because for him Christology is the determinative doctrine, the starting-point and not the conclusion. We cannot agree with Dr Baillie that Barth can be treated as if he were a slightly out-of-step member of this school. At every point he shows his superiority of judgment. This does not commit us to agreeing with him either, in everything that he says. If, like the reviewer, we come from another tradition, we shall doubtless consider that we have been enabled to see certain realities, such as the Church, the Sacraments, and the liturgy, a little more clearly than Barth does. But time is likely to show that it is Barth and not the semi-liberals, whatever their churchmanship, who stood in the great line of succession from the early Fathers. In taking his stand on what is permanent in Christianity, the Christology, he shows the way in which our modern insights can indeed be taken up into our theology in a corrected form, without the clichés of a passing philosophy so determining our thought that we have to squeeze the grand tradition of our faith into their narrow and soon obsolete forms.

We may regret that Dr Baillie did not have space to consider certain other pressing questions, which arise when one views the issues in this Christological light, such as the place of metaphysics in the analysis of faith, and the connexion of revelation with culture,

of which Dr Thornton has much that is important to say. But of that we cannot well complain. Where Dr Baillie's book must seem inadequate in the last resort is in his failure to make this Christological correction of modern theology, or indeed to show us clearly that other thinkers, with whom he may perhaps disagree, have been engaged in the task.

WILLIAM NICHOLLS

The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology. Edited by W. D. DAVIES and D. DAUBE in honour of CHARLES HAROLD DODD. Cambridge, 1956. 70s. net.

No one has a better claim to be called a 'scholar discipled to the Kingdom of Heaven' than Professor C. H. Dodd; and in this handsome volume twenty-six other scholars have paid him a worthy tribute. Not that they always agree with him; but many of them reveal the debt which they owe to his work, and the editors have wisely attempted to make this something more than a collection of essays by concentrating on the two main themes which Dodd has himself illuminated by his writings, the background of the New Testament and its eschatology. The ten essays which deal with the background form a less satisfying unity than the remaining sixteen, as is almost inevitable with a subject so diversified, since exegesis and textual criticism have to rub shoulders with the Gnostics and the Ebionites; but even in this first section of the book there is enough to make it a necessary possession for all who want to know how such studies stand today. The second part of the book forms, on the whole, a remarkably complete guide to the present-day understanding of the eschatology of the New Testament. There are gaps of course, of which perhaps the most serious is the lack of any extended reference to the Apocalypse and the Johannine Epistles; if there is anything in R. P. Casey's opinion (p. 76) that 'the Johannine riddle will be solved only after the point of the entire Johannine corpus has been discovered', it is all the more to be regretted that this volume does not carry us further in that direction. But it would be absurd to expect a single volume to cover the whole of this great area, and it surely remains true that this is one of the most satisfying *Festschriften* to have appeared since the custom began.

There is a useful balance between contributions which assess the present state of knowledge and opinion on a given subject, and those which break fresh ground. The former naturally predominate in the first part of the book. E. C. Blackman leads off with an essay on exegesis which will appeal to most British scholars as an excellently sane account of the task before them. He dismisses the oversimplification of the 'liberal' historians like Harnack, and the un-

justified elaborations of the traditional doctrine of the fourfold sense of scripture, preferring (with Luther) to speak of a literal and a spiritual sense, and to describe the intimate relation between the two by saying that the spiritual sense is contained within the literal (and not added to it as a kind of extra), so that the two must always be studied and apprehended together. He follows Luther again in insisting that Christ Himself is the spiritual sense of Scripture, and that this 'provides us with both a canon of interpretation and a principle of unity' (p. 22). From this point of view he has criticisms to make of Farrer, Vischer and Thornton, all of which will ring true to the ears of most of us; yet one could have wished that he had pursued this part of his inquiry further, for it is by no means self-evident how the principle of 'witness to Christ' is to be applied in individual cases. Our understanding of Christ's person and work depends on our reading of the whole biblical history, and our reading of the biblical history is, as Luther's principle states, conditioned by our belief in Christ, who He was and is and what He did and does: exegesis affects Christology and vice versa. The doctrines of the Church and of the testimony of the Holy Spirit are no doubt the guarantee that we do not here argue in a circle; but it is not always clearly seen that the relation of Jesus Christ to the whole biblical history is a pressing exegetical as well as theological question. Typology and the 'prefigurative' exegesis of Farrer may, if pressed too far, subtly distort our understanding of the universal significance of Christ; for if we can exhibit no connexion between the meaning of an Old Testament passage as intended by the author or redactor and its meaning when interpreted typologically, we are taking a step towards the denial that Christ's coming in the flesh is the climax *both* of God's dealings with men *and* of men's failure to respond to Him in obedience within the covenant. (A similar danger arises perhaps from a different source when the whole stress is laid on the mighty acts of God in the *Heilsgeschichte* to the exclusion of the response, obedient or disobedient, of the people with whom He has made covenant.) We badly need a further examination of the nature and limits of typology, particularly since our purpose in making use of it appears often to be quite different from that of the ancient writers; but it would be captious to criticise Dr Blackman for not having done more towards this end in one short essay.

Two papers by P. Katz and K. W. Clark discuss developments in textual studies of the Septuagint and the New Testament respectively. The former is a most useful résumé which should be read by all who make any use, however incidental, of the LXX text; it contains, among other things, strong criticism of Kahle's theory that the LXX began as a series of Greek Targums, and a warning not to

trust citations of the LXX proper in the third edition of the *Biblia Hebraica*. Professor Clark also provides a useful summary, and concludes that the time has not yet come, although it will come before long, for a wholesale reconstruction of hypotheses about the history of the text of the New Testament.

Dealing more directly with the background of the New Testament itself, Professor F. C. Grant brings together a large number of references and data on economic affairs, and W. F. Albright recounts some of the recent archaeological discoveries which are forcing us to revise our estimate of the historical value of the Fourth Gospel. R. P. Casey, in a more controversial paper on Gnosis and Gnosticism, gives strong reasons for his opinion that 'the New Testament requires no explanation, either as a whole or in any of its parts, in terms of a hypothetical primitive Gnosticism' (p. 80). In this, so far as the Fourth Gospel is concerned, Albright supports him (p. 163). But those who agree with Casey's general conclusion may not be disposed to agree with all his opinions expressed en route, e.g. his denial of any Messianic secret in the narrative of Mark 8 (pp. 57-60). And if we can agree to dismiss the Gnostics, H. J. Schoeps (pp. 115ff) is determined to strike another blow for the Ebionite version of Christianity. But the two most original papers in Part I of the book are those by W. D. Davies, who systematically demolishes Archbishop Carrington's theory that the structure of some early Christian documents (and especially Mark's Gospel) was determined by the needs of the early Christian calendar and lectionary, and Principal Matthew Black, who shows that the accounts of the Essenes in Hippolytus and Josephus probably go back to a single earlier account which Hippolytus has faithfully reproduced.

Part II opens with a short paper by Professor T. W. Manson on 'The Life of Jesus: some tendencies in present-day research'. This paper forms the obvious starting-point for a brief survey of the contents of the remainder of the book. Manson recalls Schweitzer's opinion, given towards the end of *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, that future investigation of the life of Jesus must take one of two lines—thoroughgoing scepticism (following the road taken by Wrede) or thoroughgoing eschatology (following Schweitzer himself). Manson argues that the work of the Form-Critics continues the line begun by Wrede, and reaches the well-nigh incredible position that we know next to nothing about the Jesus of history and a great deal about the needs of the early Church which created the figure that we had hitherto thought to be the Jesus of history. Schweitzer's view, on the other hand, leads to the conclusion that Jesus was a deluded fanatic whose death failed to inaugurate the apocalyptic kingdom which he had proclaimed and expected. The solution to

this apparent impasse Manson associates with the names of Burkitt, Dodd and Otto.

On the one hand, part at least of the answer to the Form-Critics (if not to the demythologisers) is given by Dodd's work on the early Christian *kerygma*. The unanimity in the early Christian preaching can be due neither to accident nor to design; it is because the claims made by Peter and Paul alike are founded on facts that they agree. It is doubtful how far this by itself provides an answer to the Form-Critics; and in any case Dodd has to meet the critics of his theories about the *kerygma*, two of whom are represented in this volume (H. J. Cadbury, pp. 313-21, and R. P. Casey, p. 65).

More important, however, for our present purpose is the way in which Schweitzer's views have been followed up. Burkitt began the process by pointing out that Jesus added a prologue to the apocalyptic Messianic ideal which He had proclaimed, namely His ministry of service on behalf of all (Mark 10.45). Dodd and Otto followed with the assertion that Jesus' ministry was not the prologue to the Kingdom of God, but the Kingdom itself. This, as now expounded by Dodd in his comment on the Johannine phrase 'the hour cometh and now is',[1] is the doctrine of *sich realisierende Eschatologie*. The Kingdom is coming, and now is; the End is upon us, but the End is not yet: however we may be disposed to criticise the details of Dodd's exegesis here or elsewhere, and whatever misgivings may be felt about his understanding of the relations between history and Eschatology (see Professor Bultmann's essay in this volume), it remains in large measure his achievement that all subsequent discussion of eschatology has been forced into this mould of the 'now' and the 'not yet' which has made possible an advance in every realm of Christian thought. The effects of this movement of thought on Christian ethics, for example, are adumbrated in Professor Amos Wilder's paper on 'Kerygma, Eschatology and Social Ethics' (pp. 509ff).

But if statements about eschatology now require to be written in both the present and the future tenses, it is also true that the past tense is involved—we are approaching a new understanding of the way in which past, present and future are bound together in the proclamation of the Church. In this connexion Professor N. A. Dahl's paper on 'Christ, Creation and the Church' is especially relevant. Dahl outlines five different ways in which the relation between the first and the last things is elaborated in biblical thought; but he also makes it clear that this is not merely an external correspondence between two sets of 'events', since 'the Christian correlation of salvation and creation is not merely derived from the eschato-

[1] *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 447 and n. 1.

logical idea that the end shall be like the beginning; it has also antecedents in applications of the creation-pattern to historic and actual experiences of God's dealing with man. What we find in the New Testament is due to a coincidence of eschatological doctrine and actual experience, where eschatology is "realised", and "reality", as given in Christ, is eschatologically interpreted' (p. 431f).

From this point of view Dahl is able to give a warning against false antithesis between eschatology and the work of God in Creation: 'the miracles of Jesus should, for instance, hardly be understood as *either* eschatological signs *or* deeds of mercy; they are one of these things in being the other. In a similar way, the moral teaching of Jesus insists upon the original will of God the Creator, and just in this way it is the revelation of the will of God for the last days, in which the Kingdom of God is proclaimed on earth' (p. 442).

It is in worship, as Dahl indicates (pp. 424f, 431), that the first and last things are brought together with the present in such a manner that their significance can be laid hold of by faith. Here we turn to Professor Moule's essay on the judgment theme in the sacraments. He begins by stressing that judgment is an essential aspect of Christian Baptism, inasmuch as Baptism is dying with Christ and rising again—and to die with Christ is to accept, along with Him, the verdict pronounced by God on all sin. Baptism is an eschatological event in the sense that it is the means by which, in faith, the Church and individuals within the Church are incorporated into, or united with, the death and resurrection of Christ. This is (in a sense) to be 'brought past the great assize, past the final judgment of the last day, into the life of the new age' (p. 467; cf. John 5.24): to accept judgment obediently trusting in Christ's prior and perfect obedience is to go beyond judgment. Therefore Baptism, like the final judgment, which it anticipates, happens once and once only—once and once only on the Cross, once and once only for each believer.

Between Baptism and judgment stands Holy Communion, in which the same theme of judgment is present, and the same liaisons with past and future (one might here compare the Appendix to Dodd's *Apostolic Preaching*), but with this difference, that the Lord's Supper is not a once-for-all event, but a means of successive renewals of this verdict first given sacramentally in Baptism. (Here Professor Moule assists his argument with a convincing exegesis of 1 Cor. 11.27-32.) Of course apostasy, or a wilful lack of discernment of the meaning of Christ's death and resurrection from within the body (the Church), may mean that the judgment is not past, but still in the future; and one might add the comment that in worship, in the combination of adoration with confession, we can catch a glimpse

of how it is that the judgment, the *eschaton*, is both past and future.

It is of the greatest importance to keep clear this distinction between the past and the future judgment, and yet to see that they are the same judgment, for all judgment is Christ's judgment, and is in Him and according to His standards. Two papers by distinguished German-speaking scholars help us at this point. One, by Eduard Schweizer, discusses the relation between the doctrine of the Spirit and eschatology in Zoroastrian, Judaistic, Gnostic and New Testament thought. The doctrines of the Spirit as an ever-present moral force in men, found in the three first-mentioned groups, are to be sharply distinguished from the Old Testament belief in the Spirit as the Divine gift of special powers to special individuals, and from the New Testament assertions which combine (*a*) the present possession of the Spirit with (*b*) its eschatological character and (*c*) its universality in the new community. In four brief closing paragraphs, Schweizer demonstrates convincingly how the doctrine of the Spirit develops in the New Testament to the point where it 'explains' (so far as the mystery can be explained) the living relationship between Christ and His Church.

The same unity of eschatological action, of which the Spirit is both the guarantee and the expression, comes out at a characteristic point in Professor Gunther Bornkamm's magnificent essay on eschatology and the Church in the Gospel according to St. Matthew. This is too long for any detailed account of its contents to be given; it makes clear how the Gospel constantly reiterates the demand for a 'better righteousness' which will be the fulfilment of the Law, and presents Jesus Himself as the pattern and prototype of this righteousness, who through His humility, obedience and pity for humanity fulfils the Law in spirit as well as letter. This new righteousness revealed by Jesus (here is the point we want to make) is *both* the distinguishing mark between Jesus' disciples and the Pharisees (and others) *and* the standard by which *all*, Jesus' disciples included, will be judged at the coming judgment (p. 232). From this unity of standards of judgment, present and future, it follows that the Church's authority depends on its obedience (and obedience means suffering). Furthermore Bornkamm's exegesis of the promise to Peter in Matt. 16.17-19 makes it clear that this principle applies here too. The promise to Peter is a promise to the obedient, suffering, following disciple—and Church.

Bornkamm's essay is the first of a series of eight covering eschatology in books of the New Testament from Matthew to 1 Peter. Against the background of Bornkamm's work, it is hard to credit the Abbé Feuillet's contention that the *Parousia* in Matt. 24 and James 5 refers not to a final judgment but to the destruction of Jerusalem in

A.D. 70; none the less it is true that the importance of the events of A.D. 70 is probably still underestimated by modern scholars, and passages like Matt. 10.23 still present problems. Unlike Bornkamm, who discusses St. Matthew's Gospel but not the historical Jesus, Professor Stauffer, in his contribution on the Fourth Gospel, has no doubt that Jesus was not an 'eschatological prophet', and that in this respect the Fourth Gospel is correcting mistakes made by the other three. But whatever we think of this, Stauffer has made some useful comments on the belief in a 'hidden Messiah' and its application to Jesus.

St. Paul is represented only by an article from Professor Goguel and a painstaking analysis by Professor Clavier of what is meant by the 'spiritual body'. With regard to the Last Judgment in Paul, Goguel remarks that it has become a superfluity for 'it cannot in any case do more than make clear a distinction (or discrimination) which exists already' (p. 334). But apart from the fact that this 'making clear' may in itself be something of prime importance, this criticism surely reveals a failure to grasp what we have been trying throughout to stress: that a Christian eschatology and a Christian doctrine of judgment must be firmly rooted in past, present and future alike, and that all these three elements are necessary for our human understanding, but none can be isolated from the others.

Such an understanding of the matter is explicit in C. K. Barrett's excellent paper on the Eschatology of the Epistle to the Hebrews and in E. G. Selwyn's brief but equally good comments on 1 Peter. Christians, according to 1 Peter, live in grace but not in glory, and yet they not only look forward to this glory: 'the grace they enjoy is regarded as in a sense thrown backwards from the world to come (1.13)' (p. 396). 'In a sense'—again we are dealing with matters which defy expression in everyday language; but here again we glimpse another facet of the many-sided truth of the Last Things. Barrett comes into conflict with Professor Hering of Strasbourg, who writes on Biblical Eschatology and Platonic Idealism; Hering maintains the (almost) conventional view that the author of Hebrews is attempting a not altogether successful synthesis between biblical eschatology and Platonism, whereas Barrett argues strongly (but not without qualifications) that the thought of the epistle is biblical and not in any sense synthetic (see especially p. 393). In this, as throughout his paper, he seems to me wholly convincing. This, from his conclusion, is worth quoting here: 'the most significant contribution of Hebrews to the growing problem of NT eschatology lies in the author's use of philosophical and liturgical language. By means of this terminology it is possible to impress upon believers the nearness of the invisible world without insisting upon the nearness

of the *parousia*. The author of Hebrews did believe that the *parousia* was near (10.25), but lays no stress on this conviction' (p. 391).

There is no room here to offer further comments on the important paper by Professor Wilder already referred to, beyond saying that he contends that there is a basis for social action in the Pauline view of the overthrow of the 'principalities and powers' in Christ. There are many good things in this paper, which deserves to be widely read.

There remain the formidable figures of Cullmann and Bultmann. Cullmann asks 'Does the expectation of the end paralyse the missionary impulse?' (p. 409) and answers with a resounding 'no'. The missionary enterprise is a sign of the coming end (this Cullmann supports with a novel exegesis of the riders in Rev. 6 and 19) and it is not confined to any one generation, 'for it is characteristic of this final period, in which we are living, that it forms a unity, and that as a whole it is characterised by "signs". But we can never say, "this is the final hour" in which the "sign" will appear' (p. 421). With this warning against millenarianism we might conclude, were it not that Bultmann, in a few comments on Dodd's *The Bible To-Day*, calls in question Dodd's whole understanding of history, revelation and eschatology. Is Bultmann correct in asserting that Christ as pre-existent and risen stands outside history altogether, and that He calls the believer out of history and out of the world, that His call comes only to individuals and that it is never an event which can be studied by anyone else? Or is Dodd right in maintaining that revelation can be given through history, that it *is* indeed history interpreted as the Bible and the Church interpret it, and that there is public evidence available to attest the truth of the eschatological events proclaimed by the Church? To formulate the issue in these few brief questions is inevitably to distort it; but both Dodd and Bultmann are writers of such clarity that anyone who reads the original documents will surely see the issues, even if he cannot devise any answers. He will find in this *Festschrift* no answers to the last questions, but much light on the journey towards them.

R. S. Barbour

Words and Images: A Study in Theological Discourse. By E. L. Mascall. Longmans, Green & Co. Pp. 132. 12s. 6d.

Dr Eric Mascall, one of the leading Anglican neo-Thomist theologians, defines his purpose in this small but significant book as that of 'providing a rational justification for the activities of thinking and talking about God' (p. 121). As a member of the group of Oxford dons, styling themselves the Metaphysicals, who have recently produced the volume *Faith and Logic*, Dr Mascall is interested in the

queries raised by contemporary philosophy concerning the permissibility and the character of theological language.

He begins with the Logical Positivist challenge to the meaningfulness of religious utterances, as brilliantly popularised by A. J. Ayer. There is probably nothing new to be said at this time of day about either Ayer's rigid verification principle of 1936 or his modified version of 1946. It seems clear enough, as Dr Mascall argues, that in either form the verification principle is a methodological criterion derived from and applicable to discourse concerning the world of sensory experience, and that as such it provides no basis upon which to rule as meaningless other types of discourse. The more recent interest of philosophical analysts in religion (inspired by Wittgenstein rather than by the Vienna Circle) is not governed by any such negative dogma as that which underlies the verification principle but, more hospitably, accepts religious language as having proper uses of its own which it is the task of the philosopher to investigate. As a development, however, of the positivist strand in modern philosophy, the question of meaningfulness was raised in a fresh way by John Wisdom in his celebrated parable of the Gardener (1944), posing the question whether theism and atheism entail contradictory predictions concerning the future course of human experience. Does the theist expect anything which the atheist does not expect, anything the occurrence or non-occurrence of which could thus serve to verify or falsify his faith? And if not, can theism be regarded as constituting a genuine assertion?

Dr Mascall describes the answers to these questions proposed by three Oxford philosophers, R. M. Hare, Basil Mitchell, and Ian Crombie, though he does not undertake (as this reader at least would have liked him to do) any detailed and critical examination of their suggestions.

Dr Mascall then proceeds to his own positive contribution. He claims that the fundamental error of Logical Positivism and its derivatives is the view that perception, in the sense of direct awareness of a real object, is to be identified with sensation. As against the prevailing view, by no means peculiar to Logical Positivism, that the mind is active in the perception of our material environment through a continuous interpreting of sense data, Dr Mascall advocates an epistemology derived from the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition. The distinctive feature of his position is that the real world is such that it cannot be an object to the senses but only to the intellect. The phenomenon impressed upon the senses is a manifestation of an intelligible object, and the intellect apprehends the latter through the former. 'Perception', he says, 'is primarily an *intellectual act*, an act in which the mind utilises the phenomenon as an *objectum quo*

and passes through it to grasp the concrete trans-sensible reality, whose nature is that not of sensible but of intelligible being' (p. 121).

Dr Mascall is doubtless right in feeling that such a Thomist-type theory deserves the careful consideration of contemporary secular epistemologists. But unfortunately he does not expound it in sufficient detail to attract philosophical examination. He nowhere explains what he means by the important assertion that it is 'of the essence of reality to be not sensible but intelligible' (p. 40). The only hint offered is that relativity and quantum theory express the kind of intelligibility which characterises reality (p. 41). Does this mean that the real world, so far from being that disclosed to our senses, is the 'physicists' world' consisting of quanta of energy in continuous patterned discharge? But this is only a revised and refined version of the Newtonian and Lockian picture, which Mascall has already rejected (pp. 31-33), of a structure of primary qualities as the reality underlying the richer world of perceptual consciousness. We are left, then, in uncertainty as to the exact meaning of the crucial phrases 'intelligible object' and 'the intelligible world'.

In the second half of the book Dr Mascall completes his theory by maintaining that there is a mode of perception which penetrates beneath the phenomenal surface of the world. This mode of cognition, which is contemplative rather than ratiocinative, leads not only to true knowledge of the world, but also to knowledge of God. For only in this way 'is it possible for us to apprehend that unique but universal characteristic of finite beings which manifests their dependence upon the creative activity of a transcendent cause, the God of Christian theology' (p. 71). God is apprehended through the world when the world is contemplated as a Mystery. This means that instead of wondering *about* the world we wonder *at* it, and so come to apprehend God as its creative ground. Here of course Dr Mascall's thought links up with, and is supported by, his argument in *He Who Is* and *Existence and Analogy*. The discussion closes with an interesting chapter building upon some suggestions of Austin Farrer regarding the function of symbols and images in theological communication.

I have space to make only one brief critical comment. It seems clear (e.g. on pp. 70-71) that the intellect's apprehension of intelligible objects through sensory appearances is, in Dr Mascall's view, epistemologically continuous with the apprehension of God through the world. The awareness of God through His creation is a special case of the awareness of intelligible realities through sense appearances. But whereas in the earlier chapters Dr Mascall presents his theory that cognition is an intellectual act as the correct analysis of ordinary sense perception, in the later chapters he treats this same

intellectual act as a special mode of cognition, bordering upon the mystical, which is not universally practised but which is capable of being cultivated. Thus he seems to be asserting, apparently incompatibly, (*a*) that all perception is really an apprehension of intelligible reality through sense (or other) impressions, and (*b*) that if only people would cultivate the special mode of perception which passes through sense-impressions to the underlying intelligible reality, they would be in a position to apprehend God.

I have no doubt that in a fuller treatment of these topics by Dr Mascall, this query, along with others, would be resolved. My complaint is really that he should have elected to deal with such large matters in such insufficient compass. What Dr Mascall has given us is an admirably clear and interesting introduction to an extremely important philosophical position. If such comments as these can help to provoke him into producing a more substantial work in the same field, their otherwise unjustifiably carping tone will have been justified. JOHN H. HICK

The Authority of Scripture. By J. K. S. REID. Methuen, 1957. Pp. 286. 25s.

'LIKE Jesus Christ Himself, the Holy Scripture is, in its own way and its own degree, true God and true Man, i.e. witness of the revelation, which itself belongs to the revelation, *and* historical literary document of a definite humanity.' So Karl Barth (*K.D.*, I/2, p. 555). 'Any true view of Scripture must hold that there is both a divine and a human element in it, just as any true view of Christ holds that He is both *kata sarka* and *kata pneuma*. The imperfection of the Bible is to be located in the human element and not in the divine element, in the human recording of revelation and not in the revelation itself.' So Professor Reid (pp. 184-5).

It is the application to Scripture of the Christological analogy, in ways like those exemplified in these quotations, which has more than any other single factor assisted the revival of biblical authority in the Church—and this not in any one school or party. It has discredited the Liberalism which could discern only the expression of human religiosity, and it has at least put on the defensive the Fundamentalism which reduced the humanity of the Bible to a minimum and attached to the human text the divine attribute of infallibility. Dr Reid's book traces the living thought of the biblical revival in theology, the problems which it had to face, both historical and contemporary, and states afresh for today the achievement that there has been. In spite of the progress made, a large number of people, both within the Church and without, still hold, and believe the Church to hold, an understanding of Scripture which is im-

prisoned in the categories of the Victorian controversies a hundred years ago. As a guide to the state of this whole problem in the middle of our century Dr Reid's book should prove standard.

The book rather varies in style, presenting as it does in certain chapters a mainly historical-descriptive study (in Calvin, Luther, Protestant Orthodoxy and the theology of Barth and Brunner), being both descriptive and controversial on the Roman Catholic view, and mainly controversial on the ideas of Inspiration and Progressive Revelation. Some sections thus contain comparatively little original comment by Professor Reid, and he reserves to the last chapter a full constructive statement of his own; but some of the best things he has to say will be found in the course of his discussion of different opinions, and especially perhaps in that on the Roman Church. Conversely certain subjects can be treated more than once, e.g. the term 'inspiration' or the meaning of the Canon.

But the reviewer, who finds this book extremely provocative of fresh lines of thought, is anxious to take up some more specific points with Professor Reid. We may perhaps begin from the excellent *exposé* of the Theology of the Word in chapter seven. This should do much to familiarise a wider public with the great work which Barth and Brunner have done for the authority of Scripture in the last twenty years or so. What one misses here is criticism from Professor Reid himself. Taking as a basis this admirably objective statement, can Barth leave his doctrine of Scripture where it stood in the first two half-volumes of his *Dogmatik*? Or in more general terms, in what direction does Professor Reid think the understanding of Scripture must now move? Have we reached a terminus, or must a new period of restatement now begin?

To the reviewer, who has long been in substantial agreement with what Barth has to say in this regard, it now seems clear that a considerable modification must be made in the position which has been reached under his leadership; and in so far as this affects the assessment of Dr Reid's book it is perhaps worth while to say now what this modification would be. In this we do not intend to contradict Barth's thought or to turn back the clock to the forms of Fundamentalism and Liberalism which existed before. Nevertheless, and perhaps because these latter views constituted special problems of that time, an important inadequacy is now apparent.

This inadequacy is the neglect or under-emphasis of the element of human response behind the Scripture. It was of course agreed, indeed it was acknowledged with joy, that the Bible is Word of Man. This insistence shattered any bibliolatry and gave a new hope to those who had learned from critical study of the humanity and diversity of the Bible. It is Man who speaks, and who writes, in the

Bible. Nevertheless the whole course of the thought is to fit the Bible into the conception of the Word which comes from God to Man. It is one of the three forms of the Word of God addressed to Man; the others are Christ Himself and the proclamation of the Church. Thus the characteristic designation of the Bible is as 'witness' or as 'proclamation'; as the original event of the Word is from God to Man, so the office of the Bible is to bring the witness of these events, again from God to Man. The Scripture, we are repeatedly told, 'points away from itself' to that of which it witnesses.

This does not do justice to the facts of the formation of the Bible. Behind the Scripture lie the acts of God in history. In Israel and in the Church these acts are indeed witnessed to or proclaimed, they are announced to others and passed on to future generations. But also a response is made to them, and this response, however sinful and imperfect, bears some genuine impress of the divine action. The response is in worship, in prayer, in the building of the community after the will of God. The response, however weak, is genuine word of Man to God. Now in the building up of the tradition of Israel and the Church, which is the making of our Bible, this response plays at least as great a part as the direct witness from God to Man. Indeed the two are inextricably intertwined in our Bible, and interact continually. In the Old Testament for instance we have the witness to the divine act at the Exodus and the response of the Passover bearing the mark of the divine action; but in the actual tradition the two have worked upon one another as the tradition was handed down. The moulding of the tradition is a continual response to the divine Act or Word.

Barth, in his account of the matter, does take account of a human response or obedience, but in most of what he says this is the obedience of the apostle who goes out to proclaim what he has seen; it is a response of further transmission of the Word to Man, not a response of answer to God from Man. That a response by worship, by moulding and shaping the community, is a kind of witness is true; but it is not true that this takes place *only* as witness, *only* as transmission of the Word *to* Man. All response cannot be subsumed under proclamation; buying is not a form of selling. And seen from this side, it becomes less useful to reiterate that the Bible 'points away from itself'. The finger of John the Baptist should be given a rest; he is simply not an adequate analogue for the whole range of biblical statement. The designation of the Bible as 'witness' was of special value in denying the identity of the Bible with the Word of God, and will always be of great value; but a one-sided emphasis can be given to it. Scripture is answer as well as address.

We can put this another way with reference to the quotations with

which this review began. The distinction of Word of God and Word of Man must be modified. 'Word of Man' suggests Man in his frailty, his otherness from God; it helps to explain the imperfections of the Bible and its creaturely, historical particularity. But the Bible is not in essence this. It is, but is not in essence, Word of Man; it is in essence Word of Israel, Word of the Church, Word, that is to say, of the covenanted community which bears in its thinking and its constitution the stigmata of the divine action which brought it into being. The word of Israel and of the Church moves both from God to Man and from Man to God.

Or, if we are to use the Christological analogy, the Scripture is not only analogous to Christ the Word who comes from God, but to Jesus of Nazareth who speaks a Word of obedience to God from within mankind. This latter Word is as unique and authoritative as the former. And would we not expect that one like Karl Barth, who is becoming known now not only as the theologian of the Word but as the theologian of the human obedience of Christ, would give a greater place to the Word of response if he were writing his doctrine of Scripture today? The Christological analogy is not properly used if we relate the Bible only to the entry of God into the world in the Incarnation; we have to relate it also to Christ's priestly mission, and to the Ascension.

We must now ask Professor Reid how precisely he wishes to be taken when he speaks of a divine 'element' and a human 'element' in Scripture. In the quotation already given this would seem to mean that the actual revelation is the divine element, the recording the human element. But strictly this would mean only one 'element' in the Bible; the story of the Resurrection is an element in the human record of the Gospels, the actual event of the Resurrection is not. Alternatively we could speak of divine and human 'elements' in such a way as to maintain that the two were inextricably mingled, as it were, and could no longer be so simply distinguished as in this first sense. Would this not be what is meant in the discussion of Calvin on p. 36? But it seems to the reviewer that the terminology which speaks of the two 'elements', if strictly enough understood, has broken down. There is in fact only one 'element', the human. How then can the Scripture be regarded as the Word of God? If our argument has been sound, it carries one extremely important consequence: the true analogy for the Scripture as Word of God is *not* the unity of God and Man in the Incarnation; it is the relation of the Spirit of God to the People of God. That this latter relation does itself have certain analogies to the unity of God and Man in the Incarnation does not obscure its important differences. And to state our result in another way: *inasmuch as the Scripture is strictly not of two*

'elements' but of one, an incarnational analogy is not an adequate substitute for a doctrine of inspiration.

Before pressing this farther, another point may be made about our quotation from Karl Barth. 'True God' represents 'witness of the revelation', and 'true Man' represents 'historical literary document of a definite humanity'. Such a statement at least leaves room for the impression, if it does not actually encourage it, that the authority of Scripture rests upon its divine character, and indeed that there alone is true revelation to be found. The presence of 'true Man' is entirely right and proper, but under this character as 'true Man' is to be found not revelation or authority, but 'historical literary document'—material for literary criticism and history of religions! Whether this taken alone represents the whole view of Barth or not, every teacher of exegetical science must recognise something like it in the eagerness of his students to appeal away from the Word of 'true Man' to the Divine Word, away from the 'historical literary document' to the seat of revelation. And here it needs to be said emphatically—the *human* character is the bearer of revelation, the *human* word is the word that has authority. The human scripture is true Man, or rather is true Israel, speaking or writing its historical literary document which is in its own particular form the witness to, and response to, revelation.

Consider modern scientific exegesis. This takes its starting-point in the Bible as the Word of Israel, as the Word of the primitive Church; and from here it is able to penetrate not only to historical-critical results but to the real biblical theology. There is in fact now no other method. A superficial use of the 'double nature' view of the Bible could lead us to a double exegetical approach, a 'scientific' one working from the Bible as human Word, and a 'theological' one working from the divine Word. It is in fact clear that the relations between exegetical science and dogmatics are deeply involved in this matter, and one could wish that groups of exegetes and dogmaticians might sit down together around Dr Reid's book. For in fact exegetes have often been, and often still are, naïve to the point of absurdity in their judgment of the issues involved and in their fancy that the dogmatic tradition can be simply brushed aside (cf. C. H. Dodd's *The Authority of the Bible*, certainly a much less humble book than this); while dogmaticians have not always attended clearly enough to the way in which the Bible is in fact being studied today and may in extreme cases so steep themselves in Calvin's commentaries as to suggest that nothing of real value has been achieved in exegesis since that time.

Can we use the word 'inspiration' usefully? If so, it must be purified from all suggestion of inerrancy and infallibility, and from

all teaching that identified the production of the Bible with the revelation of God. It has been used to heighten the 'divineness' of the Bible. Our suggestion is that, if that whole way of thinking can now be washed away, it is paradoxically the humanity of the Bible which leads us to restate a view of inspiration. Behind the Scripture is the action of God in history, creating and redeeming His people. The Scripture is not 'Word of God and Word of Man' but is the response of that people, in witness, in worship and in the moulding of communal life and individual piety, a response which bears authentic marks of the divine action. Within the total response of the people is that particular aspect of obedience which is the formation of the sacred tradition and eventually its canonisation into 'Scripture'. The guidance of the people of God in this particular aspect is inspiration. It can usefully be classified with such concepts as Election: as God elects into existence His People, He elects into existence their tradition. The old problems of how the writers could be guided by God and yet be themselves and write of themselves are part of the general problem of election and human freedom. On the other hand the whole matter must lie distinctly within the realm of the communion of the Spirit with the People of God, as the means by which the divine action is both lighted up and is made to be a source of light in time following. This seems to provide at least a partial justification of the term 'inspiration'.

Dr Reid considers carefully and critically the idea of 'verbal inspiration'. Perhaps the phrase is too compromised with inerrancy and infallibility to be of continuing value. The question must at any rate remain, to what extent are we bound by the actual words of the Bible—not because they are dictated by God, or because they are inerrant, or because no better ones might have been invented, but because it is in these words, and not in some other, that the tradition which is the crystallisation of the history of the people of God has in fact, and by the will of the men of that people, fixed itself. Do we not have a split between form and content unless authority is bound in some way to the verbal form of the Bible? A dogmatic and an exegetical consideration may be added: theologically, it is one thing to say that the Divine Word has taken on an earthly 'form' and that we must not make an idol of this form, and quite another to make a distinction of form and content. Exegetically, it is in fact from the words as they are that we begin, and only so can exegesis truly challenge and assist theology. The actual words are the court of appeal against what is alleged to be the content or meaning. After all worship of the printed word is overcome, can we not have some restatement which will do justice to the importance of the verbal form of Scripture?

Take even that famous belief of Protestant Scholasticism, to which Dr Reid makes reference, and which has often been regarded as the ultimate absurdity of an Inspiration theory, the opinion that the vocalisation of the Hebrew text was divinely inspired. The Massoretic vocalisation is after all a tradition of interpretation of the consonantal text, and one which has a long history behind it. It could therefore be properly regarded as a last faint impulse of the great movement of Israelite tradition which formed our Old Testament. That this is a Jewish and not a Christian tradition need not cause any more difficulty than the fact that we follow a Jewish canon of Scripture rather than that which the early Church itself used. By the time of the Reformation (unlike say the time of Jerome when the situation was different) it would have been very strange for the Church to accept the consonantal text and no such further determination of the meaning as the vocalisation provided. The absurdity of the scholastic formulae was in the suggestion of divine inerrancy and perfection for the vowels; but on a view of inspiration which abandons all inerrancy it is perhaps not wholly absurd, even if it be rather strained, to argue that the vocalisation is a faint manifestation of that divine economy which guided the tradition to its present form. In fact the Church could at any time accept the Massoretic vocalisation only as a guide, but as a guide which has a special right to be consulted, as a first instance to be consulted before it is by-passed. A certain respect for it is a respect for the significance of the verbal form.

What of the designation of Scripture as the Word of God? Could it not be said that God, revealing Himself in His acts in the world, calls forth the Word of His People, Israel and the Church, in a response of witness and of worship, and this Word coalesces in the Scripture? But for following ages God makes that Word of His People His own Word. Not in a sense of identity, for God retains His Word in His power, but in a very special sense, as the pattern of witness and answer from the special age of revelation.

In a careful historical investigation Professor Reid asks whether Calvin and Luther were adherents to verbal inspiration. The result seems slightly inconclusive; in some of his statements Calvin was one, in others he was nearly one but not quite. This study has great importance in confuting claims that modern fundamentalism represents the purity of the Reformation, and elsewhere Dr Reid in a valuable section indicates the forces which have made this modern view something different from anything that had been held before the rise of modern science. The reviewer is no expert on Calvin, and only wonders whether, when Calvin seems unwilling to answer this question, we should continue to ask him it in this form. May it

not be that a real difference between Calvin and modern times lies in his theological methodology, and particularly in the relation between Scripture and doctrine? Is it not the case that the sixteenth century saw a much closer, more direct, less ambiguous relation between Scripture and doctrine than we do today? This might be so even though Scripture and Word of God are not identified, though revelation is not conceived in simple propositional terms, and whether a view of verbal inspiration in the strict sense were held or not. Is it not in this wider setting that the Reformation understanding of Scripture may help us in our modern problems?

This leads us to remark the way in which the authority of Scripture is interlocked with our conceptions of other realities—the true method of exegesis, the best way to test doctrine against a criterion, the nature of the Church, the problem of the Canon, the submission of life ethically to the Bible. It is in Dr Reid's study of the Roman Church that his grasp of these complicated relationships comes most clearly to light, for the Roman definitions of Scriptural authority can never be interpreted in isolation. Dr Reid is at his best here, and it is perhaps an over-simplification when in the last chapter, seeking to re-state the authority of the Bible, he begins from the question: Why should I read the Bible? Biblical authority, as the controversy with the Roman position here well indicates, is definable not only by relation to the ultimate Word of God but by reference to other instances which may claim some kind of authority. Here two questions occur to the mind. A passage from Barth is discussed on p. 199 which points out the danger of a type of exegesis which, while formally accepting biblical authority, would in fact smother it. Against this danger he speaks of an 'exegesis open on all sides . . . for the sake of a free Bible'. Do we not need more guidance what this means, and how the working minister may put it into practice? Secondly, not very much is said about the problem of biblical authority for ethics individual and social, and the volume edited by Richardson and Schweitzer, which made some essays in this direction, is curiously not mentioned.

A wide range of readers should be able to find great help in this book. Few of us perhaps realise how much our conception of biblical authority can affect the enjoyment and profit we gain from the Bible. The objective description and the profound discussion which Professor Reid offers are the antidotes for lazy thinking. No one need fear to attempt this book, and those who read it will return to it again and again. It is unlikely that this generation, in which so much can be done by ministers and laity to make progress with this problem, will see another study of it so fundamental as this.

James Barr

Christology and Myth in the New Testament. By GERAINT VAUGHAN JONES. Allen and Unwin, 1956. 21s.

THIS is a book which challenges reader and reviewer by the peculiar difficulty of its subject-matter, but a book to be carefully perpended as offering a valuable and comprehensive survey of an obscure and interesting problem. Naturally it starts off from Dr Rudolf Bultmann's familiar proposals for 'demythologising' the New Testament, which Dr Jones regards as of importance and consequence for the understanding and communication of the New Testament message in our time. His acceptance of the challenge is, indeed, the readier because, as one whose native approach to theology is from the liberal standpoint, he scents danger in the tendency of recent theology in its swing away from the liberal tradition to become, as he puts it, only too 'complacent in seeking support in a recovered, and possibly excessive, biblical emphasis'.

But though Dr Jones accepts Bultmann's position that biblical language must not be permitted to obscure the biblical 'intention', he does not propose to re-interpret the 'mythological' material of the New Testament just in Bultmann's way. A brief analysis of the positions in which he concurs and in which he disagrees with Bultmann may be read on pp. 10-11 of his preface. He rejects the extreme scepticism of the Marburg theologian's attitude to history, and he deprecates his assumption that the re-interpretation of the mythological content of the New Testament must necessarily take the form of existential or existentialist thinking. On the other hand, he welcomes Bultmann's insistence that the 'mythological' element in Christology is to be *interpreted*, not simply eliminated as liberal theology and modernism have in one way or another assumed.

Dr Jones distinguishes between legend-myth and 'metaphysical' myth. The latter he defines as 'a supra-historical explanation in mythical terms of an event which is part of known history'. It is 'a giving of transcendent meaning to a historical occurrence of decisive significance'. The great Christological passages in Ephesians, Colossians and Philippians, for example, involve categories such as the pre-existence of Christ, His descent from and ascent to heaven, and His kenosis, which are definitely 'mythological' in form, and associated with a world-view in which apocalyptic Judaism and Hellenistic gnosis were the principal ingredients. Yet it is of a historical person that St. Paul speaks in these passages, and while his language may be foreign to the modern way of thinking, the 'Christological intention' of the Apostle has to be safe-guarded in any modern re-statement of the teaching. Dr Jones quotes Berdyaev: 'Myth presents to us the supernatural in the natural, the super-sensible in the sensible, the spiritual life in the life of the flesh. . . . It is high

time to cease being ashamed of Christian mythology and trying to free it from myth.'

The book has much to say that is revealing and suggestive with regard to Bultmann's distinction between *Historie* and *Geschichte*, according to which the element of 'intention' is that which gives permanent significance to events. Dr Jones accepts that 'Christian existence is not "historical" but "eschatological"; it is not in nature but in grace'. Incidentally this section of the book provides a useful introduction to Bultmann's whole way of thinking.

The main substance of the book, however, is given to an analysis and exposition of the central Christological concepts of NT Christianity, its ideas of the Incarnate Logos and of Jesus as *Kyrios* or Lord especially with reference to creation. Dr Jones takes these concepts to their roots in the theology and speculation of their time, and inquires what proximate forms of expression they might assume in terms of modern thought. The idea of the Logos appearing as man is a clear instance of mythological thinking, which has affinities with Gnostic and other extra-biblical conceptions. Yet to St. Paul and Christianity, it came via the Jewish Wisdom-theology. It is surprising in this connexion that Dr Jones does not consider the possibility that the factor most potent in impelling to this speculative development of Christology was the Church's recognition that in its world-mission it must offer Jesus to the world as 'the light of the Gentiles' and the true 'Wisdom of God'. Another form of mythological Christology Dr Jones sees in the kenotic interpretation of the Incarnation, for primitive Christianity was adoptionist in its Christology, and anagogic, rather than katagogic, in its process of thought, as Dr Jones confesses himself to be. But at every level such symbolical language calls for transposition into terms made natural by contemporary theology. Dr Jones here takes occasion to allude to the categories in which Karl Heim, and L. S. Thornton following Whitehead's philosophy, have tried to state the nature of a spatially conceived and graded universe such as St. Paul's.

While the *Kyrios* conception appears in association with the ideas of pre-existence and of heavenly agency and co-creatorship with God, it does not always depend on that setting for its religious meaning and validity. Therefore in the attempt to de-mythologise the conception by calling in the aid, for example, of the modern notions of emergent evolution or of historical-religious culmination, we must not forget the danger of not allowing sufficiently for the transcendent or katagogic and final significance which Jesus has for Christianity as unique Revealer of God. Similarly with regard to the New Testament's presentation of the evil in the cosmos as due to demonic causation, Dr Jones has to pronounce Bultmann's atti-

tude an over-simplification of the intractableness of evil and cites the evidence of modern psychology in support of his *caveat*.

In the closing section of the book on 'The Myth as Logos' and particularly in the chapter on 'The Myth as Norm', there is brought to final statement the author's attitude to 'mythological thinking' as an element in religion. The element of myth is inseparable from religious belief and thought, and though there is the recurrent necessity of stating its significance in terms intelligible to the contemporary mind, the symbol must remain as 'permanent point of reference without which Christianity would dissolve into metaphysics or ethics'.

Even as involving cosmology, the mythological constituents of Christology 'are not statements about cosmology, but affirmations of faith in Jesus Christ'. The Logos states itself as myth because only by means of sensuous and symbolic and poetic language can God's self-communication to men in Christ be expressed in the full reality of its emotional and aesthetic as well as intellectual appeal. 'Any attempt to speak of God which renounces picture, myth, symbol, or analogy, tends to result in a negative or apophatic theology in which the term "God" makes little impression on the mind and little impact on the emotions or the imagination.' 'Universal experience', he writes, 'lends support to the thesis that religion deprived of its mythological expression loses its creative and dynamic power, and also its roots in man's deepest psychological needs.' These may be taken as representative statements of the normative value of the transcendent elements in New Testament Christology. The latter are symbolic constants which, though continually calling for vital exposition, can never be dispensed with.

Errata noticed are: ἐκένοσεν for ἐκένωσεν (pp. 86, 295), φθώρα for φθόρα (pp. 156, 295). WILLIAM MANSON

Scripture and Myth, an Examination of Rudolf Bultmann's Plea for Demythologization. By P. E. HUGHES. Tyndale Press, London, 1956. 1s. 6d.

The Teacher of Righteousness on the Qumran Texts. By F. F. BRUCE. Tyndale Press, London, 1957. 2s.

God Became Man. By A. M. STIBBS. Tyndale Press, London, 1957. 1s. 6d.

TOWARDS the close of his Tyndale Biblical Theology Lecture for 1956 Dr Hughes affirms that he is not 'unappreciative of the fact that Bultmann has been impelled by the commendable desire to make the Christian message intelligible and relevant to modern man'. One may, however, wonder if it is really possible for a British Evangelical fully to enter into the mind of a German Existentialist; the

premises from which they set out are so completely different. Dr Hughes has certainly tried, but his attitude throughout is critical of Bultmann, who has 'permitted his zeal to carry him to such extremes that the Christian message has been robbed of its essential content'. As a statement of a conservative position this lecture is in many ways quite excellent, and it affords some acute criticisms of Bultmann's attitude, but for a balanced view the reader would do well to ponder the words of Professor Ian Henderson, that Bultmann rejects the mythological 'because, as he sees it, it does not do justice to the supernatural, that is, to the eschatological fact of Jesus Christ'. Professor Henderson's *Myth in the New Testament* is curiously not taken into account by Dr Hughes.

The Lecture in Biblical Archaeology was delivered by Professor F. F. Bruce, who in his preface wisely disclaims 'anything like finality' for any pronouncement on the Qumran Scrolls. The lecture itself is a careful and judicious study, although (perhaps inevitably) it does not seem to reach any very definite conclusions. Professor Bruce has concerned himself with the Scrolls for some years past, and his familiarity both with the texts and with the latest literature is evident on every page. Experts who hold other views will no doubt find much to criticise, but this paper may be commended as a genuine contribution to the study of the Scrolls. It may (or may not) be relevant to draw attention to 2 Peter 2.5, where Noah is described as the 'herald of righteousness'.

Mr Stibbs is aware of being 'orthodox'. He writes with a complacently self-conscious dogmatism which demands the exercise of a considerable patience and restraint on the part of the reader. This is the more unfortunate in that he has some useful things to say on such modern trends as the attempt by some writers to substitute a theology of the Incarnation for one of Redemption. It may be added that a knowledge of the history of the NT Canon would have saved Mr Stibbs some questionable statements, and that the Greek of 2 Tim. 3.16 admits of two translations (see R.S.V. margin). In view of Mr Stibbs' conception of infallibility, it would be of interest to have his explanation of Mark 2.26 (cf. 1 Sam. 21).

R. McL. Wilson

Meditations from Kierkegaard. By T. H. Croxall. James Nisbet and Co. 12s. 6d.

Kierkegaard Commentary. By T. H. Croxall. James Nisbet and Co. 25s.

About a score of Kierkegaard's books are now available in English. Probably the best approach to his personality and thought is a combined use of his Journals (translated and edited by Alexander

Dru) and the definitive biography by Dr Walter Lowrie. He was a somewhat abnormal personality, and his writing is often obscure, involved and woolly—'a puzzling and difficult writer who cannot be understood without patience', as the first sentence of the second book under review admits—'and exceedingly fond of mystification'. It may well be asked if many people have ever taken quite kindly to the term 'existential' which we owe to Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, his work, accomplished in a life of forty-two years, has introduced a profound and decisive ferment into theological thought, especially in the last generation.

This book of 'Meditations' ought to be specially serviceable to readers desiring a first introduction to Kierkegaard. Its material for the most part has not been published before. It is made up of some seventy meditations, the great majority of them from the life of our Lord, the Sermon on the Mount, and the parables and miracles. In each case a Scripture passage is given, followed by brief selections and prayers from Kierkegaard's pen. Especially for devotional purposes it is an enriching collection; and the price is moderate.

The 'Commentary' is designed to clarify the actual text of Kierkegaard's works; and to describe his plan, aims and methods. How his books appeared, stage by stage, is carefully expounded. Almost inevitably, this is a crowded book, a little heavy but never confused. Dr Croxall is recognised as one of the world's most outstanding and understanding scholars in this field of study.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Gospel of Suffering. By SÖREN KIERKEGAARD. Translated by A. S. ALDWORTH and W. S. FERRIE. James Clarke, London. Pp. 150. 10s. 6d.

THIS is a translation of Part 3 of *Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits* (13th March 1847) which is described by Kierkegaard as the 'religious' part of the volume (see *Papirer* VIII A 15f). Aldworth and Ferrie thus complete their translation of this volume and offer the first translation to be published in Britain of a work already published in America—they published Part 1 in 1937 under the title *Purify Your Hearts* and Part 2 in 1940 under the title *Consider the Lilies*, and the Swensons published Parts 2 and 3 in 1948.

The first point I would like to make about the book is concerned with the translation of the title—*Opbyggelige Taler i Forskellig Aand.* Aldworth and Ferrie translate 'i forskellig aand' as 'in a different vein'. They remark in the introduction that the phrase can mean not only this but also 'in different veins'. It seems to me that they should first establish that it can mean 'in a different vein' before

inviting us to be persuaded by their reasons for choosing this rendering, for I do not see how it can be thought that the phrase could mean 'in a different vein'. This has nothing whatever to do with the way in which we look at these discourses, but is simply a matter of determining whether a translation is admissible, and it is quite clear that it is not. Moreover, their reason for adopting this rendering is also open to question, since, as we noted above, Kierkegaard describes the three parts as respectively aesthetical, ethical and religious. It is indeed true to say, as the translators do, that Kierkegaard 'now sought to be not only edifying but definitely religious and that in a specifically Christian way', but it is the third part, these seven discourses, that is subtitled 'A Christian Discourse'. The trilogy as a whole is 'i forskellig aand', of a varied tenor (to borrow Steere's translation), simply because the discourses are, as the evidence from the *Papirer* shows, in different moods. I have laboured this point not to suggest that the translation of the book is faulty but rather because the translation of the title which is given misrepresents Kierkegaard's dialectical method. Indeed the translation seems on the whole to be very satisfactory and the eloquence of these discourses is very well brought out.

The theme of the seven discourses is the joyful message of the triumph of faith. What Kierkegaard is trying to do is to show the relation between guilt, suffering and faith, and the paradox he expounds is that there is joy involved in the task of following Christ, that is in taking up the Cross. A parallel paradox is the Lutheran *peccator simul justus*, and it is possible that Kierkegaard is indebted to Luther for this insight into the metaphysical character of theological language. This is not to deny that he gained this new string to his instrument as a result of the 'tension of reality' as he himself tells us (*Papirer* X A 138, cf. VIII A 143). Thus there is tremendous pathos in these discourses written as they were in the year following the attack made on Kierkegaard by the *Corsair*. This attack isolated him and the wounds it inflicted were deep. However, his profound suffering had positive effects and one such is seen in these discourses. To read them in this light is to learn the wonder of the gracious education in obedience which Kierkegaard experienced in these years, and to learn this is to have our eyes opened to the way in which the existential problem of suffering is posed and answered.

I cannot do anything resembling justice to Kierkegaard in these comments on the book, because this Christian discourse makes me a bundle of rags left at my own doorstep. Again, the sheer eloquence of the discourses makes it difficult to describe their content briefly. We should perhaps not do it an injustice if we said that another title for the book would be 'Encouraged by Joy—in Suffering'. We are

led into an understanding of what it means to be a follower of Christ. 'In life there is one blessed joy: to follow Christ, and in death there is one final blessed joy: to follow Christ into Life.' So Kierkegaard teaches the language of faith, that difficult way of speaking which brings together such different words as light and burden. Kierkegaard's superb psychological description is seen in his masterly account of a lover and a guilty beloved. From this we learn the joy in the thought that before God we are always guilty. The final discourse is a passionate expression of Kierkegaard's own great courage in conflict.

I have remarked that Kierkegaard's understanding of the non-empirical character of religious language may be connected with Luther. Be that as it may, there is no denying the power of his point as he makes it with even greater clarity in his discourse on guilt. Particularly significant, I think, is his assertion (pp. 89-90) that our fundamental guilt is eternal. Here is a clear understanding of what the religious man means. Assertions about God's activity are not descriptive statements, and in the same way assertions about ourselves with reference to God are not descriptive. Before God I am eternally guilty. But this is very different from saying: 'I am guilty of the murder of Mr X.' This example must suffice to illustrate how very rewarding a sympathetic but critical or analytic study of this little book can be. There may still be people who are not convinced of Kierkegaard's tremendous importance. If they read this book carefully they will doubt no longer.

J. Heywood Thomas

Early Medieval Theology—The Library of Christian Classics, vol. IX. Translated and edited by George E. McCracken and Allen Cabaniss. S.C.M. Press, 1957. 35s.

This particular volume admirably fulfils the aim of the series, namely to supply an accurate English translation of some of the most significant Christian treatises which were written before the end of the sixteenth century. Many students lack the knowledge of Latin and Greek which would enable them to read the original texts and in addition, the originals are not easy to obtain. This especially applies to the study of Christian theology before the twelfth century. There were some translations of specific works published in the nineteenth century but most of these have for a long time been out of print. Hence the relevance of this volume.

An anthology of this kind depends upon a wise selection of texts and the translators are to be congratulated on their choice. Similar collections have concentrated on commentaries on Holy Scripture or on dogmatic theology. One of the interesting features of this

anthology is the inclusion of treatises dealing with pastoral theology. Each selection is preceded by a scholarly introduction of the writer's life, his teaching and the influence he exercised upon succeeding generations of theologians. The treatises are grouped under the following headings: The Nature of Divine Truth; God's Word in Holy Scripture; the Voice of the Preacher and the Ideal of the Priesthood.

The first selection consists of the Commonitory of Vincent of Lérins. Strictly speaking, it is the work of a younger contemporary of St. Augustine and hence belongs to the last stage of the classical age. If not actually medieval, Vincent can be included quite justly as an important precursor. His description of the Catholic faith as that 'which has been believed everywhere, always, and by all men', has often been quoted. His influence upon the leaders of the English Reformation was considerable. Thus in his examination by the Bishop of Lincoln, Ridley replied that he had always been guided by the excellent rule of Vincent of Lérins: 'Where one part of the Church is infected with heresy, to prefer the whole before that part; and if the greatest part of the Church be corrupted, to prefer the doctrines of the ancient Church, to those of the present.'

The focus of theological interest during the Carolingian era was the controversies which centred upon the doctrines of predestination and the Eucharist. Philosophy was called in to supplement the arguments of theologians. The Saxon monk Gottschalk, an earnest student of Augustine, was attracted by the more pessimistic aspects of his theology and in his writings espoused a view which was similar to that of Calvin in the sixteenth century. Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims called upon the help of Scotus Erigena, the leading philosopher of the day, to confute Gottschalk. Erigena published his answer in 851. He was influenced by his study of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and used the doctrine that evil is not a real being to demolish the argument of Gottschalk. The result was that Erigena's refutation was as obnoxious to the orthodox as the views of his opponent. In this volume, the selections from the Reply to the Three Letters, often attributed to Remigius, are concerned with the question of predestination. Scottish readers may be interested to know that the Synod of Valence, 855, condemned Erigena's effort as 'Scots' porridge' (pultes Scotorum).

The Eucharistic controversy started with the treatise of Radbertus of Corbie on the Lord's Body and Blood. Radbertus, possibly an adherent of the philosophical doctrine of extreme realism, took a materialistic view of the Real Presence which was later formulated and elaborated by Peter Lombard in the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Ratramnus, a monk of the same abbey, replied by a treatise

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of the same title in which he advocated an anti-realist attitude towards the Sacrament. A translation of Ratramnus is provided in full. Erigena seems to have written a treatise on similar lines but it is not now extant. The importance of Ratramnus in the sixteenth century lies in the fact that his treatise was studied by Ridley and Cranmer and was one of the influences which went to form the Anglican doctrine of the Eucharist.

Several of the selections in this volume appear in English dress for the first time. Thus Guibert of Nogents' 'How to Make a Sermon' is an interesting plea for the necessity of preaching, though it does not conform to his title which leads the reader to expect a discussion of the methods applicable to the composition of a sermon. Ivo of Chartres, a younger contemporary of Peter Abelard, is usually known as one of the most famous canon lawyers of the middle Ages. His sermons are not so well known. Two examples, that on the Lord's Prayer and the other on the Apostles' Creed, are included in this anthology.

Perhaps the most interesting selections are those which deal with the pastoral work of the clergy. The anonymous 'Address to the Clergy' and the 'Precepts to Priests' of Theodulph of Orléans represent the ideal of the priesthood as understood by the medievals. The final selection from Bede's *Ecclesiastical History* gives an account of St. Aidan, the ideal appearing in actuality. Although generally known as the Venerable Bede, he is now accorded the grade of Sanctus in the Roman Kalendar.

This volume is tastefully bound and its clear print and good quality paper make it delightful to handle. It is strongly recommended to theological students and to all interested in the life and thought of the Middle Ages. S. J. Curtis

Wille und Wandlung. Die Grundlinien der Theologie Johann Heinrich August Ebrards. By Professor Dr Paul Jacobs. Zwingli-Verlag, Zürich, 1955. Swiss Fr. 10.00.

In this little work, Paul Jacobs, professor of reformed dogmatics at the university of Münster, gives a clear summary and criticism of the theological life-work of Ebrard (1818-88), reformed theologian, dealing chiefly with dogmatics (in Erlangen und Zürich), Church leader (in Speyer), linguist and author, and—in his old age—minister of the French Reformed Congregation in Erlangen. The first pages of the book complain that Ebrard has been unjustly overlooked by the theologians of our time (including K. Barth!) and that he has not received due recognition in theological literature. However, in reading this account of Ebrard's theology, one can understand why his name has been so quickly forgotten. In his

concepts, Ebrard, the great critic of Schweizer and D. F. Strauss, lives between the time of Hegel and the romantic movement, on the one hand, and the climax of the scientists' self-consciousness, at the end of the nineteenth century, on the other hand. He himself still proceeds along the lines of Schleiermacher and tries to bring about a theology of the 'Union', i.e. the compromise between the Calvinists and Lutherans, especially in regard to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. Nevertheless, he tends to recover all the central and essential truths of the Reformation on the basis of verbal inspiration and the so-called orthodoxy. Moreover, he tries to transpose these doctrines into the idiom of the nineteenth century. From Calvin, whose pupil he is in all other respects, he differs fundamentally in rejecting the doctrine of predestination. Influenced by Melanchthon's theology, he sympathises with Coccejus and reduces *praedestinatio* to *praescientia Dei*. His central idea, God's transfiguration in the world, helps him to study *metanoia*, rebirth, and the problem how far the human will plays a part in a man's conversion.

Undoubtedly, our generation can learn a good deal by Jacobs' brief account of Ebrard's theology. Although he makes no mention of eschatology, Ebrard's ideas can provide material for the ecumenical discussion on this subject as well as for the studies of the history of the relations between Christological theology and idealistic anthropology. P. Jacobs succeeds in rousing the reader's sympathy for the work and personality of Ebrard, his tolerance (except towards Schweizer and Strauss), and mediation between the denominations. The style of the booklet does not always make for easy reading. Besides, the author does not give the reader enough information about his own views concerning rebirth and predestination and leaves him in the dark about his attitude towards Calvin's doctrine. (On p. 41 a mistake has slipped in: Ebrard did not reach the age of eighty, but only seventy years.) D. Ritschl

The Westminster Formularies in Irish Presbyterianism (Carey Lectures 1954-6). By John M. Barkley. Pp. 97. 10s.

This is a most valuable publication, albeit in pamphlet form, rich in understanding of the history and doctrine of Irish Presbyterianism and dealing, by no means incidentally with its foundations in the Scottish mother Church.

We are already in Professor Barkley's debt for his paper on 'The Meaning of Ordination' (*SJT*, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 135ff), and this pamphlet reveals again his conciseness of mind and historical perception. He begins his study of each of the Westminster Formularies with a survey of its influence on and its importance in Scotland and leads his readers through the history of doctrine (as he deals with

'The Confession of Faith'), of worship (as he deals with the 'Directory'), and of Church Government (as he deals with the 'Form' and 'Directory for Ordination') in Ireland since 1647. We have in effect a history of the Irish Presbyterian Church, illustrated copiously within the limits of space from Session and Presbytery records.

The first paper considers in detail the question of the 'Confession of Faith' used as a test of orthodoxy and in the formulae of subscription at ordination in Scotland and in Ireland. The second tells of the Ulster and Secession Synods and then the fascinating story of the machinations of Duncan Chisholm, alias George Matthews, and the Presbytery of Munster.

The next sections deal with Public Worship, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, when perhaps Professor Barkley is too ready to blame the 'Brownists' for every 'deforming' of earlier Reformed worship. Other influences were at work and some changes were expedient and non-doctrinal. Besides, reaction to court-inspired ritual had not only an effect on the formation of the 'Directory' but also lasting results in over-simplicity and even drabness in the public worship of God.

Ireland followed Scottish practice generally though not slavishly. In some cases the tendency was to be more faithful to the 'Directory' and at the present time there is more conservatism of traditional features.

Lectures VI and VII on Church Order and Ordination are full of information, historical and doctrinal, and clear-cut comment on the nature and values of Presbyterianism. All who think ecumenically would do well to study again the thought-forms crystallised in the Westminster Formularies and Professor Barkley's summary of their influence in Ireland.

The last lecture has much to say on catechising in general as a method of teaching, and on the Longer and Shorter Catechisms in particular. Once again as in every section of this most helpful pamphlet, the reader has the feeling that the lecturer is dealing historically, theologically and practically with great issues before the Church today, and witnessing to a great tradition which must ever be appreciated anew and never underestimated in consideration of the shape of the Church in the days to come.

A. Ian Dunlop

The Bridges of God. By Donald A. McGavran. World Dominion Press. 7s. 6d.

The author of this bold study in the strategy of missions has been a missionary in India for more than thirty years, and the son of missionaries. He is undoubtedly well abreast of missionary problems,

well read in the history of missions; and he is able to write with a lucidity and pungency which challenge. In introducing the book, Professor K. S. Latourette describes it as 'one of the most important books on missionary methods that has appeared in many years'.

All the Churches and missionary societies have of recent times been engaged in a thorough scrutiny of the policy, strategy and even theology of missions; and several highly important reports have been published. All this was necessary because of the success and also of the failure of modern missions. New, indigenous Churches had come into being everywhere as a result of missionary activity; and the relationship of Church and Mission was an urgent problem. The rise of new nations, the ferment of nationalism, the urge to self-government, the distrust of the older nations and Churches, the spread of literacy, the pressures of modern materialism—all these called for this fresh examination. As this discussion proceeds and vital decisions are faced, Mr McGavran's book is bound to receive a great deal of attention and, as he anticipates, some criticism and opposition.

The argument of the book is that, while missionary work has been in several ways a big work, the results are relatively small; and he attributes this mainly to an overlooking of what is essential to making a people Christian. Conversion there must be, but there has been too much extracting of individuals from their community. What is all-important is that Christian advance should proceed by 'a People's Movement', and it is agreed that this is the New Testament pattern, that it was Paul's way, and that Christendom arose mainly out of such group-movements. On the other hand, the nineteenth century, 'the Great Century' of Latourette's study, followed a very different method and became the period of 'great separateness'. Everything from then onwards was dominated by the 'mission station' approach —'gathered churches', with large institutions attached, the converts separate from their relatives, and madly keen on education. This latter method is 'the beach-head' method, while the former is 'the break-through'. A new pattern is now demanded—'the Message of the Lord; His Chariot is the People's Movement'. Such strong words appear as 'Under the present strategy, Christian leaders tend to think of missions as a conglomerate mass of mixed chicken-raising, evangelism, medicine, loving service, educational illumination, and better farming out of which, sometime and somehow, a Christian civilisation will arise!'; and the Willingen conference of missionary leaders is accused of vagueness. Tables are included to show at a glance the benefits of the method that is so strenuously argued for.

The present reviewer was for a number of years the Convener of the Church of Scotland's Foreign Mission Committee, and he has

been familiar with all these issues. Much of what Mr McGavran pleads for is in process of being secured in the new relations of integration between Church and Mission being applied everywhere. Few of the great pioneers of missions failed to see that ultimate changes of a far-reaching character would be necessary. Is not the basic contrast of this book too sharp? Is it theologically sound to describe education and medicine as 'secondary aims'? Is not the old distinction between direct and indirect evangelism an unsound one? Does not man's whole life belong to God and require to be consecrated? In the world into which we are moving, the Church certainly cannot hope that its schools and hospitals will exert such an influence as hitherto they have done. It is an error to suggest that the true ends of missionary service have not been served by schools, hospitals and other institutions. Many well-tried missionaries claim that two out of every three converts have in the past been secured by these operations. It must not be easily assumed that, freed from much of this work, the Church of the future will find it easier to proceed with its proper task. If that proper task is nothing less than the winning of all life for Christ, it is not to be made easier but more difficult by present trends. An experience in the West of the impotence of a Church disintegrated from the other aspects of the people's life should give us pause. Moreover, the depth of the life of the Christians gathered in People's Movements has not yet been as impressive as this book implies. GEORGE S. GUNN

Smoke on the Mountain. By JOY DAVIDMAN. Hodder and Stoughton. 7s. 6d.

THERE are dozens of books on the Ten Commandments, but this one will hold its place among them. It is alive and challenging, uncommonly well written so that none will grow weary while reading it, and full of thought. The Decalogue is described as 'a shining rainbow bridge stretching between earth and heaven', and the undying, universal element in the Decalogue, in the original setting of Israel's history and now in its world-wide application, is powerfully brought out.

The writer is of Jewish ancestry and has progressed by a varied spiritual pilgrimage from early agnosticism through Communism to enthusiastic membership of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America. It is fitting that C. S. Lewis, himself an adult convert to Christianity, should write a characteristic foreword.

It is indeed a grim picture which Miss Davidman sees of our world—idolatry of many man-made idols, superstition, belief in magic, broken families, ever bigger lies, and many-headed materialism. Beneath it all is the sin of fear to which the opening chapter is

given, leading to perversions of the true gospel. Where so much of all this is disseminated in print, she holds that the illiterate are almost fortunate. Occasionally the argument is just a little too drawn out, and the words too polished. There are sentences which, when carefully examined, reveal absurdly sharp antithesis of the kind a popular journalist or a not very well trained preacher tends to employ. At times we wonder if the exception is not taken as the normal. Some readers will feel that the references to the Puritans (pp. 37-38, 50; but cf. p. 51) lack balance. The two references to the Kirk in Scotland (pp. 46 and 54) are too compressed to be just. Many non-pacifists will feel that what is said of the pacifist (p. 72) is less than fair. The irony of the description of the modern Sunday (pp. 48-50) is brilliant and in large measure true.

'To be Christian is to be reborn, and free, and unafraid, and immortally young.' So there is only one cure for the diseases which have been so incisively diagnosed; and the last chapter is given to the 'Light of Light'. Miss Davidman falls into the common error of describing 'Love God and your neighbour as yourself' as *Christ's* commandment, whereas in fact, in Mat. 22.37-40, He is linking together two parts of the old Jewish law, as the high water mark of Old Testament morality. The new commandment for Christians is 'love one another as I have loved you' (John 13.34)—a text not quoted at all in the last chapter, though the substance of the chapter is sound. This is the bond of the Christian fellowship, and it is only this which will make Christian witness irresistible. Neither the second part of the old commandment nor the still higher standard of the new commandment is possible except for those who are 'in Christ'.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Temple of Jerusalem. By ANDRÉ PARROT. S.C.M. Press, London 1957. Pp. 112. 9s. 6d.

Golgotha and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. By ANDRÉ PARROT S.C.M. Press, London, 1957. Pp. 127. 10s. 6d.

THE first little book, no. 5 in the series 'Studies in Biblical Archaeology', is the English version of *Le Temple de Jérusalem*, brought out by the learned *conservateur* of the Louvre in 1954 and now translated for the use of English students by Beatrice Hooke. Like other volumes in the same series, it is intended less for the specialist (who may nevertheless find useful matter here) than for the student or interested general reader, to whom it offers a succinct introduction. This purpose it fulfils very well, since in five chapters, followed by a bibliography, it deals in turn with the temple of Solomon, the projected temple of Ezekiel, the Second Temple, Herod's Temple, and the succeeding Haram esh-Sherif. A fair number of plates and line

drawings help in offering a vivid picture of the building and its furnishings at various times. The book is based mainly on the older 'standard' works: more recent reconstructions, like those by Vincent in the second part of *Jérusalem de l'Ancien Testament*, or the suggestions by Yadin and Avi-Yonah in *Sepher Yerushalayim* (1956), were apparently too late for consideration in this edition. The latter shows, however, both in footnotes and bibliography, some revisions undertaken since the original French version came out.

The translation is vivid and idiomatic, and there are only a few minor blemishes in the book: the figure, V on p. 30, is upside down; on p. 41 read the Aegean for Egea.

The second book is the English version of *Golgotha et Saint-Sépulchre*, and no. 6 in the series 'Studies in Biblical Archaeology'. It is a slender volume which aims at giving a general introduction to the various problems, archaeological, topographical, and otherwise, connected with the present building which is also briefly described. There are four chapters: I, the Archaeological problem of the Holy Sepulchre; II, the traditional site; III, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; and IV, Tombs and Burials in Ancient Jerusalem. There follow a short bibliography and a list of abbreviations, and the book is illustrated by plates and line drawings.

The book brings a good general introduction to the points which have so long caused discussion about the historical claims of the present Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and an outline of the development of the building. The author's interest centres on the earlier stages and the holy places, and the medieval building receives a very short treatment only. The book largely follows Vincent and Abel: English readers might like a reference to the relevant chapter in J. W. Crowfoot's *Early Churches in Palestine*, besides W. H. Harvey's survey of the medieval building.

The translation (by Edwin Hudson) is good and idiomatic (but on p. 39, note 3, the English spelling should be Ras esh-Shaqqa; and p. 64, note 1, gives 5 piastres as about 10s. which is hardly right). Some of the photos on plates have not come out very well—no. 10 in particular fails to give a real impression. In spite of such minor points the book can perform a very useful service for those to whom it is addressed.

B. S. J. Isserlin

Spätjudisch-häretischer und frühchristlicher Radikalismus (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 24). By Herbert Braun. J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1957. 2 vols., pp. 163, 153. DM. 36.

In some recent literature on the Dead Sea Scrolls there has been an unfortunate tendency to draw far-reaching conclusions from quite inadequate evidence, or indeed from none at all. For the authors of

such studies, and possibly also for their readers, this book should be compulsory reading. It might not convince them of the error of their ways, but it would certainly demonstrate that the question of the relation between the Scrolls and primitive Christianity is much more complex than would appear upon a superficial view.

The author's method is to study the Scrolls in themselves, against the background of official Judaism as represented by *Aboth* I-IV. The basis for the investigation is provided by the Manual of Discipline and the Habakkuk Scroll, to which have been added the Damascus document and the accounts of the Essenes in Philo and Josephus. The results thus obtained in the first volume are then applied in an examination of the Synoptic tradition in the second. The five chapters of the first volume are each divided into three sections, in which the document under review is examined first in regard to the degree of strictness which it requires in observance of the Torah, secondly in regard to certain particular aspects (ritual, property, treatment of one's neighbour, martyrdom, etc.), and finally for the views held as to the relations of God and man. The study of the Gospel material in the second volume deals with the same three themes in greater detail, each section being expanded into a chapter of several divisions. The book is marked throughout by a wealth of detailed references and cross-references, and each volume is provided with an extensive index. It may be indeed that the index of Greek and Hebrew words will prove to be among the most valuable parts of the book, since it affords a key to the footnotes, which provide almost a concordance to the usage of the various texts.

This is not an easy book to read (the author thinks of the reader as having the relevant Greek and Hebrew texts open before him as he works), and it may prove most useful as a work of reference: but no one who works through these volumes can fail to profit in a deeper understanding of the problems with which they deal—although it may be that he will not always agree with the author's conclusions. It is in fact a guarantee of reliability that so often one wonders if another view is not possible on the evidence presented.

One possible line of criticism is that the basis appears to be somewhat narrow, since only a few of the documents now published have been used; but to work through all that have appeared on such a scale as this would be the labour of years. Again, some may wish to question the use of *Aboth* I-IV as normative, for the Judaism of the first two centuries was much more complex than appears to be allowed. And again, the second volume seems to depend too much on Bultmann's *Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition.* Some statements as to what is primary, what secondary, would not be generally accepted. Finally, some footnotes might have been better as appen-

dices (e.g. in the second volume note 1 to p. 46 ends on p. 53!); and at least once a note refers the reader to another page—where he is referred back to the earlier passage. These criticisms however do not alter the fact that this is a very thorough and careful study, and one which deserves serious attention. R. McL. WILSON

Martin Bucer's Liturgical Ideas. The Strasburg Reformer and his Connection with the Liturgies of the Sixteenth Century. By G. J. VAN DE POLL. Assen, 1954. Pp. 179. Cloth, *ca.* 23s.

MARTIN BUCER was one of the leading figures of the sixteenth century, and in recent years students have become more appreciative of his importance and of his influence upon his contemporaries. It may be that his conciliatory outlook—he has been called *indefessus conciliator et pacis instaurator*—made him less noticeable than others of his time. But the need for a carefully annotated edition of his writings has become more clearly recognised, and now this need is being met by the series of his *Opera Latina* which is being published with French translation. Various studies of his ideas and ideals have also appeared, and the present volume will prove to be one of the most useful of these.

Dr van de Poll has broken new ground or at least has delved more deeply than any predecessor in the same field. He makes clear the great liturgical importance of Bucer, not only in his own Strasburg, but also in Hesse, Cologne and England, not only because of his own liturgical work but also in connexion with that of Farel, Calvin, Poullain and others.

The book opens with a short study of the liturgical reformation in Strasburg, and passes to Bucer's share in that reformation, with a careful study of the liturgies of 1537 and 1539. The third chapter is of great value, considering Bucer's liturgical ideas in the light of his theology under six heads—the Church, the Office (i.e. the Ministry), the Service of the Word, the Holy Supper, Holy Baptism, and Confirmation. While these are all of the greatest interest, the sections on the Ministry and on Confirmation (of which Bucer approved) are particularly so in view of present-day discussion. The fourth chapter contains a detailed study of the connexion of Bucer and the Strasburg liturgy with the sixteenth-century liturgies. The last part of this chapter contains an all too brief summary of Bucer's influence and a few concluding remarks on his significance.

This outline will give an idea of the scope of this treatise. One of its valuable features is the quotation of texts in the original Latin or old German, though the fact that many of these are not translated may to some extent lessen its usefulness for the general reader. Another is the emphasis upon the theological-liturgical relationship

in Bucer's thinking. The author sets forth Bucer's four foundation principles for public worship—the Bible, for the Word of God must be examined and put into practice; the sense of community; the operation of the Holy Spirit; and the rule of Christian liberty. These principles which have their obvious theological background, should be kept in view 'if we would not understand him one-sidedly for lack of any system in his writings' (p. 17). Again, Bucer regarded congregational singing as of first importance. 'To Bucer the Church is built round the hymn' (p. 31). The author describes the development which led to the issue of his *Gesangbuch* in 1541, and it is interesting that its purpose was to establish a greater uniformity in Church singing. Each parish had had its own hymn-book, but uniformity was not reached till the *Grosskirchengesangbuch* came out in 1560. Special mention should also be made of the apparatus of references which is very full and most useful.

Many other points of interest might be noticed. It is unfortunate that there are so many printer's errors, and some mistakes even in the page references within the volume itself. But the book ought to be widely read, for it is of first importance for the history and the correlations of all the Reformation liturgies.

JOHN A. LAMB

The Eucharistic Prayer. A Study of the Canon Missae. By J. A. JUNGMANN, S.J. Challoner Publications, London, 1956. Pp. 55. Paper cover, 5s. net.

PROFESSOR JUNGMANN is the author of the great work *Missarum Sollemnia*, which it is surprising to see is mis-spelt in this little volume, and one must welcome the translation of these lectures on the Canon. They were given at a Liturgical Week for priests in 1952 and at a Liturgical Congress in 1953, and they may be regarded as an introduction to his larger works, indicating his main lines of thought.

The four lectures derive their titles from the Canon itself—*Memores*, *Offerimus*, *Plebs Sancta*, *Socia Exsultatione*. The first dwells on the idea of the Eucharist as a memorial of our Lord, and therefore on the importance of the historical acts of redemption, and on an effective remembering of them. These acts become effective for us sacramentally by means of the sacred signs, and also through the reflection and calling to mind by Christian people of the redemption-facts. This involves a personal relationship with God. The Canon speaks of remembering not only the Death on the Cross, but also the Resurrection and the Ascension, and this is essential to the realisation of the whole salvation-drama.

This lecture deals also with the Thanksgiving and its relation to the service of the Word, and further on the importance of the reading

of the Word of God to the people. The Word should be read to them in an intelligible manner, in their own language, and directed to them, and then if occasion arises, developed and applied in the homily. It is indeed interesting to see how many Roman Catholic writers are emphasising the value of this exercise.

The second lecture deals with the nature of the sacrifice, which is regarded as the sacrifice of Christ and the sacrifice of the Church. The author feels that the second aspect has been under-emphasised in the past. There is a brief historical outline of the doctrine of the sacrifice.

The third chapter speaks of the Christian Ecclesia. The congregation, the *plebs sancta*, is the subject of the remembrance and the sacrifice. This is shown by the place which the people should have, though have often lost, in worship. The prayers of the service, as distinguished from the private prayers of the priest, are those of the people, and the chants of the Ordinary are the praises of the people. This involves a greater share in the service for the congregation. The basilican position is discussed without any very definite conclusion. The whole Eucharistic celebration is brought to its conclusion by the sacred meal—the *plebs sancta* drawn together and sanctified anew by the Bread of Heaven.

The last lecture speaks of the great joy shared in common. Jungmann says that the festive joy of social worship, though the emphasis is on its corporate character, yet 'tends to become so highly developed that it becomes a threat to the social character of the liturgy', and he applies this to the church building, to Church music, and to ceremonial. The second of these receives closest and fullest attention, and a warm welcome is given to the tendency for groups of young people to 'prefer to sing plain chant and straightforward hymns as opposed to the more artistic forms of musical culture'—a tendency which would be very welcome in other denominations than the Roman.

Altogether this is a valuable book which has much to say to clergy and people of any branch of the Christian Church.

JOHN A. LAMB